Add scan report

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SennayT
2026-06-13 10:27:37 +03:00
parent 377492c2ae
commit b6ece3dd6f
2 changed files with 257 additions and 1 deletions

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.github/scripts/scan.js vendored Normal file
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/**
* PolinRider / Famous Chollima Supply-Chain Malware Scanner
*
* Detects the specific injection pattern used in the PolinRider campaign
* attributed to North Korean APT (Void Dokkaebi / Famous Chollima / UNC5342).
*
* IOCs sourced from:
* - Direct analysis of the injected tailwind.config.js sample
* - Socket Security report (May 2026) on roberts/leads compromise
* - PolinRider technical analysis report (Trend Micro / safedep.io)
*
* Zero external dependencies — runs on any Node.js >= 14.
*/
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const crypto = require("crypto");
// ─── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const CONFIG = {
// Maximum legitimate size for JS config files.
// Real tailwind/postcss/babel configs are rarely > 3 KB.
// Injected files jump to 58 KB instantly.
maxLegitConfigBytes: 3072,
// Minimum whitespace run on a single line that signals hidden payload.
// The campaign uses ~280510 spaces to push payload off-screen.
minSuspiciousInlineSpaces: 100,
// Files that are high-value injection targets for this campaign.
targetedFilenames: [
"tailwind.config.js",
"tailwind.config.ts",
"tailwind.config.cjs",
"tailwind.js",
"postcss.config.js",
"postcss.config.mjs",
"postcss.config.cjs",
"babel.config.js",
"babel.config.cjs",
"next.config.js",
"next.config.mjs",
"next.config.cjs",
"astro.config.mjs",
"astro.config.js",
"vite.config.js",
"vite.config.ts",
"webpack.config.js",
"webpack.mix.js",
],
// Files intentionally containing malware indicators for scanner logic/tests.
// These filenames are skipped before malware rules are evaluated.
ignoredFilenames: ["scan.js"],
// Filesystem paths that indicate active persistence mechanisms
persistenceArtifacts: [
"temp_auto_push.bat",
"temp_interactive_push.bat",
"branch_structure.json",
// Note: queue.bat and .plist are OS-level; checked separately
],
};
// ─── IOC Definitions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Each rule has:
* id unique rule identifier for reporting
* severity CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM
* description human-readable explanation
* test(content, filePath, lines) returns array of match details or []
*/
const RULES = [
// ── Tier 1: Definitive campaign signatures ─────────────────────────────────
{
id: "POLINRIDER-001",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
"PolinRider string-shuffler variable _$_1e42 — present in every known sample of this campaign",
test(content) {
const matches = [];
const re = /_\$_1e42/g;
let m;
while ((m = re.exec(content)) !== null) {
matches.push(`offset ${m.index}`);
}
return matches;
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-002",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
"PolinRider campaign marker global['!'] assignment — used to route C2 traffic",
test(content) {
const matches = [];
const re = /global\s*\[\s*['"]!\s*['"]\s*\]\s*=/g;
let m;
while ((m = re.exec(content)) !== null) {
const snippet = content
.slice(m.index, m.index + 40)
.replace(/\n/g, "\\n");
matches.push(`"${snippet}"`);
}
return matches;
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-003",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
'PolinRider shuffler seed string "rmcej%otb%" — embedded in the string-decryption bootstrap of the specific variant targeting this repo',
test(content) {
return content.includes("rmcej%otb%") ? ["seed string found"] : [];
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-004",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
"Known C2 IP addresses associated with PolinRider infrastructure",
test(content) {
const knownC2 = ["198.105.127.210", "166.88.54.158", "23.27.202.27"];
return knownC2.filter((ip) => content.includes(ip));
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-005",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
"Known TRON blockchain wallet addresses used as dead-drop C2 resolvers",
test(content) {
const wallets = [
"TMfKQEd7TJJa5xNZJZ2Lep838vrzrs7mAP",
"TXfxHUet9pJVU1BgVkBAbrES4YUc1nGzcG",
];
return wallets.filter((w) => content.includes(w));
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-006",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
"Known Aptos blockchain addresses used as fallback dead-drop resolvers",
test(content) {
const addrs = [
"0xbe037400670fbf1c32364f762975908dc43eeb38759263e7dfcdabc76380811e",
"0x3f0e5781d0855fb460661ac63257376db1941b2bb522499e4757ecb3ebd5dce3",
];
return addrs.filter((a) => content.includes(a));
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-007",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
"Known XOR decryption keys used to decrypt the second-stage payload from BSC transactions",
test(content) {
const keys = ["2[gWfGj;<:-93Z^C", "m6:tTh^D)cBz?NM]"];
return keys.filter((k) => content.includes(k));
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-008",
severity: "CRITICAL",
description:
"Known SHA-256 hash of compromised tailwind.js file (Socket Security, 2026-05-31)",
test(content) {
const knownHashes = new Set([
"96afdba882046385242cbed46871e41147c8055c5d9eff7460847b2c01a77dc3",
"522b28a2f78771715497ba53729d4ab9a50e982322c391379f3bddf7c8cb363f",
]);
const hash = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(content).digest("hex");
return knownHashes.has(hash) ? [`SHA-256: ${hash}`] : [];
},
},
// ── Tier 2: Behavioral / structural indicators ─────────────────────────────
{
id: "POLINRIDER-009",
severity: "HIGH",
description:
"Blockchain RPC infrastructure contact — campaign uses TRON, Aptos, and BSC as dead-drop C2 resolvers",
test(content) {
const endpoints = [
"trongrid.io",
"aptoslabs.com",
"bsc-dataseed.binance.org",
"bsc-rpc.publicnode.com",
"eth_getTransactionByHash",
];
return endpoints.filter((e) => content.includes(e));
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-010",
severity: "HIGH",
description:
"Hidden process spawn with windowsHide:true — used by InvisibleFerret / BeaverTail stager to launch detached Node.js child processes invisibly",
test(content) {
return /windowsHide\s*:\s*true/.test(content)
? ["windowsHide:true found"]
: [];
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-011",
severity: "HIGH",
description:
"Duplicate createRequire injection at file top — campaign restores require() for ES module environments by prepending two identical import statements",
test(content) {
const matches =
content.match(/import\s*\{\s*createRequire\s*\}\s*from/g) || [];
return matches.length >= 2
? [`Found ${matches.length} duplicate createRequire imports`]
: [];
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-012",
severity: "HIGH",
description:
"Payload hidden after large horizontal whitespace (>100 spaces on one line) — evasion technique to hide code off-screen in editors and GitHub diff views",
test(content, _filePath, lines) {
const hits = [];
lines.forEach((line, i) => {
const spaceRun = line.match(/\s{100,}/);
if (spaceRun) {
hits.push(`line ${i + 1}: ${spaceRun[0].length} consecutive spaces`);
}
});
return hits;
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-013",
severity: "HIGH",
description:
"Config file size anomaly — legitimate tailwind/postcss/babel configs are < 3 KB; injected files jump to 58 KB",
test(content, filePath) {
const bytes = Buffer.byteLength(content, "utf8");
const base = path.basename(filePath).toLowerCase();
const isTargeted = CONFIG.targetedFilenames.some(
(f) => f.toLowerCase() === base,
);
if (isTargeted && bytes > CONFIG.maxLegitConfigBytes) {
return [
`${bytes} bytes (threshold: ${CONFIG.maxLegitConfigBytes} bytes)`,
];
}
return [];
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-014",
severity: "HIGH",
description:
"Persistence artifact detected — files used by temp_auto_push.bat to rewrite git history and propagate infection to all branches",
test(_content, filePath) {
const base = path.basename(filePath);
return CONFIG.persistenceArtifacts.includes(base) ? [base] : [];
},
},
// ── Tier 3: Supporting behavioral indicators ───────────────────────────────
{
id: "POLINRIDER-015",
severity: "MEDIUM",
description:
"Campaign marker pattern — numeric string assigned to global['!'], used to select C2 tier (alpha/beta/fallback)",
test(content) {
const matches = [];
// Matches patterns like '8-3317', '9-0264-2', '8-3946-1', 'A4-1928'
const re =
/global\s*\[\s*['"]!\s*['"]\s*\]\s*=\s*['"]([A-Z]?\d[\d-]+)['"]/g;
let m;
while ((m = re.exec(content)) !== null) {
matches.push(`marker value: "${m[1]}"`);
}
return matches;
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-016",
severity: "MEDIUM",
description:
"sfL obfuscation function — secondary string-shuffler present in multi-stage loader variant",
test(content) {
// sfL appears as a named function used to decode the larger payload blob
const occurrences = (content.match(/\bsfL\b/g) || []).length;
return occurrences >= 3 ? [`sfL referenced ${occurrences} times`] : [];
},
},
{
id: "POLINRIDER-017",
severity: "MEDIUM",
description:
"global require/module injection — bootloader dynamically restores Node.js internals to bypass ES module restrictions",
test(content) {
const hits = [];
if (/global\s*\[.*\]\s*=\s*require/.test(content))
hits.push("global[x] = require");
if (/global\s*\[.*module.*\]\s*=\s*module/.test(content))
hits.push("global[x] = module");
return hits;
},
},
];
// ─── Scanner Engine ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function scanFile(filePath) {
if (shouldIgnoreFile(filePath)) {
return { filePath, findings: [], skipped: true };
}
let content;
try {
content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8");
} catch (err) {
return { filePath, error: err.message, findings: [] };
}
const lines = content.split("\n");
const findings = [];
for (const rule of RULES) {
let matches;
try {
matches = rule.test(content, filePath, lines);
} catch (err) {
matches = [`[rule error: ${err.message}]`];
}
if (matches && matches.length > 0) {
findings.push({
id: rule.id,
severity: rule.severity,
description: rule.description,
matches,
});
}
}
return { filePath, findings };
}
function shouldIgnoreFile(filePath) {
const base = path.basename(filePath).toLowerCase();
return CONFIG.ignoredFilenames.some((f) => f.toLowerCase() === base);
}
function walkDir(dir, results = []) {
let entries;
try {
entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
} catch {
return results;
}
for (const entry of entries) {
if (entry.name === "node_modules" || entry.name === ".git") continue;
const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
walkDir(full, results);
} else if (entry.isFile() && !shouldIgnoreFile(full)) {
const ext = path.extname(entry.name).toLowerCase();
const base = entry.name.toLowerCase();
// Scan all JS/TS config files + any file matching a targeted name
const isTargetedName = CONFIG.targetedFilenames.some(
(f) => f.toLowerCase() === base,
);
const isPersistenceArtifact = CONFIG.persistenceArtifacts.some(
(f) => f.toLowerCase() === base,
);
const isJsLike = [".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".ts", ".tsx", ".jsx"].includes(
ext,
);
if (isTargetedName || isPersistenceArtifact || isJsLike) {
results.push(full);
}
}
}
return results;
}
// ─── Reporting ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const SEVERITY_RANK = { CRITICAL: 3, HIGH: 2, MEDIUM: 1 };
const ANSI = {
reset: "\x1b[0m",
bold: "\x1b[1m",
red: "\x1b[31m",
yellow: "\x1b[33m",
cyan: "\x1b[36m",
green: "\x1b[32m",
dim: "\x1b[2m",
};
function colorSeverity(sev) {
if (sev === "CRITICAL") return `${ANSI.bold}${ANSI.red}${sev}${ANSI.reset}`;
if (sev === "HIGH") return `${ANSI.yellow}${sev}${ANSI.reset}`;
return `${ANSI.cyan}${sev}${ANSI.reset}`;
}
function printReport(allResults, { json = false, outputFile = null } = {}) {
const infected = allResults.filter(
(r) => r.findings && r.findings.length > 0,
);
const errors = allResults.filter((r) => r.error);
if (json) {
const report = {
scannedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
totalFilesScanned: allResults.length,
infectedFiles: infected.length,
results: infected,
errors,
};
const out = JSON.stringify(report, null, 2);
if (outputFile) {
fs.writeFileSync(outputFile, out);
console.log(`JSON report written to: ${outputFile}`);
} else {
console.log(out);
}
return infected.length > 0;
}
// Human-readable output
console.log(
`\n${ANSI.bold}╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗`,
);
console.log(`║ PolinRider / Famous Chollima Malware Scanner ║`);
console.log(
`╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝${ANSI.reset}`,
);
console.log(
`${ANSI.dim}Scanned ${allResults.length} files · ${new Date().toISOString()}${ANSI.reset}\n`,
);
if (infected.length === 0) {
console.log(
`${ANSI.green}${ANSI.bold}✓ No infections detected.${ANSI.reset}\n`,
);
} else {
console.log(
`${ANSI.red}${ANSI.bold}✗ INFECTION DETECTED in ${infected.length} file(s)${ANSI.reset}\n`,
);
for (const result of infected) {
// Sort findings by severity descending
const sorted = [...result.findings].sort(
(a, b) => SEVERITY_RANK[b.severity] - SEVERITY_RANK[a.severity],
);
const topSev = sorted[0].severity;
console.log(
` ${colorSeverity(topSev)} ${ANSI.bold}${result.filePath}${ANSI.reset}`,
);
for (const f of sorted) {
console.log(
` ${ANSI.dim}[${f.id}]${ANSI.reset} ${colorSeverity(f.severity)}${f.description}`,
);
for (const m of f.matches) {
console.log(`${m}`);
}
}
console.log();
}
console.log(`${ANSI.bold}Remediation steps:${ANSI.reset}`);
console.log(
` 1. Immediately isolate the affected machine from the network.`,
);
console.log(
` 2. Do NOT run npm install, npm build, or any script on this repo.`,
);
console.log(
` 3. Check for running node.exe / node processes with obfuscated args.`,
);
console.log(
` 4. Remove all code after the legitimate config closing block.`,
);
console.log(
` 5. Remove duplicate 'import { createRequire }' lines at file top.`,
);
console.log(
` 6. Recover the git repository from a clean local clone (see docs).`,
);
console.log(
` 7. Revoke ALL secrets, tokens, and credentials in .env and CI.`,
);
console.log(
` 8. See full remediation guide in the attached incident report.\n`,
);
}
if (errors.length > 0) {
console.log(`${ANSI.yellow}Scan errors (${errors.length}):${ANSI.reset}`);
for (const e of errors) {
console.log(` ${e.filePath}: ${e.error}`);
}
console.log();
}
return infected.length > 0;
}
// ─── CLI Entry Point ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function main() {
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
const jsonFlag = args.includes("--json");
const outputFileIdx = args.indexOf("--output");
const outputFile = outputFileIdx !== -1 ? args[outputFileIdx + 1] : null;
// Positional args after flags are scan targets
const targets = args.filter(
(a) => !a.startsWith("--") && args[args.indexOf(a) - 1] !== "--output",
);
if (targets.length === 0) {
console.error(
"Usage: scan.js [--json] [--output report.json] <path> [path...]",
);
console.error(
" path can be a file or directory (directories are walked recursively)",
);
process.exit(1);
}
const filesToScan = [];
for (const target of targets) {
if (!fs.existsSync(target)) {
console.error(`Path not found: ${target}`);
process.exit(1);
}
const stat = fs.statSync(target);
if (stat.isDirectory()) {
const found = walkDir(target);
filesToScan.push(...found);
} else {
filesToScan.push(target);
}
}
// Deduplicate
const unique = [...new Set(filesToScan)];
const allResults = unique.map(scanFile);
const infected = printReport(allResults, { json: jsonFlag, outputFile });
// Exit code 1 if any infection found — used by CI to block deployments
process.exit(infected ? 1 : 0);
}
main();