fix issue

This commit is contained in:
Marshal
2026-07-16 00:33:31 +00:00
parent 234a74e812
commit 41fe04652f
51 changed files with 1895 additions and 206 deletions

View File

@@ -793,17 +793,34 @@ export class ContractTransitionService {
const contract = await this.contractsService.findById(contractId);
if (dto.role === 'CUSTOMER') {
// H12(a): only the owning company's customer may sign — assert ownership
// before anything else (hidden as NotFound otherwise). A signing customer
// has no permission key, so this is the gate that binds the sign to the
// contract's company.
await this.contractsService.assertCustomerCanAccessContract(
options.signerUserId,
contract,
);
assertContractStatus(contract, ['CONTRACT_READY']);
const existing = await this.contractsRepository.findSignature(contractId, 'CUSTOMER');
if (existing) {
throw new BadRequestException('Customer has already signed this contract');
}
// Sudo-mode gate: a fresh, single-use OTP (SMS'd to the customer's phone)
// must be verified before the signature is applied.
if (!dto.otpPhone || !dto.otp) {
// Sudo-mode gate: a fresh, single-use OTP must be verified before the
// signature is applied. H12(b): verify against the CONTRACT COMPANY's
// registered phone — never the caller-supplied dto.otpPhone, which an
// attacker could point at their own phone to sign someone else's
// contract. The OTP is issued to the company's registered number.
const companyPhone = contract.company?.phone?.trim();
if (!companyPhone) {
throw new BadRequestException(
'The contract company has no registered phone on file to verify the signing OTP against',
);
}
if (!dto.otp) {
throw new BadRequestException('OTP verification is required to sign the contract');
}
await this.otpService.verifyOtpForAction({ phone: dto.otpPhone }, dto.otp);
await this.otpService.verifyOtpForAction({ phone: companyPhone }, dto.otp);
await this.applySignature(contract, dto, options);
await this.contractsRepository.update(contractId, {
status: 'SIGNED_CUSTOMER',