feat: password reset flow

apps/edr-freight-api/src/modules/auth/forgot-password.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+
+import { BadRequestException, Injectable, Logger } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { InjectDataSource, InjectRepository } from "@nestjs/typeorm";
+import { DataSource, Repository } from "typeorm";
+
+import { hashPassword } from "@tria-plc/api-common/utils/argon";
+import { EOtpType } from "@tria-plc/iamapi-common/enums/otp.enum";
+import { User } from "@tria-plc/iamapi-common/entities/iam/user/user.entity";
+import { UserVerification } from "@tria-plc/iamapi-common/entities/iam/user/user-verification.entity";
+
+import { OtpService, OtpTarget } from "../otp/otp.service";
+import { ResetChannel } from "./dto/forgot-password.dto";
+
+/**
+ * How long the reset ticket minted for `PATCH /api/auth/set-password` stays
+ * valid. The IAM `setPassword` handler enforces this via `expiresAt`.
+ */
+const RESET_TICKET_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+
+/** How long the emailed/SMS'd OTP stays valid before it must be re-requested. */
+const RESET_OTP_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+
+export interface ResetTicket {
+  userId: string;
+  verificationCode: string;
+}
+
+@Injectable()
+export class ForgotPasswordService {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(ForgotPasswordService.name);
+
+  constructor(
+    @InjectRepository(User)
+    private readonly userRepository: Repository<User>,
+    @InjectDataSource()
+    private readonly dataSource: DataSource,
+    private readonly otpService: OtpService,
+  ) {}
+
+  /**
+   * Resolve an account that is actually eligible for a password reset.
+   *
+   * IAM's `set-password` handler flips `isActive: true` on the user as a side
+   * effect, so a reset on a deactivated account would silently resurrect it.
+   * Gating here — rather than at the set-password call — is what keeps that
+   * from being reachable. Mirrors IAM's own login lookup: match on any of
+   * email / username / phone, and require an active credential row.
+   */
+  async resolveActiveUser(identifier: string): Promise<User | null> {
+    const id = identifier.trim();
+    if (!id) return null;
+
+    return await this.activeUserQuery()
+      .andWhere(
+        "(LOWER(u.email) = LOWER(:id) OR u.username = :id OR u.phoneNumber = :id)",
+        { id },
+      )
+      .getOne();
+  }
+
+  /** Same eligibility gate as {@link resolveActiveUser}, keyed by IAM user id. */
+  async resolveActiveUserById(userId: string): Promise<User | null> {
+    if (!userId) return null;
+    return await this.activeUserQuery()
+      .andWhere("u.id = :userId", { userId })
+      .getOne();
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Base query for accounts eligible to reset. `.where()` is claimed here so
+   * callers must use `.andWhere()` — TypeORM's `.where()` resets the clause,
+   * which would silently drop the `isActive` gate.
+   */
+  private activeUserQuery() {
+    return this.userRepository
+      .createQueryBuilder("u")
+      .innerJoin("u.userCredentials", "uc", "uc.isActive = true")
+      .where("u.isActive = true")
+      .orderBy("u.createdAt", "DESC");
+  }
+
+  /** The address the code goes to, taken from the account — never from input. */
+  private targetFor(user: User, channel: ResetChannel): OtpTarget | null {
+    if (channel === ResetChannel.Email) {
+      return user.email ? { email: user.email } : null;
+    }
+    return user.phoneNumber ? { phone: user.phoneNumber } : null;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Send a reset code to the account's own email/phone. Returns the target so
+   * authenticated (backoffice) callers can echo a masked version; unauthenticated
+   * callers must discard it.
+   *
+   * Note: `otp_verifications` keys rows by a unique phone/email, and `sendOtp`
+   * upserts. A reset request therefore overwrites any pending signup code for
+   * the same address — last code sent wins. That is the pre-existing behaviour
+   * between any two flows sharing this table.
+   */
+  async requestReset(
+    user: User,
+    channel: ResetChannel,
+  ): Promise<OtpTarget | null> {
+    const target = this.targetFor(user, channel);
+    if (!target) return null;
+
+    await this.otpService.sendOtp(target);
+    return target;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Prove possession of the OTP, then mint an IAM reset ticket the caller can
+   * spend on the public `PATCH /api/auth/set-password`.
+   *
+   * Minting a `UserVerification` row rather than writing `UserCredential`
+   * ourselves keeps IAM as the single owner of the password write path (old
+   * credential deactivation, argon hashing, changed-at bookkeeping).
+   */
+  async verifyAndMintTicket(
+    identifier: string,
+    channel: ResetChannel,
+    otp: string,
+  ): Promise<ResetTicket> {
+    const user = await this.resolveActiveUser(identifier);
+    const target = user && this.targetFor(user, channel);
+
+    if (!user?.id || !target) {
+      // Same shape as a wrong code: a caller probing for accounts learns nothing
+      // beyond what the request step already (deliberately) refuses to tell them.
+      throw new BadRequestException("Invalid verification code");
+    }
+
+    await this.otpService.verifyOtpForAction(target, otp, RESET_OTP_TTL_MS);
+
+    const code = randomBytes(24).toString("base64url");
+    const verificationCode = await hashPassword(code);
+    const userId = user.id;
+
+    await this.dataSource.transaction(async (manager) => {
+      const repo = manager.getRepository(UserVerification);
+      // Retire any outstanding codes so only the ticket we just minted can be
+      // spent — `findVerificationForPrimaryReset` reads the newest row.
+      await repo.update({ userId }, { isUsed: true });
+      await repo.insert({
+        userId,
+        otpType: EOtpType.RESET_PASSWORD,
+        verificationCode,
+        expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + RESET_TICKET_TTL_MS),
+        isUsed: false,
+        attemptCount: 0,
+      });
+    });
+
+    this.logger.log(`Reset ticket minted for user ${userId}`);
+    return { userId, verificationCode: code };
+  }
+
+  /** `+251911234567` -> `+251•••••4567`; `ab@x.com` -> `a•@x.com`. */
+  maskTarget(target: OtpTarget): string {
+    if (target.email) {
+      const [local, domain] = target.email.split("@");
+      const head = local.slice(0, 1);
+      return `${head}${"•".repeat(Math.max(local.length - 1, 1))}@${domain}`;
+    }
+    const phone = target.phone ?? "";
+    return `${phone.slice(0, 4)}${"•".repeat(Math.max(phone.length - 8, 1))}${phone.slice(-4)}`;
+  }
+}