mirror of
https://github.com/Tria-plc/emaui.git
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Add malicious code scanner script
This script scans for malicious code patterns in JavaScript files, detecting obfuscated code, suspicious global assignments, and other potential threats.
This commit is contained in:
Sennay
674
.github/scripts/scan-malware.js
vendored
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674
.github/scripts/scan-malware.js
vendored
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@@ -0,0 +1,674 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* Malicious Code Scanner
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* Detects obfuscated droppers, eval-based loaders, suspicious global assignments,
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* blockchain C2 patterns, high-entropy payload strings, and stealthy child processes.
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*
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* Exit codes: 0 = clean, 1 = threats found, 2 = scanner error
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*/
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"use strict";
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const fs = require("fs");
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const path = require("path");
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// ─── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const EXTENSIONS_TO_SCAN = new Set([
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".js",
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".cjs",
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".mjs",
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".ts",
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".tsx",
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".jsx",
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".json",
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".html",
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".htm",
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".vue",
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".svelte",
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]);
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const ALWAYS_SKIP = new Set([
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"node_modules",
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".git",
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"dist",
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"build",
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".next",
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".nuxt",
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"coverage",
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".nyc_output",
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"__pycache__",
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"scan-malware.js",
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".turbo",
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]);
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const ENTROPY_THRESHOLD = 5.2; // Shannon bits/char – high = likely encoded payload
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const ENTROPY_MIN_STRING_LEN = 64; // only test strings at least this long
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const MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024; // skip files > 2 MB
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// ─── Detection Rules ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Each rule: { id, description, severity, test(content, filePath) }
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* test() returns null | { line, snippet }[]
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*/
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const RULES = [
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// ── 1. Global require/module hijacking ──────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "GLOBAL_REQUIRE_ASSIGN",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Assigns require/module/process to a global slot to survive closure boundaries",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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// Quoted-key form: global['literal'] = require
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/global\s*\[\s*['"][^'"]{0,40}['"]\s*\]\s*=\s*require\b/g,
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/global\s*\[\s*['"][^'"]{0,40}['"]\s*\]\s*=\s*module\b/g,
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/global\s*\[\s*['"][^'"]{0,40}['"]\s*\]\s*=\s*process\b/g,
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// Computed-key form: global[_$_1e42[0]] = require (real sample pattern)
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/global\s*\[\s*[^\]]{1,60}\]\s*=\s*require\b/g,
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/global\s*\[\s*[^\]]{1,60}\]\s*=\s*module\b/g,
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/global\s*\[\s*[^\]]{1,60}\]\s*=\s*process\b/g,
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// Dot form: global.x = require
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/global\s*\.\s*\w+\s*=\s*require\b/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 2. Obfuscator fingerprints ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "OBFUSCATOR_VAR_NAMES",
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severity: "HIGH",
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description:
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"Variable names matching known obfuscator output patterns (_$_, _$af…, sfL…)",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(
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src,
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[
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// _$_1e42 family — the exact dropper signature (minHits=1, one hit is definitive)
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/\b_\$_[0-9a-zA-Z]{4,}\b/g,
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// _$af163278 style
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/\b_\$[a-f0-9]{6,}\b/g,
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// sfL as a standalone identifier (the shuffler function name in this dropper family)
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/\bsfL\b/g,
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// sfLxxx variants
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/\bsfL[A-Za-z0-9]{2,}\b/g,
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// generic hex-suffix identifiers (broader catch for other obfuscators)
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/\b[a-zA-Z]{1,3}[0-9a-f]{8,}\b/g,
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],
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1,
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); // one strong match is enough — these patterns don't appear in legitimate code
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},
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},
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// ── 3. Function-constructor eval-by-constructor ──────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "FUNCTION_CONSTRUCTOR_EVAL",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Dynamically constructs and executes code via the Function constructor",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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// Explicit new Function(...)
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/new\s+Function\s*\(\s*[^)]{40,}\)/g,
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/Function\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`]{40,}['"`]\s*\)\s*\(\)/g,
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/\(\s*new\s+Function\s*\(/g,
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/\bFunction\b[^(]*\([^)]*\)\s*\(\s*\)/g,
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// ── Stolen-property pattern (the real sample's technique) ──
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// var x = fn[computed] then x('', decode(bigString))
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// Step 1: extract constructor via computed property on a function
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/var\s+\w+\s*=\s*\w+\s*\[\s*\w+\s*\]\s*;[\s\S]{0,120}var\s+\w+\s*=\s*\w+\s*\(\s*(?:''|""|``|\w+)\s*,\s*\w+\s*\(\s*\w+\s*\)\s*\)/g,
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// Step 2: direct two-arg call with empty first arg (how Function ctor is invoked)
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/\w+\s*\(\s*(?:''|""|``)\s*,\s*\w+\s*\(\s*\w+\s*\)\s*\)/g,
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// Step 3: fn[computed](empty, decoder(str)) in one expression
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/\w+\s*\[\s*\w+\s*\]\s*\(\s*(?:''|""|``|\w*)\s*,\s*\w+\s*\(\s*\w+\s*\)\s*\)/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 4. Encoded-string eval calls ────────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "EVAL_ENCODED_STRING",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description: "Passes a large encoded/obfuscated literal directly to eval()",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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/\beval\s*\(\s*['"`][A-Za-z0-9+/=%\\]{80,}['"`]\s*\)/g,
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/\beval\s*\(\s*[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*\s*\(\s*[^)]{0,60}\)\s*\)/g, // eval(decode(...))
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/\beval\s*\(\s*atob\s*\(/g,
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/\beval\s*\(\s*Buffer\s*\.from\s*\(/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 5. Plain suspicious eval ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "SUSPICIOUS_EVAL",
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severity: "MEDIUM",
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description: "eval() used in a context that suggests dynamic code loading",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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/\beval\s*\(\s*(?!\/[\/*])(?!\s*['"`]\s*['"`])[^;)]{20,}\)/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 6. Stealthy child_process spawn ─────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "DETACHED_CHILD_PROCESS",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Spawns a detached, stdio-less child process — classic dropper persistence",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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/detached\s*:\s*true/g,
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/stdio\s*:\s*['"`]ignore['"`]/g,
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/windowsHide\s*:\s*true/g,
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/spawn\s*\(\s*['"`]node['"`]\s*,\s*\[\s*['"`]-e['"`]/g,
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/execFile\s*\([^)]+detached/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 7. Blockchain C2 endpoints ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "BLOCKCHAIN_C2",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Contacts blockchain APIs (TronGrid, Aptos, etc.) to retrieve a payload",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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/trongrid\.io/gi,
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/tronscan\.org/gi,
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/fullnode\.mainnet\.aptoslabs\.com/gi,
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/aptos\.dev\/v1\/accounts/gi,
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/getTransactionInfo|getTransactionById/g,
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/\.resource\.data\.value\b/g, // Aptos on-chain data access pattern
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/wallet_address.*blockchain|blockchain.*wallet_address/gi,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 8. XOR-based decryption of a payload ────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "XOR_PAYLOAD_DECRYPT",
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severity: "HIGH",
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description:
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"XOR-decryption loop over a fetched or hardcoded payload buffer",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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/charCodeAt\s*\([^)]*\)\s*\^\s*\w+\.charCodeAt\s*\(/g,
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/\^\s*key\.charCodeAt\s*\(/g,
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/\.map\s*\(\s*\([^)]*\)\s*=>\s*[^.]+\.\s*charCodeAt[^)]*\s*\^/g,
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/fromCharCode\s*\([^)]*\^[^)]*\)/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 9. String.fromCharCode(127) split (known dropper separator) ───────────────
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{
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id: "FROMCHARCODE_SEPARATOR",
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severity: "HIGH",
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description:
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"Uses String.fromCharCode() as a string delimiter/split marker",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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/String\.fromCharCode\s*\(\s*1[0-2][0-9]\s*\)/g, // DEL, extended ctrl chars
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/\.split\s*\(\s*String\.fromCharCode\s*\(/g,
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/String\.fromCharCode\s*\(\s*0\s*\)/g, // null byte as delimiter
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 10. Rate-limiting / re-execution guard (anti-detection) ──────────────────
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{
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id: "EXECUTION_RATE_LIMIT",
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severity: "MEDIUM",
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description:
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"Hardcoded timing gate (30 s window) used to avoid repeated execution",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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/Date\.now\s*\(\)\s*-\s*\w+\s*[<>]=?\s*3000[0-9]/g, // 30 000 ms
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/setTimeout[^)]+3[0-9]{4}/g,
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/lastRun|_lastExec|_rateLimit|__ts/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 11. High-entropy string literals ─────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "HIGH_ENTROPY_STRING",
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severity: "HIGH",
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description:
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"Long string literal with entropy above threshold — likely encoded payload",
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test(src, filePath) {
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// Skip minified bundles and lockfiles
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if (/\.(min\.js|lock|map)$/.test(filePath)) return null;
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const hits = [];
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// Broader charset: the real dropper's joW/pYd blobs contain spaces, brackets,
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// semicolons, etc. — any non-newline, non-quote content of 100+ chars qualifies.
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// We use two regexes: one for tightly-packed base64-like strings, one for the
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// looser mixed-content payload strings this dropper family actually uses.
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const patterns = [
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// Tight: no spaces (base64, hex, classic obfuscation)
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/(['"`])([A-Za-z0-9+/=\\%^&*!@#$\-_.~]{64,})\1/g,
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// Loose: mixed printable chars including spaces — catches joW / pYd style blobs
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/(['"`])([^'"` \t\r\n]{50,}[^'"` \t\r\n])\1/g,
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// Single-quoted with internal spaces — the exact form used in this dropper
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/'([^'\r\n]{100,})'/g,
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];
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const seen = new Set();
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for (const strRe of patterns) {
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strRe.lastIndex = 0;
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let m;
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while ((m = strRe.exec(src)) !== null) {
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const s =
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m[1] !== undefined && m[1].length === 1 ? (m[2] ?? m[1]) : m[1];
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const payload = typeof s === "string" ? s : m[0].slice(1, -1);
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if (payload.length < 50) continue;
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const key = payload.slice(0, 32); // dedup by prefix
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if (seen.has(key)) continue;
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seen.add(key);
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if (shannonEntropy(payload) >= ENTROPY_THRESHOLD) {
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hits.push({
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line: lineOf(src, m.index),
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snippet: payload.slice(0, 80) + "…",
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});
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}
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}
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}
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return hits.length ? hits : null;
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},
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},
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// ── 15. Global nonce / infection marker ─────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "GLOBAL_NONCE_MARKER",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Sets a short global marker string (e.g. global['!']='8-3946') as an infection flag / re-execution guard",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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// global['!'] = '8-3946' or global["x"] = "abc-123"
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/global\s*\[\s*['"][^'"]{0,5}['"]\s*\]\s*=\s*['"][0-9!@#$%^&*\-]{3,20}['"]/g,
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// global['!']='...' with no spaces (minified form)
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/global\['[^']{0,5}'\]='[^']{2,20}'/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 16. String-shuffler IIFE ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "STRING_SHUFFLER_IIFE",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Self-invoking string-shuffler function (seeded character-swap loop) used to decode obfuscated identifiers and payloads",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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// The core pattern: (function(x,y){ ... charAt ... % bignum ... })(str, bigint)
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/\(function\s*\(\s*\w\s*,\s*\w\s*\)\s*\{[^}]{30,}charAt[^}]{10,}%\s*[0-9]{5,}/g,
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// Seeded arithmetic inside a loop: e = (s + w) % bignum
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/[a-z]\s*=\s*\(\s*[a-z]\s*\+\s*[a-z]\s*\)\s*%\s*[0-9]{6,}/g,
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// The characteristic swap: var y=g[t]; g[t]=g[p]; g[p]=y
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/var\s+\w\s*=\s*\w\s*\[\s*\w\s*\]\s*;\s*\w\s*\[\s*\w\s*\]\s*=\s*\w\s*\[\s*\w\s*\]\s*;\s*\w\s*\[\s*\w\s*\]\s*=\s*\w/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 17. Method-extraction constructor theft ───────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "CONSTRUCTOR_THEFT",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Extracts the Function constructor via a computed property on a function object (e.g. sfL['constructor']), bypassing direct 'Function' keyword detection",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(
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src,
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[
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// var EKc = sfL('...').substr(0, N) — computing the property name 'constructor'
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/\w+\s*\([^)]{5,50}\)\.substr\s*\(\s*0\s*,\s*\w+\s*\)/g,
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// var dgC = sfL[EKc] — stealing the constructor via computed key
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/var\s+\w+\s*=\s*\w+\s*\[\s*\w+\s*\]/g,
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// multi-step: var x=fn[computed]; var y=x; var z=x(empty, decode(blob))
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/var\s+\w+\s*=\s*\w+;\s*var\s+\w+\s*=\s*\w+\s*\(\s*(?:\w+|''|"")\s*,\s*\w+\s*\(\s*\w+\s*\)\s*\)/g,
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],
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2,
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); // need ≥2: the substr alone can appear legitimately, but substr + bracket-access together is the tell
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},
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},
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// ── 18. Multi-step join/split decode chain ────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "JOIN_SPLIT_DECODE_CHAIN",
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severity: "HIGH",
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description:
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"Repeated join/split/join sequence used to reassemble an obfuscated string — characteristic of this dropper family",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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// .join(x).split(y).join(z) — at least two chained steps
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/\.join\s*\([^)]{0,20}\)\s*\.split\s*\([^)]{0,20}\)\s*\.join\s*\([^)]{0,20}\)/g,
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// Three+ steps (the real sample has 4): .join.split.join.split.join
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/(?:\.join\s*\([^)]{0,20}\)\s*\.split\s*\([^)]{0,20}\)\s*){2,}/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 19. typeof-against-dynamic-string ─────────────────────────────────────────
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{
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id: "TYPEOF_DYNAMIC_CHECK",
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severity: "HIGH",
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description:
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"Uses typeof x === decoded_var[n] instead of typeof x === 'object' to hide the string 'object' from static analysis",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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// typeof module === _$_1e42[1]
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/typeof\s+\w+\s*===\s*_\$_/g,
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// typeof x === anyVar[digit]
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/typeof\s+\w+\s*===\s*\w+\s*\[\s*\d+\s*\]/g,
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// typeof x === dynamicVar (no bracket, just a variable holding the type string)
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/typeof\s+(?:module|require|process|exports)\s*===\s*[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*(?!\s*[[(])/g,
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]);
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},
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},
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// ── 20. IIFE with numeric seed + numeric return (dropper wrapper) ──────────────
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{
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id: "DROPPER_IIFE_WRAPPER",
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severity: "CRITICAL",
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description:
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"Top-level IIFE that calls the final compiled payload with a numeric seed and returns a fake numeric value — canonical dropper wrapper structure",
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test(src) {
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return matchAll(src, [
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// Tgw(2509); return 1358})()
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/\w+\s*\(\s*\d{4,5}\s*\)\s*;\s*return\s+\d{3,6}\s*\}\s*\)\s*\(\s*\)/g,
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// return NNNN})() — the fake return at the end of the outer IIFE
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/return\s+\d{3,6}\s*\}\s*\)\s*\(\s*\)/g,
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// (function(){...})() containing a numeric final call + numeric return
|
||||
/\w+\s*\(\s*[0-9]{4}\s*\)[^)]*return\s+[0-9]{4}/g,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 12. Dynamic property access on require/module ────────────────────────────
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: "DYNAMIC_REQUIRE",
|
||||
severity: "HIGH",
|
||||
description: "require() called with a computed or obfuscated argument",
|
||||
test(src) {
|
||||
return matchAll(src, [
|
||||
/require\s*\(\s*\w+\s*\[\s*\d+\s*\]\s*\)/g, // require(arr[0])
|
||||
/require\s*\(\s*[A-Za-z_$]+\s*\(\s*[^)]{20,}\)\s*\)/g, // require(decode(...))
|
||||
/\[['"`]require['"`]\]\s*\(/g, // ['require'](...)
|
||||
]);
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 13. Self-deletion / evidence wiping ──────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: "SELF_DELETE",
|
||||
severity: "CRITICAL",
|
||||
description: "File deletes itself or wipes evidence after running",
|
||||
test(src) {
|
||||
return matchAll(src, [
|
||||
/fs\.unlink.*__filename/g,
|
||||
/fs\.unlinkSync.*__filename/g,
|
||||
/rimraf.*__dirname/g,
|
||||
/process\.argv\[1\].*unlink/g,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 14. Exfiltration patterns ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: "EXFILTRATION_PATTERN",
|
||||
severity: "HIGH",
|
||||
description:
|
||||
"Reads sensitive files or env vars and sends them over the network",
|
||||
test(src) {
|
||||
return matchAll(src, [
|
||||
/readFileSync.*\.ssh/g,
|
||||
/readFileSync.*\.aws/g,
|
||||
/readFileSync.*\.env/g,
|
||||
/process\.env\.[A-Z_]{4,}.*fetch|fetch.*process\.env\.[A-Z_]{4,}/g,
|
||||
/HOME.*\.npmrc.*post|post.*HOME.*\.npmrc/g,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function shannonEntropy(str) {
|
||||
const freq = {};
|
||||
for (const c of str) freq[c] = (freq[c] || 0) + 1;
|
||||
const len = str.length;
|
||||
return -Object.values(freq).reduce((acc, f) => {
|
||||
const p = f / len;
|
||||
return acc + p * Math.log2(p);
|
||||
}, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function lineOf(src, idx) {
|
||||
return src.slice(0, idx).split("\n").length;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Run one or more regexes; return hits if total unique-line matches >= minHits */
|
||||
function matchAll(src, patterns, minHits = 1) {
|
||||
const hits = [];
|
||||
for (const re of patterns) {
|
||||
re.lastIndex = 0;
|
||||
let m;
|
||||
while ((m = re.exec(src)) !== null) {
|
||||
hits.push({ line: lineOf(src, m.index), snippet: m[0].slice(0, 120) });
|
||||
if (re.lastIndex === m.index) re.lastIndex++; // guard zero-width
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (hits.length < minHits) return null;
|
||||
return hits;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── File Walking ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function* walk(dir) {
|
||||
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
|
||||
if (ALWAYS_SKIP.has(entry.name)) continue;
|
||||
const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
|
||||
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
|
||||
yield* walk(full);
|
||||
} else if (
|
||||
entry.isFile() &&
|
||||
EXTENSIONS_TO_SCAN.has(path.extname(entry.name).toLowerCase())
|
||||
) {
|
||||
yield full;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Main Scanner ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function scan(rootDir) {
|
||||
const findings = []; // { file, rule, hits }
|
||||
let scanned = 0;
|
||||
let skipped = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (const filePath of walk(rootDir)) {
|
||||
const stat = fs.statSync(filePath);
|
||||
if (stat.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES) {
|
||||
skipped++;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (stat.size === 0) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let src;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
src = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8");
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
skipped++;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
scanned++;
|
||||
const relPath = path.relative(rootDir, filePath);
|
||||
|
||||
for (const rule of RULES) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const hits = rule.test(src, filePath);
|
||||
if (hits && hits.length > 0) {
|
||||
findings.push({ file: relPath, rule, hits });
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
// Never let a broken rule crash the whole scan
|
||||
process.stderr.write(
|
||||
`[WARN] Rule ${rule.id} threw on ${relPath}: ${err.message}\n`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { findings, scanned, skipped };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Reporting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
const SEVERITY_ORDER = { CRITICAL: 0, HIGH: 1, MEDIUM: 2, LOW: 3 };
|
||||
const SEVERITY_COLOR = {
|
||||
CRITICAL: "\x1b[31;1m", // bold red
|
||||
HIGH: "\x1b[33;1m", // bold yellow
|
||||
MEDIUM: "\x1b[36m", // cyan
|
||||
LOW: "\x1b[37m", // white
|
||||
};
|
||||
const RESET = "\x1b[0m";
|
||||
const BOLD = "\x1b[1m";
|
||||
|
||||
function color(sev, text) {
|
||||
if (!process.stdout.isTTY) return text;
|
||||
return `${SEVERITY_COLOR[sev] || ""}${text}${RESET}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function report({ findings, scanned, skipped }) {
|
||||
const sorted = [...findings].sort(
|
||||
(a, b) =>
|
||||
(SEVERITY_ORDER[a.rule.severity] ?? 9) -
|
||||
(SEVERITY_ORDER[b.rule.severity] ?? 9),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("\n" + "═".repeat(72));
|
||||
console.log(`${BOLD} Malicious Code Scanner — Results${RESET}`);
|
||||
console.log("═".repeat(72));
|
||||
console.log(` Files scanned : ${scanned}`);
|
||||
console.log(` Files skipped : ${skipped}`);
|
||||
console.log(` Findings : ${sorted.length}`);
|
||||
console.log("─".repeat(72));
|
||||
|
||||
if (sorted.length === 0) {
|
||||
console.log("\n ✅ No suspicious patterns detected.\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Group by severity
|
||||
const bySeverity = {};
|
||||
for (const f of sorted) {
|
||||
(bySeverity[f.rule.severity] ??= []).push(f);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const sev of ["CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW"]) {
|
||||
const group = bySeverity[sev];
|
||||
if (!group) continue;
|
||||
console.log(`\n ${color(sev, `── ${sev} (${group.length})`)}`);
|
||||
for (const { file, rule, hits } of group) {
|
||||
console.log(`\n ${BOLD}${file}${RESET}`);
|
||||
console.log(` Rule : ${rule.id}`);
|
||||
console.log(` Detail : ${rule.description}`);
|
||||
const shown = hits.slice(0, 3);
|
||||
for (const h of shown) {
|
||||
console.log(` Line ~${h.line}: ${color(sev, h.snippet)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (hits.length > 3)
|
||||
console.log(` … and ${hits.length - 3} more occurrences`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Summary counts
|
||||
const counts = Object.fromEntries(
|
||||
["CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW"].map((s) => [
|
||||
s,
|
||||
(bySeverity[s] || []).length,
|
||||
]),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("\n" + "─".repeat(72));
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
` Summary: ` +
|
||||
color("CRITICAL", `${counts.CRITICAL} CRITICAL`) +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
color("HIGH", `${counts.HIGH} HIGH`) +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
color("MEDIUM", `${counts.MEDIUM} MEDIUM`) +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
`${counts.LOW} LOW`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
console.log("═".repeat(72) + "\n");
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail CI on CRITICAL or HIGH
|
||||
return counts.CRITICAL + counts.HIGH > 0 ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── JSON output for upload-artifact / SARIF consumers ───────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function writeJsonReport(findings, outPath) {
|
||||
const out = findings.map(({ file, rule, hits }) => ({
|
||||
file,
|
||||
rule_id: rule.id,
|
||||
severity: rule.severity,
|
||||
description: rule.description,
|
||||
occurrences: hits,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(outPath, JSON.stringify(out, null, 2));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Entry point ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
const targetArg = process.argv[2] || process.cwd();
|
||||
const jsonOut = process.env.SCAN_JSON_OUT || "";
|
||||
|
||||
// Accept either a directory OR a single file as the scan target
|
||||
let result;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const targetStat = fs.statSync(targetArg);
|
||||
if (targetStat.isFile()) {
|
||||
// Single-file mode: scan just that file regardless of extension
|
||||
const src = fs.readFileSync(targetArg, "utf8");
|
||||
const findings = [];
|
||||
for (const rule of RULES) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const hits = rule.test(src, targetArg);
|
||||
if (hits && hits.length > 0) {
|
||||
findings.push({ file: path.basename(targetArg), rule, hits });
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
process.stderr.write(`[WARN] Rule ${rule.id} threw: ${err.message}\n`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
result = { findings, scanned: 1, skipped: 0 };
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
result = scan(targetArg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
console.error(`Scanner internal error: ${err.message}`);
|
||||
process.exit(2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const exitCode = report(result);
|
||||
|
||||
if (jsonOut) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
writeJsonReport(result.findings, jsonOut);
|
||||
console.log(`JSON report written to: ${jsonOut}`);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
console.error(`Failed to write JSON report: ${err.message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
process.exit(exitCode);
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user