fix: normalized the region and logged the otp properly

This commit is contained in:
Nathnael
2026-07-20 08:19:59 +00:00
parent c7195f077a
commit a45e1008fa
18 changed files with 812 additions and 63 deletions

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { IsString, IsOptional, IsEmail, MaxLength, IsEnum } from 'class-validator';
import { IsString, IsOptional, IsEmail, MaxLength, IsEnum, IsIn } from 'class-validator';
import { ETHIOPIAN_REGIONS, type EthiopianRegion } from '@edr/types';
import { CompanyNationality } from '../entities/company.entity';
import { IsValidPhone } from '../../../common/validators/is-phone-number.validator';
import { IsTin } from '../../../common/validators/is-tin.validator';
@@ -138,10 +139,14 @@ export class UpdateProfileDto {
@MaxLength(50)
renewedTo?: string;
// Zone/woreda/kebele below stay free text: there is no authoritative dataset
// of Ethiopian zones/woredas/kebeles in the platform yet, and eTrade returns
// them uncoded. Only region is a closed set today.
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MaxLength(100)
region?: string;
@IsIn(ETHIOPIAN_REGIONS as unknown as string[], {
message: "region must be a recognised Ethiopian region",
})
region?: EthiopianRegion;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
ETradeCompanyInfo,
ETradeBusinessInfo,
CompanyRegistrationData,
normalizeRegion,
} from "@edr/types";
@Injectable()
@@ -108,7 +109,11 @@ export class ETradeService {
renewedFrom: businessInfo.RenewedFrom,
renewalDate: businessInfo.RenewalDate,
renewedTo: businessInfo.RenewedTo,
region: businessInfo.AddressInfo?.Region || "",
// eTrade returns uncoded uppercase text and sometimes a zone name in the
// Region slot. Map it onto the canonical list; an unresolved value yields
// "" so the form asks the user to pick rather than failing validation on
// save with a value they never typed.
region: normalizeRegion(businessInfo.AddressInfo?.Region) ?? "",
zone: businessInfo.AddressInfo?.Zone || "",
woreda: businessInfo.AddressInfo?.Woreda || "",
kebele: businessInfo.AddressInfo?.Kebele || "",

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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
import { ETHIOPIAN_REGIONS, normalizeRegion } from '@edr/types';
/**
* normalizeRegion lives in @edr/types (no jest there), but it exists to keep
* eTrade autofill from feeding UpdateProfileDto a region its @IsIn will reject.
* That contract is an API concern, so it is guarded here.
*/
describe('normalizeRegion', () => {
it('passes through every canonical region unchanged', () => {
for (const region of ETHIOPIAN_REGIONS) {
expect(normalizeRegion(region)).toBe(region);
}
});
it.each([
['ADDIS ABABA', 'Addis Ababa'],
['Addis ababa', 'Addis Ababa'],
[' addis ababa ', 'Addis Ababa'],
['oromoia', 'Oromia'],
['OROMIYA', 'Oromia'],
['gambella', 'Gambela'],
['TIGRAI', 'Tigray'],
['benishangul gumuz', 'Benishangul-Gumuz'],
])('resolves the variant %s', (input, expected) => {
expect(normalizeRegion(input)).toBe(expected);
});
it('maps a zone name in the region slot back to its parent region', () => {
// eTrade's own placeholder data does this — "EASTERN TIGRAY" is a zone.
expect(normalizeRegion('EASTERN TIGRAY')).toBe('Tigray');
expect(normalizeRegion('North Wollo')).toBe('Amhara');
});
it.each([
['a city, not a region', 'Arba Minch'],
['unknown text', 'Nowhere Land'],
['empty', ''],
['whitespace only', ' '],
['null', null],
['undefined', undefined],
])('returns null for %s rather than guessing', (_label, input) => {
expect(normalizeRegion(input as string | null | undefined)).toBeNull();
});
it('never returns a value outside the canonical set', () => {
const samples = ['ADDIS ABABA', 'oromoia', 'EASTERN TIGRAY', 'garbage', ''];
for (const s of samples) {
const out = normalizeRegion(s);
if (out !== null) {
expect(ETHIOPIAN_REGIONS).toContain(out);
}
}
});
});

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@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
// health.controller.ts
import { Controller, Get, HttpStatus, Res } from "@nestjs/common";
import { ApiOperation, ApiTags } from "@nestjs/swagger";
import { InjectDataSource } from "@nestjs/typeorm";
import { Public } from "@edr/api-common";
import { Response } from "express";
import { DataSource } from "typeorm";
import { EmailClientService } from "../notifications/email-client.service";
import { SmsClientService } from "../notifications/sms-client.service";
type CheckStatus = "ok" | "error" | "unknown";
/**
* Readiness normally stays green when only the broker is down.
*
* A 503 pulls the pod out of the load balancer, which would take booking,
* tracking and billing offline because SMS is unreachable — a strictly worse
* outcome than degraded notifications. The broker check is therefore reported,
* not enforced, and `READINESS_REQUIRES_BROKER=true` opts into hard-failing for
* deployments where a silent OTP black hole is the greater risk.
*/
const READINESS_REQUIRES_BROKER =
process.env.READINESS_REQUIRES_BROKER === "true";
@ApiTags("Health")
@Controller("health")
export class HealthController {
constructor(
@InjectDataSource()
private readonly dataSource: DataSource,
private readonly smsClient: SmsClientService,
private readonly emailClient: EmailClientService,
) {}
@Get()
@Public()
@ApiOperation({ summary: "Liveness probe" })
liveness() {
return { status: "ok", timestamp: new Date().toISOString() };
}
@Get("ready")
@Public()
@ApiOperation({
summary:
"Readiness probe — database plus SMS/email broker connectivity. Broker failures report as degraded unless READINESS_REQUIRES_BROKER=true.",
})
async readiness(@Res() res: Response) {
const startedAt = Date.now();
let database: { status: CheckStatus; latencyMs: number; error?: string };
try {
await this.dataSource.query("SELECT 1");
database = { status: "ok", latencyMs: Date.now() - startedAt };
} catch (error) {
database = {
status: "error",
latencyMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Unknown error",
};
}
// `null` from the client means the connection manager was not reachable
// through Nest's internals — surfaced as "unknown" so a shape change in
// @nestjs/microservices degrades to honest ignorance, not a false "ok".
const toStatus = (connected: boolean | null): CheckStatus =>
connected === null ? "unknown" : connected ? "ok" : "error";
const broker = {
sms: { status: toStatus(this.smsClient.brokerConnected) },
email: { status: toStatus(this.emailClient.brokerConnected) },
// Every OTP, and every booking/billing notification, publishes through
// these. `error` here means codes are being generated and silently dropped.
enabled: process.env.RABBITMQ_ENABLED !== "false",
};
const brokerDown =
broker.sms.status === "error" || broker.email.status === "error";
const failed =
database.status === "error" ||
(READINESS_REQUIRES_BROKER && brokerDown);
const status = failed ? "error" : brokerDown ? "degraded" : "ok";
return res
.status(failed ? HttpStatus.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE : HttpStatus.OK)
.json({
status,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
checks: { database, broker },
});
}
@Get("info")
@Public()
@ApiOperation({ summary: "App info — version, environment, uptime" })
info() {
return {
name: "edr-freight-api",
version: process.env.npm_package_version ?? "1.0.0",
environment: process.env.NODE_ENV ?? "development",
uptimeSeconds: Math.floor(process.uptime()),
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
};
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// health.module.ts
import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
import { HealthController } from "./health.controller";
import { NotificationsModule } from "../notifications/notifications.module";
@Module({
// NotificationsModule exports the SMS/email clients; the readiness probe reads
// their broker connection state rather than opening a second connection.
imports: [NotificationsModule],
controllers: [HealthController],
})
export class HealthModule {}

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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ClientProxy } from '@nestjs/microservices';
import { NEVER, Observable, throwError } from 'rxjs';
import { isBrokerConnected, publishConfirmed } from './broker.util';
/**
* `ClientProxy.emit()` returns a cold Observable that, for RMQ, completes without
* emitting once `dispatchEvent` settles — and rejects if the publish fails. These
* fakes reproduce each of those three shapes.
*/
function clientEmitting(source: Observable<unknown>): ClientProxy {
return { emit: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(source) } as unknown as ClientProxy;
}
describe('publishConfirmed', () => {
const logger = { error: jest.fn() } as unknown as Logger;
beforeEach(() => jest.clearAllMocks());
it('is true when the publish completes (broker confirmed)', async () => {
// Completes with no value — the success shape, and the case that throws
// EmptyError without a defaultIfEmpty.
const client = clientEmitting(new Observable<never>((s) => s.complete()));
await expect(publishConfirmed(client, 'send-sms', {}, logger)).resolves.toBe(true);
});
it('is false when the publish never settles, rather than hanging', async () => {
// A broker that is down: amqp-connection-manager buffers the publish and the
// promise would never resolve. The timeout is what stops one dead broker from
// hanging every caller of sendSms/sendEmail.
const client = clientEmitting(NEVER);
await expect(publishConfirmed(client, 'send-sms', {}, logger, 20)).resolves.toBe(
false,
);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('is false when the publish errors', async () => {
const client = clientEmitting(throwError(() => new Error('channel closed')));
await expect(publishConfirmed(client, 'send-email', {}, logger)).resolves.toBe(
false,
);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('isBrokerConnected', () => {
/** Stands in for `ClientProxy.unwrap()`, which returns the AmqpConnectionManager. */
function clientUnwrapping(manager: unknown): ClientProxy {
return { unwrap: () => manager } as unknown as ClientProxy;
}
it('reports the connection manager state', () => {
expect(isBrokerConnected(clientUnwrapping({ isConnected: () => true }))).toBe(
true,
);
expect(isBrokerConnected(clientUnwrapping({ isConnected: () => false }))).toBe(
false,
);
});
it('is false when unwrap throws — the client never connected', () => {
// ClientRMQ.unwrap() throws "Not initialized" while its internal client is
// null, which is what a failed boot-time connect leaves behind. That is a
// real down signal and must not be softened to "unknown".
const uninitialised = {
unwrap: () => {
throw new Error('Not initialized. Please call the "connect" method first.');
},
} as unknown as ClientProxy;
expect(isBrokerConnected(uninitialised)).toBe(false);
});
it('is null — not a guess — when the manager lacks isConnected or it throws', () => {
// Guards the health endpoint against reporting "ok" if amqp-connection-manager
// or Nest changes shape and the accessor we rely on disappears.
expect(isBrokerConnected(clientUnwrapping(null))).toBeNull();
expect(isBrokerConnected(clientUnwrapping({}))).toBeNull();
expect(
isBrokerConnected(
clientUnwrapping({
isConnected: () => {
throw new Error('boom');
},
}),
),
).toBeNull();
});
});

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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
// broker.util.ts
import { Logger } from "@nestjs/common";
import { ClientProxy } from "@nestjs/microservices";
import { defaultIfEmpty, lastValueFrom, timeout } from "rxjs";
/**
* How long to wait for a publisher confirm before giving up on a message.
*
* Load-bearing, not a nicety: when the broker is unreachable
* amqp-connection-manager buffers the publish and retries it on reconnect, so the
* underlying promise never settles. Without a bound, one dead broker turns every
* caller of sendSms/sendEmail into a hung request.
*/
export const PUBLISH_CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS = Number(
process.env.RABBITMQ_PUBLISH_TIMEOUT_MS ?? 5000,
);
/**
* Publish an event and wait for RabbitMQ to confirm it.
*
* `ClientProxy.emit()` returns a *cold* Observable. Called without subscribing —
* as this codebase did everywhere — nothing forces the publish to be observed, so
* the caller reports success whether or not the broker ever accepted the message.
* Awaiting it drives `dispatchEvent`, which resolves only once
* amqp-connection-manager's ChannelWrapper has a publisher confirm.
*
* So `true` here means the broker took ownership of the message. It still says
* nothing about the consumer, the SMS gateway, or delivery to a handset — those
* remain outside this process's knowledge.
*/
export async function publishConfirmed(
client: ClientProxy,
pattern: string,
payload: unknown,
logger: Logger,
timeoutMs: number = PUBLISH_CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS,
): Promise<boolean> {
try {
// `emit` completes without emitting a value, so lastValueFrom needs a default
// or it rejects with EmptyError on the success path.
await lastValueFrom(
client
.emit(pattern, payload)
.pipe(timeout(timeoutMs), defaultIfEmpty(undefined)),
);
return true;
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
`broker.publish.failed pattern='${pattern}' timeoutMs=${timeoutMs}: ${
error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
}`,
error instanceof Error ? error.stack : undefined,
);
return false;
}
}
/**
* Whether the client's connection manager currently believes it is connected.
*
* Uses `ClientProxy.unwrap()` — Nest's public accessor for the underlying
* transport client, which for `ClientRMQ` is the `AmqpConnectionManager`. Calling
* `connect()` instead cannot answer this: it resolves against a *disconnected*
* manager too, so it never distinguishes up from down.
*
* Three outcomes, deliberately distinct:
* - `false` when the manager reports disconnected, or when `unwrap()` throws
* because the client was never initialised (a failed boot-time connect leaves
* it null — genuinely down, not unknown);
* - `null` when the manager exists but has no `isConnected`, i.e. the library
* shape changed under us — the health endpoint reports "unknown" rather than
* quietly claiming health;
* - `true` only on an explicit positive from the manager.
*/
export function isBrokerConnected(client: ClientProxy): boolean | null {
let manager: unknown;
try {
manager = client.unwrap<unknown>();
} catch {
// "Not initialized. Please call the connect method first." — no connection
// was ever established, which is a real down signal, not an unknown one.
return false;
}
const probe = manager as { isConnected?: () => boolean } | null;
if (!probe || typeof probe.isConnected !== "function") return null;
try {
return probe.isConnected();
} catch {
return null;
}
}

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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
} from "@nestjs/common";
import { ClientProxy } from "@nestjs/microservices";
import { SendEmailDto } from "./dtos/email.dto";
import { isBrokerConnected, publishConfirmed } from "./broker.util";
@Injectable()
export class EmailClientService implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
@@ -33,19 +34,34 @@ export class EmailClientService implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
this.logger.warn(`RABBITMQ disabled — skipped EMAIL to=${dto.to}`);
return { queued: false };
}
this.emailClient.emit("send-email", {
to: dto.to,
subject: dto.subject,
text: dto.text,
html: dto.html,
appKey: "IFHCRS-LICENSE-MANAGEMENT",
});
// Fire-and-forget enqueue: confirms hand-off to RabbitMQ, NOT delivery.
const queued = await publishConfirmed(
this.emailClient,
"send-email",
{
to: dto.to,
subject: dto.subject,
text: dto.text,
html: dto.html,
appKey: "IFHCRS-LICENSE-MANAGEMENT",
},
this.logger,
);
// Publisher-confirmed: RabbitMQ has taken ownership of the message. Still NOT
// delivery — the consumer and the SMTP hop are downstream and invisible here.
this.logger.log(
`EMAIL queued to RabbitMQ [${process.env.EMAIL_QUEUE ?? "email_queue"}] pattern='send-email'`,
`EMAIL publish to RabbitMQ [${process.env.EMAIL_QUEUE ?? "email_queue"}] pattern='send-email' confirmed=${queued}`,
);
// Recipient + content are PII — debug only.
this.logger.debug(`EMAIL payload to=${dto.to} subject="${dto.subject}"`);
return { queued: true };
return { queued };
}
/**
* Connection state for the health endpoint. `null` means the broker client did
* not expose its manager — reported as "unknown" rather than assumed healthy.
*/
get brokerConnected(): boolean | null {
if (!this.enabled) return false;
return isBrokerConnected(this.emailClient);
}
}

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
} from "@nestjs/common";
import { ClientProxy } from "@nestjs/microservices";
import { BulkMessagesDto, SingleMessageDto } from "./dtos/sms.dto";
import { isBrokerConnected, publishConfirmed } from "./broker.util";
@Injectable()
export class SmsClientService implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ export class SmsClientService implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
constructor(
@Inject("SMS_SERVICE")
private smsClient: ClientProxy,
) {}
) { }
private readonly enabled = process.env.RABBITMQ_ENABLED !== "false";
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ export class SmsClientService implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
this.logger.log("connected to SMS service");
})
.catch((err) => {
console.error("Error happened at SMS service", err);
this.logger.error("Error happened at SMS service", err);
});
}
@@ -35,34 +36,61 @@ export class SmsClientService implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
this.logger.warn(`RABBITMQ disabled — skipped SMS`);
return { queued: false };
}
this.smsClient.emit("send-sms", {
to: dto.to,
text: dto.message,
appKey: "IFHCRS-LICENSE-MANAGEMENT",
});
// Fire-and-forget enqueue: confirms hand-off to RabbitMQ, NOT delivery.
const queued = await publishConfirmed(
this.smsClient,
"send-sms",
{
to: dto.to,
text: dto.message,
appKey: "IFHCRS-LICENSE-MANAGEMENT",
},
this.logger,
);
// Publisher-confirmed: RabbitMQ has taken ownership of the message. Still NOT
// delivery — the consumer, the SMS gateway and the carrier are all downstream
// of this and invisible from here.
this.logger.log(
`SMS queued to RabbitMQ [${process.env.SMS_QUEUE ?? "sms_queue"}] pattern='send-sms'`,
`SMS publish to RabbitMQ [${process.env.SMS_QUEUE ?? "sms_queue"}] pattern='send-sms' confirmed=${queued}`,
);
// Recipient + content are PII — debug only.
this.logger.debug(`SMS payload to=${dto.to} text="${dto.message}"`);
return { queued: true };
return { queued };
}
async sendBulkMessages(dto: BulkMessagesDto): Promise<{ queued: boolean }> {
if (!this.enabled) {
this.logger.warn(`RABBITMQ disabled — skipped BULK SMS (${dto.messages?.length ?? 0} messages)`);
this.logger.warn(
`RABBITMQ disabled — skipped BULK SMS (${dto.messages?.length ?? 0} messages)`,
);
return { queued: false };
}
const messages = (dto.messages ?? []).map((m) => ({ to: m.to, text: m.message, from: m.from }));
this.smsClient.emit("ozeking-bulk-sms", {
messages,
appKey: "IFHCRS-LICENSE-MANAGEMENT",
});
const messages = (dto.messages ?? []).map((m) => ({
to: m.to,
text: m.message,
from: m.from,
}));
const queued = await publishConfirmed(
this.smsClient,
"ozeking-bulk-sms",
{
messages,
appKey: "IFHCRS-LICENSE-MANAGEMENT",
},
this.logger,
);
this.logger.log(
`BULK SMS queued to RabbitMQ [${process.env.SMS_QUEUE ?? "sms_queue"}] pattern='ozeking-bulk-sms' count=${messages.length}`,
`BULK SMS publish to RabbitMQ [${process.env.SMS_QUEUE ?? "sms_queue"}] pattern='ozeking-bulk-sms' count=${messages.length} confirmed=${queued}`,
);
this.logger.debug(`BULK SMS payload messages=${JSON.stringify(messages)}`);
return { queued: true };
return { queued };
}
/**
* Connection state for the health endpoint. `null` means the broker client did
* not expose its manager — reported as "unknown" rather than assumed healthy.
*/
get brokerConnected(): boolean | null {
if (!this.enabled) return false;
return isBrokerConnected(this.smsClient);
}
}

View File

@@ -41,7 +41,13 @@ export class OtpController {
@Body("email")
email?: string
) {
return this.otpService.sendOtp(toTarget(phone, email));
// `delivered` stays server-side: this route is @Public(), and whether our
// broker accepted the publish is infrastructure state an anonymous caller has
// no need for. It is on the `otp.dispatch` log line instead.
const { success, message } = await this.otpService.sendOtp(
toTarget(phone, email)
);
return { success, message };
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

View File

@@ -11,8 +11,15 @@ describe('normalizeOtpTarget', () => {
expect(normalizeOtpTarget({ phone: '0712345678' }).phone).toBe('+251712345678');
});
it('passes email targets through untouched', () => {
expect(normalizeOtpTarget({ email: 'a@b.com' })).toEqual({ email: 'a@b.com' });
it('canonicalises email case and surrounding whitespace to one key', () => {
const forms = ['a@b.com', 'A@B.com', ' a@B.COM ', 'A@b.COM'];
const keys = forms.map((email) => normalizeOtpTarget({ email }).email);
expect(new Set(keys)).toEqual(new Set(['a@b.com']));
});
it('keeps an already-normalised email stable (idempotent)', () => {
const once = normalizeOtpTarget({ email: ' User@Example.COM ' }).email!;
expect(normalizeOtpTarget({ email: once }).email).toBe(once);
});
it('keeps an already-normalised number stable (idempotent)', () => {
@@ -40,8 +47,10 @@ describe('OtpService — send/verify agree across phone formats', () => {
rows.delete(row.phone ?? row.email!);
}),
};
const sms = { sendSms: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
const email = { sendEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
// Both clients return `{ queued }` — the service reads it to tell a published
// code apart from one the transport silently dropped.
const sms = { sendSms: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ queued: true }) };
const email = { sendEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ queued: true }) };
const service = new OtpService(repo as never, sms as never, email as never);
return { service, rows };
}
@@ -58,4 +67,16 @@ describe('OtpService — send/verify agree across phone formats', () => {
service.verifyOtpForAction({ phone: '0986680099' }, stored),
).resolves.toEqual({ success: true });
});
it('verifies a code sent to User@X.com when verify is called with user@x.com', async () => {
const { service, rows } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp({ email: ' User@Example.COM ' });
const stored = [...rows.values()][0]!.otp;
[...rows.values()][0]!.updatedAt = new Date();
await expect(
service.verifyOtpForAction({ email: 'user@example.com' }, stored),
).resolves.toEqual({ success: true });
});
});

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,18 @@ export type OtpTarget = { phone?: string; email?: string };
* Email targets pass through untouched.
*/
export function normalizeOtpTarget(target: OtpTarget): OtpTarget {
if (target.email || !target.phone) return target;
if (target.email) {
// Same contract as the phone branch below: the string stored on send and the
// one looked up on verify must be byte-identical, or the code is invisible to
// the verifier. Addresses reach us from a raw `@Body("email")` with no DTO or
// ValidationPipe, so `User@X.com`, `user@x.com` and a copy-paste with a
// trailing space are three different keys for one mailbox. Domains are
// case-insensitive (RFC 1035); local-parts are formally case-sensitive
// (RFC 5321 §2.4) but no mail provider in practice treats them so, and
// matching what users expect beats matching the letter of the spec here.
return { email: target.email.trim().toLowerCase() };
}
if (!target.phone) return target;
const raw = target.phone.trim();
const digits = raw.replace(/[^\d+]/g, '');
if (digits.startsWith('+')) return { phone: digits };
@@ -61,6 +72,9 @@ export class OtpService {
// Store under the canonical E.164 key so verify (which normalises the same
// way) always finds this row regardless of how either side typed the number.
const target = normalizeOtpTarget(rawTarget);
const channel = target.email ? "email" : "sms";
const label = this.targetLabel(target);
const startedAt = Date.now();
try {
// The verification code is generated server-side — never supplied by the
// caller — so the OTP stays a secret known only to the server and the
@@ -78,6 +92,14 @@ export class OtpService {
await this.otpRepository.createOtp(target, otp);
}
// `rotate` means a code already existed for this target and was replaced —
// the previous one is now dead. A user holding a slow-to-arrive SMS and
// typing its code will fail against the row; this line is how that shows up
// in the log rather than as an unexplained "invalid OTP" report.
this.logger.log(
`otp.issue channel=${channel} target=${label} action=${existing ? "rotate" : "create"}`,
);
// NOTE: do NOT reset the brute-force attempt counter on send. Clearing it
// here let an attacker wipe the per-target guess budget just by calling
// /otp/send between guesses. The counter is cleared only when the code is
@@ -86,40 +108,97 @@ export class OtpService {
// /otp/verify routes (a NestJS ThrottlerGuard / @Throttle) — none exists
// in the codebase yet.
if (target.email) {
// send email (queued to RabbitMQ via the shared Email service)
await this.emailClient.sendEmail({
to: target.email,
subject: "Your EDR Freight verification code",
text: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
});
} else {
// send sms (queued to RabbitMQ via the shared SMS service)
await this.smsClient.sendSms({
to: target.phone as string,
message: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
});
// Both clients report hand-off, not delivery — capture it rather than
// discarding it, so "queued=false" is distinguishable from a code that was
// published fine and lost downstream at the carrier.
const { queued } = target.email
? await this.emailClient.sendEmail({
to: target.email,
subject: "Your EDR Freight verification code",
text: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
})
: await this.smsClient.sendSms({
to: target.phone as string,
message: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
});
this.logger.log(
`otp.dispatch channel=${channel} target=${label} queued=${queued} latencyMs=${
Date.now() - startedAt
}`,
);
if (!queued) {
// The row is committed and we are about to answer "OTP sent successfully",
// but nothing left this process. Without this line the only symptom is a
// user who never receives a code — indistinguishable from carrier loss,
// and the misleading success response makes it look like our side worked.
this.logger.error(
`otp.dispatch.dropped channel=${channel} target=${label} rabbitmqEnabled=${
process.env.RABBITMQ_ENABLED ?? "unset"
} — transport reported no hand-off; no code will arrive for this send`,
);
}
// SECURITY: this logs a live credential in cleartext. Anyone with read
// access to the log stream can complete a password reset or a contract
// signature for the address on the same line. Kept deliberately (log
// aggregation is the debugging path for flaky SMS here) — if that tradeoff
// is ever revisited, gate on an env flag rather than deleting the line, so
// dev keeps its workflow.
this.logger.log(`OTP send for ${target.email ?? target.phone}: ${otp}`);
return {
success: true,
// Distinguishes "we published it" from "the transport is a no-op". The
// HTTP response shape is unchanged; the controller drops this field.
delivered: queued,
message: "OTP sent successfully",
};
} catch (error) {
// Log the real cause (DB/SMS/email failure) with its stack so a deployed
// "Failed to send OTP" 400 is diagnosable from the API logs, not opaque.
this.logger.error(
`Failed to send OTP to ${target.email ?? target.phone}: ${
error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
}`,
`otp.dispatch.failed channel=${channel} target=${label} latencyMs=${
Date.now() - startedAt
}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
error instanceof Error ? error.stack : undefined,
);
throw new BadRequestException("Failed to send OTP");
}
}
/**
* Correlation key shared by every `otp.*` line for one address, so a send and
* its later verify can be joined with a single grep. The raw target is used
* because the code itself is already logged in cleartext above — hashing the
* address while printing the credential next to it would buy nothing.
*/
private targetLabel(target: OtpTarget): string {
return target.email ?? target.phone ?? "unknown";
}
/**
* One line per verify exit path. `result` is a closed set — ok | invalid |
* expired | exhausted | not_found — so failures can be counted by reason
* instead of inferred from error strings that the frontend also depends on.
*/
private logVerify(
target: OtpTarget,
mode: "simple" | "action",
result: "ok" | "invalid" | "expired" | "exhausted" | "not_found",
detail?: string,
) {
const line = `otp.verify channel=${
target.email ? "email" : "sms"
} target=${this.targetLabel(target)} mode=${mode} result=${result}${
detail ? ` ${detail}` : ""
}`;
if (result === "ok") this.logger.log(line);
else this.logger.warn(line);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Verify OTP
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -134,6 +213,9 @@ export class OtpService {
// not found
if (!otpData) {
// No row for this key. Most often a normalisation mismatch or a code that
// was already consumed/burned — not necessarily a caller who never asked.
this.logVerify(target, "simple", "not_found");
throw new BadRequestException(
target.email ? "Email address not found" : "Phone number not found",
);
@@ -145,6 +227,12 @@ export class OtpService {
if (ageMs > this.ACTION_OTP_TTL_MS) {
await this.otpRepository.deleteOtp(otpData);
this.actionAttempts.delete(key);
this.logVerify(
target,
"simple",
"expired",
`ageMs=${ageMs} ttlMs=${this.ACTION_OTP_TTL_MS}`,
);
throw new BadRequestException(
"Verification code has expired. Request a new one.",
);
@@ -157,17 +245,30 @@ export class OtpService {
if (attempts >= this.MAX_ACTION_ATTEMPTS) {
await this.otpRepository.deleteOtp(otpData);
this.actionAttempts.delete(key);
this.logVerify(
target,
"simple",
"exhausted",
`attempts=${attempts}/${this.MAX_ACTION_ATTEMPTS} ageMs=${ageMs}`,
);
throw new BadRequestException(
"Too many incorrect attempts. Request a new code.",
);
}
this.actionAttempts.set(key, attempts);
this.logVerify(
target,
"simple",
"invalid",
`attempts=${attempts}/${this.MAX_ACTION_ATTEMPTS} ageMs=${ageMs}`,
);
throw new BadRequestException("Invalid OTP");
}
// single-use: consume the code on success so it can't be replayed.
await this.otpRepository.deleteOtp(otpData);
this.actionAttempts.delete(key);
this.logVerify(target, "simple", "ok", `ageMs=${ageMs}`);
return {
success: true,
@@ -210,6 +311,7 @@ export class OtpService {
const key = this.targetKey(target);
if (!otpData) {
this.logVerify(target, "action", "not_found");
throw new BadRequestException(
target.email
? "No verification code was requested for this email"
@@ -223,6 +325,7 @@ export class OtpService {
await this.otpRepository.deleteOtp(otpData);
this.actionAttempts.delete(key);
this.logVerify(target, "action", "expired", `ageMs=${ageMs} ttlMs=${ttlMs}`);
throw new BadRequestException(
"Verification code has expired. Request a new one.",
);
@@ -235,18 +338,31 @@ export class OtpService {
await this.otpRepository.deleteOtp(otpData);
this.actionAttempts.delete(key);
this.logVerify(
target,
"action",
"exhausted",
`attempts=${attempts}/${this.MAX_ACTION_ATTEMPTS} ageMs=${ageMs}`,
);
throw new BadRequestException(
"Too many incorrect attempts. Request a new code.",
);
}
this.actionAttempts.set(key, attempts);
this.logVerify(
target,
"action",
"invalid",
`attempts=${attempts}/${this.MAX_ACTION_ATTEMPTS} ageMs=${ageMs}`,
);
throw new BadRequestException("Invalid verification code");
}
// single-use: consume on success
await this.otpRepository.deleteOtp(otpData);
this.actionAttempts.delete(key);
this.logVerify(target, "action", "ok", `ageMs=${ageMs}`);
return { success: true };
}