diff --git a/apps/edr-freight-api/src/common/request-log-context.spec.ts b/apps/edr-freight-api/src/common/request-log-context.spec.ts
index 403b1a137..e898cb930 100644
--- a/apps/edr-freight-api/src/common/request-log-context.spec.ts
+++ b/apps/edr-freight-api/src/common/request-log-context.spec.ts
@@ -65,10 +65,40 @@ describe("RequestLogMiddleware", () => {
       originalUrl: "/api/bookings/1/submit?dry=1",
       baseUrl: "/api/bookings",
       route: { path: "/:id/submit" },
-      headers: { "user-agent": "jest", "x-request-id": "req-42" },
+      headers: {
+        "user-agent": "jest",
+        "x-request-id": "req-42",
+        authorization: "Bearer tok",
+        "x-client-app": "freight-backoffice",
+        "current-project-id": "proj-3",
+      },
       ip: "10.0.0.1",
       query: { dry: "1" },
-      user: { id: "u-7" },
+      user: {
+        id: "u-7",
+        sessionId: "sess-9",
+        userType: "STAFF",
+        status: "ACTIVE",
+        username: "nati",
+        email: "nati@example.com",
+        phoneNumber: "0911000000",
+        name: { en: "Nati" },
+        roles: [{ key: "freight_operations" }],
+        permissions: [{ key: "a" }, { key: "b" }],
+        employee: {
+          id: "emp-1",
+          organizationId: "org-1",
+          unitId: "unit-2",
+          position: {
+            id: "pos-5",
+            key: "ops_officer",
+            employeePositionId: "ep-6",
+            isDelegate: true,
+            delegatorId: "pos-1",
+            positionType: { key: "operations" },
+          },
+        },
+      },
     };
     const res = {
       statusCode: 409,
@@ -105,6 +135,29 @@ describe("RequestLogMiddleware", () => {
       bookingId: "b-1",
       booking: { outcome: "REJECTED" },
     });
+    expect(JSON.parse(lines[0]).auth).toEqual({
+      authenticated: true,
+      hasBearer: true,
+      clientApp: "freight-backoffice",
+      userId: "u-7",
+      sessionId: "sess-9",
+      userType: "STAFF",
+      userStatus: "ACTIVE",
+      roles: ["freight_operations"],
+      permissionCount: 2,
+      employeeId: "emp-1",
+      organizationId: "org-1",
+      unitId: "unit-2",
+      positionId: "pos-5",
+      positionKey: "ops_officer",
+      positionType: "operations",
+      employeePositionId: "ep-6",
+      isDelegate: true,
+      delegatorId: "pos-1",
+      projectId: "proj-3",
+    });
+    // No personal data reaches the line, whatever the token carried.
+    expect(lines[0]).not.toMatch(/nati|example\.com|0911000000/);
     expect(res.setHeader).toHaveBeenCalledWith("x-request-id", "req-42");
     jest.restoreAllMocks();
   });
diff --git a/packages/api-common/src/logging/request-log.middleware.ts b/packages/api-common/src/logging/request-log.middleware.ts
index 5d9ead8b0..4144e72c8 100644
--- a/packages/api-common/src/logging/request-log.middleware.ts
+++ b/packages/api-common/src/logging/request-log.middleware.ts
@@ -20,7 +20,39 @@ interface LoggedRequest {
   headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
   ip?: string;
   query?: Record<string, unknown>;
-  user?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+  /** Set by the IAM JwtGuard AFTER this middleware runs — read at emit time. */
+  user?: AuthenticatedUser | null;
+  currentUnitId?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The subset of `TCurrentUser` (@tria-plc/api-common) the log line reads.
+ * Everything here is an identifier, a key or a status — the personal fields on
+ * that type (name, email, username, phoneNumber) are deliberately absent so
+ * they cannot be picked up by accident.
+ */
+interface AuthenticatedUser {
+  id?: string;
+  sub?: string;
+  userId?: string;
+  sessionId?: string;
+  userType?: string;
+  status?: string;
+  roles?: { key?: string }[];
+  permissions?: unknown[];
+  employee?: {
+    id?: string;
+    organizationId?: string;
+    unitId?: string;
+    position?: {
+      id?: string;
+      key?: string;
+      employeePositionId?: string;
+      isDelegate?: boolean;
+      delegatorId?: string;
+      positionType?: { key?: string };
+    };
+  };
 }
 
 interface LoggedResponse {
@@ -35,13 +67,48 @@ const header = (req: LoggedRequest, name: string): string | undefined => {
   return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
 };
 
-const userId = (req: LoggedRequest): string | undefined => {
+const userId = (req: LoggedRequest): string | undefined =>
+  req.user?.id ?? req.user?.sub ?? req.user?.userId;
+
+/**
+ * Who the caller was acting as — WITHOUT any personal data. Ids, role/position
+ * keys and statuses only: enough to answer "which desk did this", "was it a
+ * delegate", "which tenant", and to spot an authorization problem, with nothing
+ * that identifies the human behind the account beyond the opaque user id.
+ *
+ * `authenticated: false` with `hasBearer: true` is the signature of a rejected
+ * token (expired session, bad signature) as opposed to a missing one.
+ */
+const authContext = (req: LoggedRequest): Record<string, unknown> => {
   const user = req.user;
-  if (!user) return undefined;
-  const id = user.id ?? user.sub ?? user.userId;
-  return typeof id === "string" || typeof id === "number"
-    ? String(id)
-    : undefined;
+  const position = user?.employee?.position;
+  return {
+    authenticated: Boolean(user),
+    hasBearer: header(req, "authorization")?.startsWith("Bearer ") ?? false,
+    // Which frontend called — /auth/login rejects cross-audience credentials on it.
+    clientApp: header(req, "x-client-app"),
+    userId: userId(req),
+    sessionId: user?.sessionId,
+    userType: user?.userType,
+    userStatus: user?.status,
+    roles: user?.roles?.map((role) => role.key).filter(Boolean),
+    // Count only: the full grant list is hundreds of keys and would dwarf the line.
+    permissionCount: user?.permissions?.length,
+    employeeId: user?.employee?.id,
+    organizationId: user?.employee?.organizationId,
+    unitId: user?.employee?.unitId ?? req.currentUnitId,
+    positionId: position?.id,
+    positionKey: position?.key,
+    positionType: position?.positionType?.key,
+    employeePositionId: position?.employeePositionId,
+    // Acting on someone else's behalf — the first thing to check when a staff
+    // action lands under an unexpected desk.
+    isDelegate: position?.isDelegate,
+    delegatorId: position?.delegatorId,
+    // Tenant/scope headers the frontends send alongside the token.
+    projectId:
+      header(req, "current-project-id") ?? header(req, "x-current-project-id"),
+  };
 };
 
 /**
@@ -101,6 +168,9 @@ export class RequestLogMiddleware implements NestMiddleware {
           status,
           durationMs,
           userId: userId(req),
+          // Read at emit time on purpose: the guard populates req.user long
+          // after this middleware handed control on.
+          auth: authContext(req),
           ip: req.ip,
           userAgent: header(req, "user-agent"),
           query: