Merge pull request #836 from Tria-plc/freight/feat/fixes-v1

Freight/feat/fixes v1
This commit is contained in:
Nathnael Wondisha
2026-07-20 15:13:49 +03:00
committed by GitHub
41 changed files with 1518 additions and 564 deletions

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@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ TELEBIRR_PRIVATE_KEY=
TELEBIRR_PUBLIC_KEY=
TELEBIRR_INSECURE_TLS=false
# Public origin of the freight customer portal. Password-reset links sent to
# customers are built against this — it must be browser-reachable.
FREIGHT_PORTAL_URL=http://localhost:5173
# Portal pages the payment provider redirects the browser to after payment.
# Point these at the freight portal's public payment result routes.
PAYMENT_RETURN_URL=http://localhost:5173/payment/success

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@@ -9,6 +9,14 @@ export default registerAs("app", () => ({
env: process.env.NODE_ENV ?? "development",
port: parseInt(process.env.PORT ?? "3001", 10),
apiPrefix: "api",
/**
* Public origin of the freight customer portal. Password-reset links mailed
* or SMS'd to customers are built against this, so it must be the address the
* customer's browser can actually reach — not an internal service name.
*/
portalBaseUrl: (
process.env.FREIGHT_PORTAL_URL ?? "http://localhost:5173"
).replace(/\/+$/, ""),
trainScheduling: {
maxTrainWeightTons: numberFromEnv("TRAIN_SCHEDULING_MAX_WEIGHT_TONS", 3500),
maxTrainLengthMeters: numberFromEnv("TRAIN_SCHEDULING_MAX_LENGTH_METERS", 760),

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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import {
Body,
Controller,
Get,
NotFoundException,
Param,
ParseUUIDPipe,
@@ -11,11 +12,14 @@ import { ApiBearerAuth, ApiOperation, ApiTags } from "@nestjs/swagger";
import { BookingStaff } from "../../common/booking-guards";
import { FREIGHT_PERMS } from "../../seed/freight-permissions.registry";
import { BackofficeResetPasswordDto } from "./dto/forgot-password.dto";
import { CustomerResetService } from "./customer-reset.service";
import {
CustomerResetService,
CustomerResetTarget,
} from "./customer-reset.service";
/**
* Staff-triggered password reset. The customer receives the code and sets their
* own password — staff never see or handle a credential.
* Staff-triggered password reset. The customer receives a single-use link and
* sets their own password — staff never see or handle a credential.
*/
@ApiTags("backoffice")
@Controller("backoffice/customers")
@@ -23,26 +27,45 @@ import { CustomerResetService } from "./customer-reset.service";
export class CustomerResetController {
constructor(private readonly customerResetService: CustomerResetService) {}
@Get(":companyId/reset-target")
@BookingStaff(FREIGHT_PERMS.customers.resetPassword)
@ApiOperation({
summary: "The primary contact's IAM account a reset link would be sent to",
})
async resetTarget(
@Param("companyId", ParseUUIDPipe) companyId: string,
): Promise<CustomerResetTarget> {
const target = await this.customerResetService.getResetTarget(companyId);
if (!target) {
throw new NotFoundException(
"This customer has no active primary-contact account to reset",
);
}
return target;
}
@Post(":companyId/reset-password")
@BookingStaff(FREIGHT_PERMS.customers.resetPassword)
@ApiOperation({
summary: "Send a password-reset code to a customer's primary contact",
summary: "Send a password-reset link to a customer's primary contact",
})
async resetPassword(
@Param("companyId", ParseUUIDPipe) companyId: string,
@Body() dto: BackofficeResetPasswordDto,
) {
const maskedTarget = await this.customerResetService.sendResetToCustomer(
const sent = await this.customerResetService.sendResetLinkToCustomer(
companyId,
dto.channel,
);
if (!maskedTarget) {
if (!sent) {
throw new NotFoundException(
`No active primary contact with ${dto.channel === "email" ? "an email address" : "a phone number"} for this customer`,
);
}
return { channel: dto.channel, maskedTarget };
return sent;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
import { Injectable, Logger } from "@nestjs/common";
import { ConfigService } from "@nestjs/config";
import { InjectRepository } from "@nestjs/typeorm";
import { Repository } from "typeorm";
import { ExternalProfile } from "../companies/entities/external-profile.entity";
import { EmailClientService } from "../notifications/email-client.service";
import { SmsClientService } from "../notifications/sms-client.service";
import { ResetChannel } from "./dto/forgot-password.dto";
import { ForgotPasswordService } from "./forgot-password.service";
import {
ForgotPasswordService,
RESET_LINK_TTL_MS,
} from "./forgot-password.service";
import { maskOtpTarget } from "./mask-target.util";
/** The account a staff-triggered reset would land on. */
export interface CustomerResetTarget {
userId: string;
name: string;
email: string | null;
phone: string | null;
}
export interface SentResetLink {
channel: ResetChannel;
maskedTarget: string;
expiresAt: string;
}
@Injectable()
export class CustomerResetService {
@@ -14,19 +35,110 @@ export class CustomerResetService {
@InjectRepository(ExternalProfile)
private readonly externalProfileRepository: Repository<ExternalProfile>,
private readonly forgotPasswordService: ForgotPasswordService,
private readonly emailClient: EmailClientService,
private readonly smsClient: SmsClientService,
private readonly config: ConfigService,
) {}
/**
* Send a reset code to the company's primary contact. Returns the masked
* destination, or null when there is no eligible account for that channel.
* The IAM account a reset would actually reach. The backoffice shows these
* values rather than `company.email` / `company.phone`: the company row holds
* business contact detail, while the link is delivered to the primary
* contact's own login credentials — the two drift apart routinely, and showing
* the wrong one has staff telling customers to check an inbox nothing was sent
* to.
*/
async getResetTarget(companyId: string): Promise<CustomerResetTarget | null> {
const resolved = await this.resolvePrimaryContactUser(companyId);
if (!resolved) return null;
const { profile, user, userId } = resolved;
return {
userId,
name: `${profile.firstName} ${profile.lastName}`.trim(),
email: user.email ?? null,
phone: user.phoneNumber ?? null,
};
}
/**
* Mint a password-reset link and send it to the company's primary contact.
* Returns the masked destination, or null when there is no eligible account
* for that channel.
*
* Unlike the public flow this reports failure honestly — the caller is an
* authenticated staff member, so there is nothing to enumerate.
*/
async sendResetToCustomer(
async sendResetLinkToCustomer(
companyId: string,
channel: ResetChannel,
): Promise<string | null> {
): Promise<SentResetLink | null> {
const resolved = await this.resolvePrimaryContactUser(companyId);
if (!resolved) return null;
const { user, userId } = resolved;
const target = this.forgotPasswordService.targetFor(user, channel);
if (!target) return null;
// Mint first, send second: a failed send leaves an unused ticket that simply
// expires, whereas sending a link before the ticket exists would hand the
// customer a URL that is dead on arrival.
const ticket = await this.forgotPasswordService.mintResetTicket(
userId,
RESET_LINK_TTL_MS,
);
const link = this.buildResetLink(ticket.userId, ticket.verificationCode);
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + RESET_LINK_TTL_MS);
const { queued } = target.email
? await this.emailClient.sendEmail({
to: target.email,
subject: "Reset your EDR Freight password",
text:
"A password reset was started for your EDR Freight account.\n\n" +
`Open this link to choose a new password:\n${link}\n\n` +
"The link expires in 24 hours and can only be used once. If you did " +
"not expect this, ignore this message — your password stays unchanged.",
})
: await this.smsClient.sendSms({
to: target.phone as string,
message: `Reset your EDR Freight password: ${link} (expires in 24 hours, single use)`,
});
this.logger.log(
`Staff-triggered ${channel} reset link sent to user ${userId} (company ${companyId}) queued=${queued}`,
);
if (!queued) {
// The ticket is committed and the backoffice is about to say "link sent",
// but nothing left this process — with RABBITMQ_ENABLED=false both clients
// are no-ops. Without this line the only symptom is a customer who never
// receives anything, indistinguishable from carrier loss.
this.logger.error(
`reset-link.dispatch.dropped channel=${channel} user=${userId} rabbitmqEnabled=${
process.env.RABBITMQ_ENABLED ?? "unset"
} — transport reported no hand-off; no link will arrive`,
);
// SECURITY: logs a live password-reset credential in cleartext. Same
// deliberate tradeoff the OTP service makes — this is the only way to
// complete a reset on an environment with no broker. Only reached when
// delivery already failed.
this.logger.warn(`Undelivered reset link for user ${userId}: ${link}`);
}
return {
channel,
maskedTarget: maskOtpTarget(target),
expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString(),
};
}
/**
* The company's primary contact, gated on the same active-account rule the
* public flow uses — so a suspended customer cannot be reactivated by a
* staff-triggered reset (IAM's `set-password` flips `isActive` back on).
*/
private async resolvePrimaryContactUser(companyId: string) {
const profile = await this.externalProfileRepository.findOne({
where: { companyId, isPrimaryContact: true },
});
@@ -36,24 +148,28 @@ export class CustomerResetService {
return null;
}
// Resolve through the same active-account gate the public flow uses, so a
// suspended customer cannot be reactivated by a staff-triggered reset.
const user = await this.forgotPasswordService.resolveActiveUserById(
profile.userId,
);
if (!user) {
if (!user?.id) {
this.logger.warn(
`Primary contact ${profile.userId} of company ${companyId} is not an active account`,
);
return null;
}
const target = await this.forgotPasswordService.requestReset(user, channel);
if (!target) return null;
return { profile, user, userId: user.id };
}
this.logger.log(
`Staff-triggered ${channel} reset sent to user ${user.id} (company ${companyId})`,
);
return this.forgotPasswordService.maskTarget(target);
/**
* The portal route that trades the token for a set-password form. Params are
* URL-encoded because the token is base64url — safe as-is, but the encoding
* keeps this correct if the token format ever changes.
*/
private buildResetLink(userId: string, token: string): string {
const base = this.config.get<string>("app.portalBaseUrl");
return `${base}/reset-password?uid=${encodeURIComponent(
userId,
)}&token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`;
}
}

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@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
import { ApiProperty } from "@nestjs/swagger";
import { IsEnum, IsNotEmpty, IsString } from "class-validator";
import { ApiProperty, ApiPropertyOptional } from "@nestjs/swagger";
import { IsEnum, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID } from "class-validator";
/** The channel the reset code is delivered over. */
/**
* The channel a reset LINK is delivered over. The OTP flow no longer picks one —
* it sends to every contact on the account — but the staff-triggered link flow
* still delivers over exactly one transport.
*/
export enum ResetChannel {
Email = "email",
Phone = "phone",
@@ -16,13 +20,27 @@ export class ForgotPasswordRequestDto {
@IsNotEmpty()
identifier!: string;
@ApiProperty({ enum: ResetChannel })
/**
* Accepted and ignored. The code now goes to the account's email AND phone,
* so there is nothing to choose — kept optional so clients still sending it
* (older portal/backoffice builds) are not rejected outright.
* @deprecated
*/
@ApiPropertyOptional({
enum: ResetChannel,
deprecated: true,
description: "Ignored — the code is sent to every contact on the account.",
})
@IsOptional()
@IsEnum(ResetChannel)
channel!: ResetChannel;
channel?: ResetChannel;
}
export class ForgotPasswordVerifyDto extends ForgotPasswordRequestDto {
@ApiProperty({ description: "The 6-digit code sent to the chosen channel" })
@ApiProperty({
description:
"The 6-digit code sent to the account's email and phone. Either delivery carries the same code.",
})
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
otp!: string;
@@ -33,3 +51,19 @@ export class BackofficeResetPasswordDto {
@IsEnum(ResetChannel)
channel!: ResetChannel;
}
/**
* The two halves of a reset link's query string. Together they stand in for the
* identifier + OTP pair of the typed flow: the token proves possession of the
* inbox/handset the link was delivered to.
*/
export class ResolveResetLinkDto {
@ApiProperty({ description: "IAM user id from the reset link's `uid` param" })
@IsUUID()
userId!: string;
@ApiProperty({ description: "Opaque token from the reset link's `token` param" })
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
token!: string;
}

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@ import { Public } from "@edr/api-common";
import {
ForgotPasswordRequestDto,
ForgotPasswordVerifyDto,
ResolveResetLinkDto,
} from "./dto/forgot-password.dto";
import { ForgotPasswordService, ResetTicket } from "./forgot-password.service";
import {
ForgotPasswordService,
ResetLinkAccount,
ResetTicket,
} from "./forgot-password.service";
/**
* Freight-owned reset flow. IAM ships a `forgot-password` route, but it only
@@ -24,17 +29,19 @@ export class ForgotPasswordController {
@Post("forgot-password/request")
@ApiOperation({
summary: "Send a password-reset code over email or SMS",
summary: "Send a password-reset code to the account's email AND phone",
description:
"Always reports success. An unknown, inactive, or channel-less account is " +
"indistinguishable from a real one, so this cannot be used to enumerate accounts.",
"One code, delivered over every contact the account has; either delivery " +
"verifies it. Always reports success — an unknown, inactive, or contactless " +
"account is indistinguishable from a real one, so this cannot be used to " +
"enumerate accounts.",
})
async request(@Body() dto: ForgotPasswordRequestDto): Promise<{ success: true }> {
const user = await this.forgotPasswordService.resolveActiveUser(dto.identifier);
if (user) {
try {
await this.forgotPasswordService.requestReset(user, dto.channel);
await this.forgotPasswordService.requestReset(user);
} catch (error) {
// A delivery failure must not change the response shape either — log it
// and let the caller sit on the OTP screen.
@@ -60,10 +67,18 @@ export class ForgotPasswordController {
"alongside the same identifier and the new password.",
})
verify(@Body() dto: ForgotPasswordVerifyDto): Promise<ResetTicket> {
return this.forgotPasswordService.verifyAndMintTicket(
dto.identifier,
dto.channel,
dto.otp,
);
return this.forgotPasswordService.verifyAndMintTicket(dto.identifier, dto.otp);
}
@Post("forgot-password/resolve-link")
@ApiOperation({
summary: "Validate a staff-issued reset link and return its set-password ticket",
description:
"Takes the link's uid/token pair. The returned { userId, identifier, verificationCode } " +
"is the body for PATCH /api/auth/set-password, so the customer never types an identifier. " +
"A bad or expired link is rejected here rather than after the password is typed.",
})
resolveLink(@Body() dto: ResolveResetLinkDto): Promise<ResetLinkAccount> {
return this.forgotPasswordService.resolveResetLink(dto.userId, dto.token);
}
}

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { BadRequestException, Injectable, Logger } from "@nestjs/common";
import { InjectDataSource, InjectRepository } from "@nestjs/typeorm";
import { DataSource, Repository } from "typeorm";
import { hashPassword } from "@tria-plc/api-common/utils/argon";
import { hashPassword, verifyPassword } from "@tria-plc/api-common/utils/argon";
import { EOtpType } from "@tria-plc/iamapi-common/enums/otp.enum";
import { User } from "@tria-plc/iamapi-common/entities/iam/user/user.entity";
import { UserVerification } from "@tria-plc/iamapi-common/entities/iam/user/user-verification.entity";
@@ -22,11 +22,32 @@ const RESET_TICKET_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
/** How long the emailed/SMS'd OTP stays valid before it must be re-requested. */
const RESET_OTP_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
/**
* A staff-triggered reset link lives longer than a typed OTP: the customer may
* only see the SMS/email hours after the call that prompted it.
*/
export const RESET_LINK_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
/** IAM refuses a ticket once its row hits this many failed attempts. */
const MAX_TICKET_ATTEMPTS = 5;
export interface ResetTicket {
userId: string;
verificationCode: string;
}
/**
* What a valid reset link resolves to. `identifier` is the value IAM's
* `set-password` matches the user on (it accepts email / username / phone), so
* the portal can spend the ticket without the customer typing anything.
*/
export interface ResetLinkAccount {
userId: string;
identifier: string;
maskedIdentifier: string;
verificationCode: string;
}
@Injectable()
export class ForgotPasswordService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(ForgotPasswordService.name);
@@ -81,8 +102,12 @@ export class ForgotPasswordService {
.orderBy("u.createdAt", "DESC");
}
/** The address the code goes to, taken from the account — never from input. */
private targetFor(user: User, channel: ResetChannel): OtpTarget | null {
/**
* A single channel of the account, for flows that genuinely deliver over one
* transport (the staff-triggered reset LINK picks email or SMS). Taken from
* the account — never from input.
*/
targetFor(user: User, channel: ResetChannel): OtpTarget | null {
if (channel === ResetChannel.Email) {
return user.email ? { email: user.email } : null;
}
@@ -90,20 +115,40 @@ export class ForgotPasswordService {
}
/**
* Send a reset code to the account's own email/phone. Returns the target so
* authenticated (backoffice) callers can echo a masked version; unauthenticated
* callers must discard it.
* Every contact the account has. The reset OTP goes to all of them and any one
* verifies it — a customer whose SMS never lands can finish from their inbox
* without restarting the flow on a different channel. An account holding only
* one of the two degrades to that channel; only a contactless account is null.
*/
targetsFor(user: User): OtpTarget | null {
const target: OtpTarget = {};
if (user.email) target.email = user.email;
if (user.phoneNumber) target.phone = user.phoneNumber;
return target.email || target.phone ? target : null;
}
/**
* The value IAM's `set-password` will match this account on. It looks the user
* up by email OR username OR phoneNumber (and lowercases whatever it is
* given), so prefer email, then phone, and fall back to username last —
* a mixed-case username would not survive that lowercasing.
*/
private identifierFor(user: User): string | null {
return user.email ?? user.phoneNumber ?? user.username ?? null;
}
/**
* Send one reset code to every contact on the account — email AND phone —
* returning the target so authenticated (backoffice) callers can echo a masked
* version; unauthenticated callers must discard it.
*
* Note: `otp_verifications` keys rows by a unique phone/email, and `sendOtp`
* upserts. A reset request therefore overwrites any pending signup code for
* the same address — last code sent wins. That is the pre-existing behaviour
* between any two flows sharing this table.
* replaces every row the target overlaps. A reset request therefore overwrites
* any pending signup code for the same addresses — last code sent wins. That
* is the pre-existing behaviour between any two flows sharing this table.
*/
async requestReset(
user: User,
channel: ResetChannel,
): Promise<OtpTarget | null> {
const target = this.targetFor(user, channel);
async requestReset(user: User): Promise<OtpTarget | null> {
const target = this.targetsFor(user);
if (!target) return null;
await this.otpService.sendOtp(target);
@@ -120,11 +165,12 @@ export class ForgotPasswordService {
*/
async verifyAndMintTicket(
identifier: string,
channel: ResetChannel,
otp: string,
): Promise<ResetTicket> {
const user = await this.resolveActiveUser(identifier);
const target = user && this.targetFor(user, channel);
// Same set of contacts `requestReset` sent to, so the code resolves whichever
// of the two the customer actually received it on.
const target = user && this.targetsFor(user);
if (!user?.id || !target) {
// Same shape as a wrong code: a caller probing for accounts learns nothing
@@ -134,9 +180,18 @@ export class ForgotPasswordService {
await this.otpService.verifyOtpForAction(target, otp, RESET_OTP_TTL_MS);
return await this.mintResetTicket(user.id, RESET_TICKET_TTL_MS);
}
/**
* Mint a single-use IAM reset ticket. Shared by the OTP flow (where the code
* is the proof of possession) and the staff-triggered link flow (where the
* ticket travels in the link and delivery to the account's own inbox/handset
* is the proof).
*/
async mintResetTicket(userId: string, ttlMs: number): Promise<ResetTicket> {
const code = randomBytes(24).toString("base64url");
const verificationCode = await hashPassword(code);
const userId = user.id;
await this.dataSource.transaction(async (manager) => {
const repo = manager.getRepository(UserVerification);
@@ -147,7 +202,7 @@ export class ForgotPasswordService {
userId,
otpType: EOtpType.RESET_PASSWORD,
verificationCode,
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + RESET_TICKET_TTL_MS),
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + ttlMs),
isUsed: false,
attemptCount: 0,
});
@@ -157,6 +212,63 @@ export class ForgotPasswordService {
return { userId, verificationCode: code };
}
/**
* Validate a reset link and hand back everything the portal needs to spend it
* on IAM's `PATCH /api/auth/set-password`.
*
* The checks mirror IAM's own — newest row, unused, unexpired, attempts left,
* argon match — so a link that resolves here is one IAM will honour. Doing
* them up front is what lets the page say "this link has expired" before the
* customer types a password rather than after.
*
* Every rejection is the same message: a link is a bearer credential, and the
* holder of a bad one learns nothing about why it failed or whether the user
* id exists.
*/
async resolveResetLink(
userId: string,
token: string,
): Promise<ResetLinkAccount> {
const invalid = new BadRequestException(
"This password-reset link is invalid or has expired. Request a new one.",
);
const user = await this.resolveActiveUserById(userId);
const identifier = user && this.identifierFor(user);
if (!user || !identifier) throw invalid;
const verification = await this.dataSource
.getRepository(UserVerification)
.findOne({
where: { userId, otpType: EOtpType.RESET_PASSWORD },
order: { createdAt: "DESC" },
});
// `expiresAt` / `attemptCount` are optional on IAM's entity but always
// written by `mintResetTicket`. A row missing either is malformed, so treat
// it as expired rather than letting it through unchecked.
if (
!verification ||
verification.isUsed ||
!verification.expiresAt ||
verification.expiresAt < new Date() ||
(verification.attemptCount ?? 0) >= MAX_TICKET_ATTEMPTS ||
!(await verifyPassword(token, verification.verificationCode))
) {
this.logger.warn(`Reset link rejected for user ${userId}`);
throw invalid;
}
return {
userId,
identifier,
maskedIdentifier: maskOtpTarget(
identifier.includes("@") ? { email: identifier } : { phone: identifier },
),
verificationCode: token,
};
}
/** `+251911234567` -> `+251•••••4567`; `ab@x.com` -> `a•@x.com`. */
maskTarget(target: OtpTarget): string {
return maskOtpTarget(target);

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { User } from '@tria-plc/iamapi-common/entities/iam/user/user.entity';
import { UserVerification } from '@tria-plc/iamapi-common/entities/iam/user/user-verification.entity';
import { ExternalProfile } from '../companies/entities/external-profile.entity';
import { NotificationsModule } from '../notifications/notifications.module';
import { OtpModule } from '../otp/otp.module';
import { AccountController } from './account.controller';
import { AccountService } from './account.service';
@@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ import { FreightMeService } from './freight-me.service';
Employee,
]),
OtpModule,
// Reset links go out over email/SMS directly, not through the OTP service.
NotificationsModule,
],
controllers: [
FreightMeController,

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,27 @@
import { OtpTarget } from "../otp/otp.service";
function maskEmail(email: string): string {
const [local, domain] = email.split("@");
const head = local.slice(0, 1);
return `${head}${"•".repeat(Math.max(local.length - 1, 1))}@${domain}`;
}
function maskPhone(phone: string): string {
return `${phone.slice(0, 4)}${"•".repeat(Math.max(phone.length - 8, 1))}${phone.slice(-4)}`;
}
/**
* Mask an OTP target for echoing back to the caller: `+251911234567` ->
* `+251•••••4567`; `ab@x.com` -> `a•@x.com`. Never return an unmasked target to
* a caller who has not yet proven possession of the channel.
*
* A dual-channel target masks both and joins them, so the UI can say exactly
* where the code went ("a•@x.com and +251•••••4567") — a user who only checks
* one of the two otherwise assumes the other never received anything.
*/
export function maskOtpTarget(target: OtpTarget): string {
if (target.email) {
const [local, domain] = target.email.split("@");
const head = local.slice(0, 1);
return `${head}${"•".repeat(Math.max(local.length - 1, 1))}@${domain}`;
}
const phone = target.phone ?? "";
return `${phone.slice(0, 4)}${"•".repeat(Math.max(phone.length - 8, 1))}${phone.slice(-4)}`;
const parts: string[] = [];
if (target.email) parts.push(maskEmail(target.email));
if (target.phone) parts.push(maskPhone(target.phone));
return parts.join(" and ");
}

View File

@@ -253,6 +253,19 @@ export class BookingLifecycleNotifierService {
// ── Staff-facing (backoffice inbox) ────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* A booking was created under a contract. Contract drawdowns never pass
* through submit, so this is the only point at which staff learn the booking
* exists — {@link submittedToStaff} covers the direct-booking flow instead.
*/
createdToStaff(b: Booking): void {
this.inAppStaff(
b,
'New booking created',
`Booking ${this.ref(b)} was created under a contract and has entered the pipeline.`,
);
}
/** Customer submitted a booking for review. */
submittedToStaff(b: Booking): void {
this.inAppStaff(

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ describe('ContractBookingService — quantity-cap completion', () => {
{} as never, // workflowService
{} as never, // invoiceService
{} as never, // clearanceFeeService
{ createdToStaff: jest.fn() } as never, // bookingNotifier
{} as never, // dataSource
{} as never, // trainSchedulingService
{} as never, // bookingBatchService

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ describe('ContractBookingService — drawdown consolidation gate', () => {
{} as never, // workflowService
invoiceService as never,
{} as never, // clearanceFeeService
{ createdToStaff: jest.fn() } as never, // bookingNotifier
{} as never, // dataSource
{} as never, // trainSchedulingService
{} as never, // bookingBatchService

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { BookingContainerUnit } from '../bookings/entities/booking-container-uni
import { BookingsRepository } from '../bookings/bookings.repository';
import { BookingPricingService } from '../bookings/booking-pricing.service';
import { BookingTransitionService } from '../bookings/booking-transition.service';
import { BookingLifecycleNotifierService } from '../bookings/booking-lifecycle-notifier.service';
import { ConsolidationService } from '../bookings/consolidation.service';
import { PriceLineItemDto } from '../bookings/dto/generate-price-response.dto';
import { BookingInvoiceService } from '../bookings/booking-invoice.service';
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ export class ContractBookingService {
private readonly workflowService: ClearanceWorkflowService,
private readonly invoiceService: BookingInvoiceService,
private readonly clearanceFeeService: ClearanceFeeService,
private readonly bookingNotifier: BookingLifecycleNotifierService,
private readonly dataSource: DataSource,
@Inject(forwardRef(() => TrainSchedulingService))
private readonly trainSchedulingService: TrainSchedulingService,
@@ -352,6 +354,12 @@ export class ContractBookingService {
const withContainers = await this.bookingsRepository.findByIdWithFiles(
booking.id,
);
// Tell staff the booking exists. Placed after the zero-price rollback (which
// hard-deletes the row) and before the consolidation gate, so it fires
// exactly once whether the booking parks for a partner or finalizes inline.
this.bookingNotifier.createdToStaff(withContainers ?? booking);
const intendedStatus =
generalCustoms || generalSelfClear
? 'AWAITING_DOCUMENTS'
@@ -481,6 +489,7 @@ export class ContractBookingService {
);
const result = await this.bookingsRepository.findByIdWithFiles(booking.id);
this.bookingNotifier.createdToStaff(result ?? booking);
return { booking: result ?? booking, warnings: [] };
}
@@ -568,7 +577,10 @@ export class ContractBookingService {
await this.clearanceFeeService.issueForBooking(booking, contract);
}
return (await this.bookingsRepository.findByIdWithFiles(booking.id)) ?? booking;
const created =
(await this.bookingsRepository.findByIdWithFiles(booking.id)) ?? booking;
this.bookingNotifier.createdToStaff(created);
return created;
}
/**

View File

@@ -73,6 +73,27 @@ function maskPhone(phone: string): string {
return `${'•'.repeat(trimmed.length - 4)}${trimmed.slice(-4)}`;
}
/** Email counterpart of {@link maskPhone} (`jane@x.com` → `j•••@x.com`). */
function maskEmail(email: string): string {
const [local, domain] = email.trim().split('@');
if (!domain) return email.trim();
return `${local.slice(0, 1)}${'•'.repeat(Math.max(local.length - 1, 1))}@${domain}`;
}
/**
* Where the signing code went, for the "we sent a code to …" line in the UI.
* Both contacts are listed when both were used — a signer who only watches their
* handset otherwise has no idea the email carries the same code.
*/
function maskSignerContacts(contacts: { phone?: string; email?: string }): string {
return [
contacts.email ? maskEmail(contacts.email) : null,
contacts.phone ? maskPhone(contacts.phone) : null,
]
.filter(Boolean)
.join(' and ');
}
/** Status-machine guard mirroring booking-status.util. */
function assertContractStatus(contract: Contract, allowed: string[]): void {
if (!allowed.includes(contract.status)) {
@@ -109,34 +130,39 @@ export class ContractTransitionService {
) {}
/**
* The phone the signing OTP is sent to and verified against: the signer's own
* IAM account number.
* The contacts the signing OTP is sent to and verified against: the signer's
* own IAM account phone AND email. One code goes to both and either delivery
* verifies it, so a signer whose SMS is delayed can still complete from their
* inbox instead of abandoning a ready contract.
*
* H12(b): resolved server-side from the authenticated user id, never from the
* request body — a caller-supplied number would let an attacker point the code
* at their own phone. Ownership is already gated separately by
* request body — caller-supplied contacts would let an attacker point the code
* at their own phone or mailbox. Ownership is already gated separately by
* {@link ContractsService.assertCustomerCanAccessContract}, so this binds the
* signature to the *person* signing rather than to a company landline that may
* be shared, stale, or imported from eTrade.
*/
private async resolveSignerPhone(signerUserId?: string): Promise<string> {
private async resolveSignerContacts(
signerUserId?: string,
): Promise<{ phone?: string; email?: string }> {
if (!signerUserId) {
// Unreachable in practice (the ownership gate rejects a missing user
// first), but never fall back to another number if it ever changes.
// first), but never fall back to another account if it ever changes.
throw new BadRequestException('Authentication required to sign');
}
const rows: Array<{ phone_number: string | null }> =
const rows: Array<{ phone_number: string | null; email: string | null }> =
await this.dataSource.query(
`SELECT phone_number FROM iam.users WHERE id = $1 AND is_active = true`,
`SELECT phone_number, email FROM iam.users WHERE id = $1 AND is_active = true`,
[signerUserId],
);
const phone = rows[0]?.phone_number?.trim();
if (!phone) {
const email = rows[0]?.email?.trim();
if (!phone && !email) {
throw new BadRequestException(
'Your account has no registered phone number. Add one in Settings → Account before signing.',
'Your account has no registered phone number or email. Add one in Settings → Account before signing.',
);
}
return phone;
return { ...(phone ? { phone } : {}), ...(email ? { email } : {}) };
}
/** Customer submits the contract for approval → SUBMITTED; freeze unit rates. */
@@ -839,11 +865,11 @@ export class ContractTransitionService {
}
/**
* Send the sudo-mode signing OTP to the SIGNER's own registered phone — the
* same number {@link sign} verifies against. The client never picks the number
* (that is the H12(b) trust property): it only asks us to send, and we resolve
* the phone from the authenticated user id. Returns a masked hint so the UI can
* say where the code went without exposing the full number.
* Send the sudo-mode signing OTP to the SIGNER's own registered phone and
* email — the same contacts {@link sign} verifies against. The client never
* picks them (that is the H12(b) trust property): it only asks us to send, and
* we resolve them from the authenticated user id. Returns a masked hint so the
* UI can say where the code went without exposing the full values.
*/
async sendSigningOtp(
contractId: string,
@@ -858,9 +884,9 @@ export class ContractTransitionService {
);
assertContractStatus(contract, ['CONTRACT_READY']);
const signerPhone = await this.resolveSignerPhone(options.signerUserId);
await this.otpService.sendOtp({ phone: signerPhone });
return { sentTo: maskPhone(signerPhone) };
const signerContacts = await this.resolveSignerContacts(options.signerUserId);
await this.otpService.sendOtp(signerContacts);
return { sentTo: maskSignerContacts(signerContacts) };
}
/** Customer signs the ready contract → SIGNED_CUSTOMER. */
@@ -887,17 +913,17 @@ export class ContractTransitionService {
}
// Sudo-mode gate: a fresh, single-use OTP must be verified before the
// signature is applied. H12(b): verify against the SIGNER's own registered
// phone, resolved server-side from the authenticated user id — never a
// caller-supplied number, which an attacker could point at their own
// phone. Ownership is already asserted above, so this proves the specific
// person holding the account is present, not merely that someone reached a
// shared company line. Must resolve identically to sendSigningOtp, or send
// and verify would target different numbers.
const signerPhone = await this.resolveSignerPhone(options.signerUserId);
// contacts, resolved server-side from the authenticated user id — never
// caller-supplied ones, which an attacker could point at their own phone
// or mailbox. Ownership is already asserted above, so this proves the
// specific person holding the account is present, not merely that someone
// reached a shared company line. Must resolve identically to
// sendSigningOtp, or send and verify would target different contacts.
const signerContacts = await this.resolveSignerContacts(options.signerUserId);
if (!dto.otp) {
throw new BadRequestException('OTP verification is required to sign the contract');
}
await this.otpService.verifyOtpForAction({ phone: signerPhone }, dto.otp);
await this.otpService.verifyOtpForAction(signerContacts, dto.otp);
await this.applySignature(contract, dto, options);
await this.contractsRepository.update(contractId, {
status: 'SIGNED_CUSTOMER',

View File

@@ -11,12 +11,17 @@ import {
import { OtpService, OtpTarget } from "./otp.service";
import { Public } from "@edr/api-common";
// Exactly one of phone/email must be present per request — the channel the
// code is sent through / checked against.
// At least one of phone/email must be present. When BOTH are given the code is
// sent to both and either one verifies it — the caller no longer picks a single
// channel, it just states every address it knows for the account.
function toTarget(phone?: string, email?: string): OtpTarget {
if (email) return { email };
if (phone) return { phone };
throw new BadRequestException("phone or email is required");
const target: OtpTarget = {};
if (email?.trim()) target.email = email;
if (phone?.trim()) target.phone = phone;
if (!target.email && !target.phone) {
throw new BadRequestException("phone or email is required");
}
return target;
}
// TODO: these public routes need per-target + per-IP rate limiting (a NestJS

View File

@@ -4,10 +4,12 @@ import { Injectable } from "@nestjs/common";
import { InjectRepository } from "@nestjs/typeorm";
import { Repository } from "typeorm";
import { FindOptionsWhere, Repository } from "typeorm";
import { OtpVerification } from "./otp.entity";
type Target = { phone?: string; email?: string };
@Injectable()
export class OtpRepository {
constructor(
@@ -46,54 +48,112 @@ export class OtpRepository {
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Find By Target (either channel)
// Find By Target (any named channel)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async findByTarget(
target: { phone?: string; email?: string }
) {
return target.email
? this.findByEmail(target.email)
: this.findByPhone(target.phone!);
}
/**
* OR across every channel the target names. A code sent to both phone and
* email lives in ONE row carrying both values, so a verify that quotes either
* one resolves the same row — that is what makes "sent to both, verify with
* either" work.
*/
private whereForTarget(
target: Target
): FindOptionsWhere<OtpVerification>[] {
const where: FindOptionsWhere<OtpVerification>[] =
[];
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Create OTP
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async createOtp(
target: { phone?: string; email?: string },
otp: string
) {
const entity =
this.repository.create({
phone: target.phone,
if (target.email)
where.push({
email: target.email,
otp,
verified: false,
});
return this.repository.save(
entity
if (target.phone)
where.push({
phone: target.phone,
});
return where;
}
async findAllByTarget(
target: Target
) {
const where =
this.whereForTarget(target);
if (!where.length) return [];
// Newest first: a target that somehow overlaps two legacy single-channel
// rows should resolve to the most recently issued code, not an arbitrary one.
return this.repository.find({
where,
order: { updatedAt: "DESC" },
});
}
async findByTarget(
target: Target
) {
const [
newest,
] = await this.findAllByTarget(
target
);
return newest ?? null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Update OTP
// Replace OTP (upsert across every channel the target names)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async updateOtp(
otpVerification: OtpVerification,
/**
* Drop every row this target overlaps and write a single fresh one holding
* all its channels.
*
* `phone` and `email` are each UNIQUE, so a dual-channel send can collide with
* up to two pre-existing single-channel rows (say an old signup code on the
* phone and a reset code on the email). Merging into one row instead of
* updating in place is what keeps that from raising a unique violation, and it
* preserves the single-use guarantee: consuming the code deletes one row and
* kills every channel it was sent to at once.
*
* "Last code sent wins" was already the behaviour between any two flows
* sharing this table — this only widens it from one channel to all of them.
*/
async replaceOtp(
target: Target,
otp: string
) {
otpVerification.otp = otp;
): Promise<{
record: OtpVerification;
rotated: boolean;
}> {
const existing =
await this.findAllByTarget(
target
);
otpVerification.verified =
false;
if (existing.length) {
await this.repository.remove(
existing
);
}
return this.repository.save(
otpVerification
);
const record =
await this.repository.save(
this.repository.create({
phone: target.phone,
email: target.email,
otp,
verified: false,
})
);
return {
record,
rotated: existing.length > 0,
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -115,8 +175,8 @@ export class OtpRepository {
// Delete OTP (single-use consume)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Hard delete so the unique `phone` row is freed and a fresh code can be
// requested for the same number on the next action.
// Hard delete so the unique `phone`/`email` rows are freed and a fresh code can
// be requested for the same target on the next action.
async deleteOtp(
otpVerification: OtpVerification
) {
@@ -124,4 +184,4 @@ export class OtpRepository {
otpVerification
);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -28,55 +28,216 @@ describe('normalizeOtpTarget', () => {
});
});
describe('OtpService — send/verify agree across phone formats', () => {
// In-memory fake keyed by the exact phone string the service stores under, so
// the test proves normalisation makes send and verify collide on one key.
function makeService() {
const rows = new Map<string, { phone?: string; email?: string; otp: string; updatedAt: Date }>();
const repo = {
findByTarget: jest.fn(async (t: { phone?: string; email?: string }) =>
rows.get(t.email ?? t.phone!) ?? null,
),
updateOtp: jest.fn(async (existing: { otp: string }, otp: string) => {
existing.otp = otp;
}),
createOtp: jest.fn(async (t: { phone?: string; email?: string }, otp: string) => {
rows.set(t.phone ?? t.email!, { ...t, otp, updatedAt: new Date(0) });
}),
deleteOtp: jest.fn(async (row: { phone?: string; email?: string }) => {
rows.delete(row.phone ?? row.email!);
}),
};
// Both clients return `{ queued }` — the service reads it to tell a published
// code apart from one the transport silently dropped.
const sms = { sendSms: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ queued: true }) };
const email = { sendEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ queued: true }) };
const service = new OtpService(repo as never, sms as never, email as never);
return { service, rows };
}
interface FakeRow {
id: string;
phone?: string;
email?: string;
otp: string;
updatedAt: Date;
}
/**
* In-memory stand-in for OtpRepository, mirroring the two properties the service
* depends on: rows are matched by OR across every channel named, and a send
* replaces all overlapping rows with one row carrying every channel.
*/
function makeService(
transports: {
sms?: () => Promise<{ queued: boolean }>;
email?: () => Promise<{ queued: boolean }>;
} = {},
) {
let rows: FakeRow[] = [];
let nextId = 1;
const matches = (row: FakeRow, t: { phone?: string; email?: string }) =>
(!!t.email && row.email === t.email) || (!!t.phone && row.phone === t.phone);
const repo = {
findByTarget: jest.fn(
async (t: { phone?: string; email?: string }) =>
rows.filter((row) => matches(row, t))[0] ?? null,
),
replaceOtp: jest.fn(
async (t: { phone?: string; email?: string }, otp: string) => {
const overlapping = rows.filter((row) => matches(row, t));
rows = rows.filter((row) => !overlapping.includes(row));
const record: FakeRow = {
id: String(nextId++),
...t,
otp,
updatedAt: new Date(),
};
rows.push(record);
return { record, rotated: overlapping.length > 0 };
},
),
deleteOtp: jest.fn(async (row: FakeRow) => {
rows = rows.filter((r) => r !== row);
}),
};
// Both clients return `{ queued }` — the service reads it to tell a published
// code apart from one the transport silently dropped.
const sms = {
sendSms: jest.fn(transports.sms ?? (async () => ({ queued: true }))),
};
const email = {
sendEmail: jest.fn(transports.email ?? (async () => ({ queued: true }))),
};
const service = new OtpService(repo as never, sms as never, email as never);
return { service, sms, email, rows: () => rows };
}
describe('OtpService — send/verify agree across phone formats', () => {
it('verifies a code sent to +251… when verify is called with 09…', async () => {
const { service, rows } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp({ phone: '+251986680099' });
const stored = [...rows.values()][0]!.otp;
// Fresh TTL: stamp updatedAt to now so the action verifier does not expire it.
[...rows.values()][0]!.updatedAt = new Date();
await expect(
service.verifyOtpForAction({ phone: '0986680099' }, stored),
service.verifyOtpForAction({ phone: '0986680099' }, rows()[0]!.otp),
).resolves.toEqual({ success: true });
});
it('verifies a code sent to User@X.com when verify is called with user@x.com', async () => {
const { service, rows } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp({ email: ' User@Example.COM ' });
const stored = [...rows.values()][0]!.otp;
[...rows.values()][0]!.updatedAt = new Date();
await expect(
service.verifyOtpForAction({ email: 'user@example.com' }, stored),
service.verifyOtpForAction({ email: 'user@example.com' }, rows()[0]!.otp),
).resolves.toEqual({ success: true });
});
});
describe('OtpService — dual-channel send', () => {
const both = { phone: '0986680099', email: 'User@Example.COM' };
it('sends ONE code to both transports', async () => {
const { service, sms, email, rows } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp(both);
const otp = rows()[0]!.otp;
expect(sms.sendSms).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(email.sendEmail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// Same secret on both messages — the user types whichever arrives first.
expect(sms.sendSms).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
to: '+251986680099',
message: expect.stringContaining(otp),
}),
);
expect(email.sendEmail).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
to: 'user@example.com',
text: expect.stringContaining(otp),
}),
);
// One row, both channels canonicalised.
expect(rows()).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows()[0]).toMatchObject({
phone: '+251986680099',
email: 'user@example.com',
});
});
it.each([
['phone alone', { phone: '0986680099' }],
['email alone', { email: 'user@example.com' }],
['both', both],
])('verifies a dual-channel code when quoted back by %s', async (_label, target) => {
const { service, rows } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp(both);
await expect(
service.verifyOtpForAction(target, rows()[0]!.otp),
).resolves.toEqual({ success: true });
});
it('consuming the code via one channel kills the other', async () => {
const { service, rows } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp(both);
const otp = rows()[0]!.otp;
await service.verifyOtpForAction({ email: 'user@example.com' }, otp);
// Single-use is per-code, not per-channel: the phone half must be dead too.
await expect(
service.verifyOtpForAction({ phone: '0986680099' }, otp),
).rejects.toThrow(/No verification code was requested/);
});
it('replaces an overlapping single-channel row instead of colliding with it', async () => {
const { service, rows } = makeService();
// A pending signup code on the phone only, then a dual-channel send.
await service.sendOtp({ phone: '0986680099' });
await service.sendOtp(both);
expect(rows()).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows()[0]).toMatchObject({ email: 'user@example.com' });
});
it('degrades to one channel when the account has only one contact', async () => {
const { service, sms, email } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp({ phone: '0986680099' });
expect(sms.sendSms).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(email.sendEmail).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('still succeeds when one transport throws', async () => {
const { service, rows } = makeService({
sms: async () => {
throw new Error('broker down');
},
});
await expect(service.sendOtp(both)).resolves.toMatchObject({
success: true,
delivered: true,
});
// The code is live and verifiable on the channel that worked.
await expect(
service.verifyOtpForAction({ email: 'user@example.com' }, rows()[0]!.otp),
).resolves.toEqual({ success: true });
});
it('fails the request when every transport throws', async () => {
const { service } = makeService({
sms: async () => {
throw new Error('broker down');
},
email: async () => {
throw new Error('broker down');
},
});
await expect(service.sendOtp(both)).rejects.toThrow('Failed to send OTP');
});
it('shares one brute-force budget across both channels', async () => {
const { service, rows } = makeService();
await service.sendOtp(both);
const otp = rows()[0]!.otp;
// Alternating channels must not hand the attacker two independent budgets:
// 5 wrong guesses in total burn the code regardless of how they are split.
for (const target of [
{ phone: '0986680099' },
{ email: 'user@example.com' },
{ phone: '0986680099' },
{ email: 'user@example.com' },
]) {
await expect(service.verifyOtpForAction(target, '000000')).rejects.toThrow(
'Invalid verification code',
);
}
await expect(
service.verifyOtpForAction({ email: 'user@example.com' }, '000000'),
).rejects.toThrow(/Too many incorrect attempts/);
// Burned: even the correct code no longer works.
await expect(service.verifyOtpForAction(both, otp)).rejects.toThrow(
/No verification code was requested/,
);
});
});

View File

@@ -8,10 +8,24 @@ import { OtpRepository } from "./otp.repository";
import { SmsClientService } from "../notifications/sms-client.service";
import { EmailClientService } from "../notifications/email-client.service";
// Exactly one of phone/email is set — enforced by the controller before it
// reaches here.
/**
* Where a code goes. At least one of phone/email must be set — enforced by the
* controller and re-checked here. When BOTH are set the same code is sent to
* both and either one can be used to verify it: a user who never receives the
* SMS can still finish from their inbox, and vice versa. Callers that resolve
* contacts from IAM pass whatever the account actually has, so an account with
* only one of the two silently degrades to a single channel.
*/
export type OtpTarget = { phone?: string; email?: string };
/** Which transports a target resolves to, in a stable order for logging. */
function channelsOf(target: OtpTarget): Array<"email" | "sms"> {
const channels: Array<"email" | "sms"> = [];
if (target.email) channels.push("email");
if (target.phone) channels.push("sms");
return channels;
}
/**
* Canonicalise a phone to E.164 so the code stored on send and the one looked
* up on verify collide regardless of how the number was typed. Without this,
@@ -19,30 +33,51 @@ export type OtpTarget = { phone?: string; email?: string };
* a code sent to one is invisible to the others — the send/verify halves must
* agree on the exact string. Ethiopian local `09…`/`07…` (10 digits) maps to
* `+2519…`/`+2517…`; a bare `251…` gains its `+`; anything already `+…` is kept.
* Email targets pass through untouched.
*/
function normalizePhone(rawPhone: string): string {
const raw = rawPhone.trim();
const digits = raw.replace(/[^\d+]/g, '');
if (digits.startsWith('+')) return digits;
const bare = digits.replace(/^0+/, '');
if (/^251\d{9}$/.test(digits)) return `+${digits}`;
if (/^9\d{8}$|^7\d{8}$/.test(bare)) return `+251${bare}`;
// Unknown shape (foreign number, already-clean intl without +) — prefix + if
// it looks like a full international number, else leave as typed.
return digits.length >= 11 ? `+${digits}` : raw;
}
/**
* Canonicalise every channel present on the target. Each field is normalised
* independently — a dual-channel target must end up with both halves in their
* canonical form, since verify may arrive naming either one.
*/
export function normalizeOtpTarget(target: OtpTarget): OtpTarget {
if (target.email) {
// Same contract as the phone branch below: the string stored on send and the
// one looked up on verify must be byte-identical, or the code is invisible to
// the verifier. Addresses reach us from a raw `@Body("email")` with no DTO or
// ValidationPipe, so `User@X.com`, `user@x.com` and a copy-paste with a
const normalized: OtpTarget = {};
if (target.email?.trim()) {
// Same contract as the phone branch: the string stored on send and the one
// looked up on verify must be byte-identical, or the code is invisible to
// the verifier. Addresses reach us from a raw `@Body("email")` with no DTO
// or ValidationPipe, so `User@X.com`, `user@x.com` and a copy-paste with a
// trailing space are three different keys for one mailbox. Domains are
// case-insensitive (RFC 1035); local-parts are formally case-sensitive
// (RFC 5321 §2.4) but no mail provider in practice treats them so, and
// matching what users expect beats matching the letter of the spec here.
return { email: target.email.trim().toLowerCase() };
normalized.email = target.email.trim().toLowerCase();
}
if (!target.phone) return target;
const raw = target.phone.trim();
const digits = raw.replace(/[^\d+]/g, '');
if (digits.startsWith('+')) return { phone: digits };
const bare = digits.replace(/^0+/, '');
if (/^251\d{9}$/.test(digits)) return { phone: `+${digits}` };
if (/^9\d{8}$|^7\d{8}$/.test(bare)) return { phone: `+251${bare}` };
// Unknown shape (foreign number, already-clean intl without +) — prefix + if
// it looks like a full international number, else leave as typed.
return { phone: digits.length >= 11 ? `+${digits}` : raw };
if (target.phone?.trim()) {
normalized.phone = normalizePhone(target.phone);
}
return normalized;
}
/** One transport's hand-off outcome. Never thrown — collected and reported. */
interface DispatchOutcome {
channel: "email" | "sms";
queued: boolean;
error?: string;
}
@Injectable()
@@ -69,35 +104,35 @@ export class OtpService {
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async sendOtp(rawTarget: OtpTarget) {
// Store under the canonical E.164 key so verify (which normalises the same
// way) always finds this row regardless of how either side typed the number.
// Store under the canonical keys so verify (which normalises the same way)
// always finds this row regardless of how either side typed the number.
const target = normalizeOtpTarget(rawTarget);
const channel = target.email ? "email" : "sms";
const channels = channelsOf(target);
const label = this.targetLabel(target);
const startedAt = Date.now();
if (channels.length === 0) {
throw new BadRequestException("phone or email is required");
}
try {
// The verification code is generated server-side — never supplied by the
// caller — so the OTP stays a secret known only to the server and the
// recipient of the SMS/email.
// recipient of the SMS/email. ONE code covers every channel: the user
// types whichever message reaches them first.
const otp = this.generateOtp();
// find existing row for this channel
const existing = await this.otpRepository.findByTarget(target);
// update existing otp
if (existing) {
await this.otpRepository.updateOtp(existing, otp);
} else {
// create new otp
await this.otpRepository.createOtp(target, otp);
}
// Replaces every row this target overlaps with, so a dual-channel send
// leaves exactly one row holding both halves — verify then resolves the
// same row whichever channel it is given.
const { rotated } = await this.otpRepository.replaceOtp(target, otp);
// `rotate` means a code already existed for this target and was replaced —
// the previous one is now dead. A user holding a slow-to-arrive SMS and
// typing its code will fail against the row; this line is how that shows up
// in the log rather than as an unexplained "invalid OTP" report.
this.logger.log(
`otp.issue channel=${channel} target=${label} action=${existing ? "rotate" : "create"}`,
`otp.issue channels=${channels.join("+")} target=${label} action=${rotated ? "rotate" : "create"}`,
);
// NOTE: do NOT reset the brute-force attempt counter on send. Clearing it
@@ -108,35 +143,49 @@ export class OtpService {
// /otp/verify routes (a NestJS ThrottlerGuard / @Throttle) — none exists
// in the codebase yet.
// Fan out to every channel the target has, independently: one transport
// being down must not suppress the other, which is the whole point of
// sending to both. Each helper swallows its own failure so a rejected
// email publish still leaves the SMS delivered (and the code valid).
const outcomes = (
await Promise.all([
target.email ? this.dispatchEmail(target.email, otp) : null,
target.phone ? this.dispatchSms(target.phone, otp) : null,
])
).filter((outcome): outcome is DispatchOutcome => outcome !== null);
for (const outcome of outcomes) {
this.logger.log(
`otp.dispatch channel=${outcome.channel} target=${label} queued=${
outcome.queued
} latencyMs=${Date.now() - startedAt}${
outcome.error ? ` error=${outcome.error}` : ""
}`,
);
}
// Every channel threw. Nothing can arrive and there is no partial success
// to preserve — fail the request the way a single-channel send always did.
if (outcomes.every((outcome) => outcome.error)) {
throw new Error(
outcomes.map((o) => `${o.channel}: ${o.error}`).join("; "),
);
}
// Both clients report hand-off, not delivery — capture it rather than
// discarding it, so "queued=false" is distinguishable from a code that was
// published fine and lost downstream at the carrier.
const { queued } = target.email
? await this.emailClient.sendEmail({
to: target.email,
subject: "Your EDR Freight verification code",
text: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
})
: await this.smsClient.sendSms({
to: target.phone as string,
message: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
});
// discarding it, so "delivered=false" is distinguishable from a code that
// was published fine and lost downstream at the carrier.
const delivered = outcomes.some((outcome) => outcome.queued);
this.logger.log(
`otp.dispatch channel=${channel} target=${label} queued=${queued} latencyMs=${
Date.now() - startedAt
}`,
);
if (!queued) {
if (!delivered) {
// The row is committed and we are about to answer "OTP sent successfully",
// but nothing left this process. Without this line the only symptom is a
// user who never receives a code — indistinguishable from carrier loss,
// and the misleading success response makes it look like our side worked.
this.logger.error(
`otp.dispatch.dropped channel=${channel} target=${label} rabbitmqEnabled=${
`otp.dispatch.dropped channels=${channels.join("+")} target=${label} rabbitmqEnabled=${
process.env.RABBITMQ_ENABLED ?? "unset"
} — transport reported no hand-off; no code will arrive for this send`,
} no transport reported hand-off; no code will arrive for this send`,
);
}
@@ -146,13 +195,13 @@ export class OtpService {
// aggregation is the debugging path for flaky SMS here) — if that tradeoff
// is ever revisited, gate on an env flag rather than deleting the line, so
// dev keeps its workflow.
this.logger.log(`OTP send for ${target.email ?? target.phone}: ${otp}`);
this.logger.log(`OTP send for ${label}: ${otp}`);
return {
success: true,
// Distinguishes "we published it" from "the transport is a no-op". The
// HTTP response shape is unchanged; the controller drops this field.
delivered: queued,
delivered,
message: "OTP sent successfully",
};
@@ -160,7 +209,7 @@ export class OtpService {
// Log the real cause (DB/SMS/email failure) with its stack so a deployed
// "Failed to send OTP" 400 is diagnosable from the API logs, not opaque.
this.logger.error(
`otp.dispatch.failed channel=${channel} target=${label} latencyMs=${
`otp.dispatch.failed channels=${channels.join("+")} target=${label} latencyMs=${
Date.now() - startedAt
}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
error instanceof Error ? error.stack : undefined,
@@ -170,13 +219,60 @@ export class OtpService {
}
/**
* Correlation key shared by every `otp.*` line for one address, so a send and
* its later verify can be joined with a single grep. The raw target is used
* Publish to one transport, converting a throw into a reported outcome. A
* broker error on one channel must not abort the other — with dual-channel
* sends the user still has a working route to the code.
*/
private async dispatchEmail(
email: string,
otp: string,
): Promise<DispatchOutcome> {
try {
const { queued } = await this.emailClient.sendEmail({
to: email,
subject: "Your EDR Freight verification code",
text: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
});
return { channel: "email", queued };
} catch (error) {
return {
channel: "email",
queued: false,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
};
}
}
/** SMS half of {@link dispatchEmail}; same swallow-and-report contract. */
private async dispatchSms(
phone: string,
otp: string,
): Promise<DispatchOutcome> {
try {
const { queued } = await this.smsClient.sendSms({
to: phone,
message: `Your verification code is ${otp}`,
});
return { channel: "sms", queued };
} catch (error) {
return {
channel: "sms",
queued: false,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
};
}
}
/**
* Correlation key shared by every `otp.*` line for one target, so a send and
* its later verify can be joined with a single grep. The raw values are used
* because the code itself is already logged in cleartext above — hashing the
* address while printing the credential next to it would buy nothing.
*/
private targetLabel(target: OtpTarget): string {
return target.email ?? target.phone ?? "unknown";
return (
[target.email, target.phone].filter(Boolean).join("+") || "unknown"
);
}
/**
@@ -190,15 +286,37 @@ export class OtpService {
result: "ok" | "invalid" | "expired" | "exhausted" | "not_found",
detail?: string,
) {
const line = `otp.verify channel=${
target.email ? "email" : "sms"
} target=${this.targetLabel(target)} mode=${mode} result=${result}${
const line = `otp.verify channels=${channelsOf(target).join(
"+",
)} target=${this.targetLabel(target)} mode=${mode} result=${result}${
detail ? ` ${detail}` : ""
}`;
if (result === "ok") this.logger.log(line);
else this.logger.warn(line);
}
/**
* "No code for this target" phrased for whichever channels were named. A
* dual-channel caller gets a neutral message — naming one channel would be
* misleading when the code went to both.
*/
private notFoundMessage(target: OtpTarget, requested: boolean): string {
const channels = channelsOf(target);
if (channels.length !== 1) {
return requested
? "No verification code was requested for this account"
: "No verification code found for this account";
}
if (target.email) {
return requested
? "No verification code was requested for this email"
: "Email address not found";
}
return requested
? "No verification code was requested for this phone"
: "Phone number not found";
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Verify OTP
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -207,20 +325,24 @@ export class OtpService {
// Same canonicalisation as sendOtp so a code stored under +2519… is found
// when verify is called with 09… (or any equivalent form).
const target = normalizeOtpTarget(rawTarget);
// find the channel's row
// Matches on ANY channel the caller named, so a code sent to both phone and
// email verifies whichever one the user quotes back.
const otpData = await this.otpRepository.findByTarget(target);
const key = this.targetKey(target);
// not found
if (!otpData) {
// No row for this key. Most often a normalisation mismatch or a code that
// was already consumed/burned — not necessarily a caller who never asked.
// No row for this target. Most often a normalisation mismatch or a code
// that was already consumed/burned — not necessarily a caller who never
// asked.
this.logVerify(target, "simple", "not_found");
throw new BadRequestException(
target.email ? "Email address not found" : "Phone number not found",
);
throw new BadRequestException(this.notFoundMessage(target, false));
}
// Key the attempt budget on the ROW, not on the channels the caller happened
// to name — otherwise guessing alternately by phone and by email would hand
// an attacker two independent budgets against the same code.
const key = otpData.id;
// TTL: reuse the same age window as the hardened action verifier — an old
// code can't be verified.
const ageMs = Date.now() - new Date(otpData.updatedAt).getTime();
@@ -265,7 +387,8 @@ export class OtpService {
throw new BadRequestException("Invalid OTP");
}
// single-use: consume the code on success so it can't be replayed.
// single-use: consume the code on success so it can't be replayed. One row
// covers every channel it was sent to, so this kills all of them at once.
await this.otpRepository.deleteOtp(otpData);
this.actionAttempts.delete(key);
this.logVerify(target, "simple", "ok", `ageMs=${ageMs}`);
@@ -273,9 +396,7 @@ export class OtpService {
return {
success: true,
message: target.email
? "Email verified successfully"
: "Phone verified successfully",
message: "Verification successful",
};
}
@@ -297,10 +418,6 @@ export class OtpService {
private readonly MAX_ACTION_ATTEMPTS = 5;
private readonly actionAttempts = new Map<string, number>();
private targetKey(target: OtpTarget): string {
return target.email ? `email:${target.email}` : `phone:${target.phone}`;
}
async verifyOtpForAction(
rawTarget: OtpTarget,
otp: string,
@@ -308,17 +425,14 @@ export class OtpService {
) {
const target = normalizeOtpTarget(rawTarget);
const otpData = await this.otpRepository.findByTarget(target);
const key = this.targetKey(target);
if (!otpData) {
this.logVerify(target, "action", "not_found");
throw new BadRequestException(
target.email
? "No verification code was requested for this email"
: "No verification code was requested for this phone",
);
throw new BadRequestException(this.notFoundMessage(target, true));
}
// Row-keyed for the same reason as verifyOtp: one code, one budget.
const key = otpData.id;
const ageMs = Date.now() - new Date(otpData.updatedAt).getTime();
if (ageMs > ttlMs) {

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
import axios from "axios";
import { API_BASE_URL } from "@/constants/apiConfig";
import {
emitApiError,
extractApiErrorPayload,
} from "@/components/errors/ApiErrorModal";
import { captureApiError } from "@/lib/posthog";
import {
AUTH_TOKEN_COOKIE,
@@ -120,8 +116,8 @@ api.interceptors.response.use(
error.response.status !== 401 &&
!originalRequest?.suppressErrorModal
) {
const payload = extractApiErrorPayload(error);
if (payload) emitApiError(payload);
// const payload = extractApiErrorPayload(error);
// if (payload) emitApiError(payload);
}
return Promise.reject(error);
}

View File

@@ -58,13 +58,9 @@ export interface LoginResponse extends Partial<AuthTokens> {
mfaRequired?: boolean;
}
/** The channel a password-reset code is delivered over. */
export type ResetChannel = "email" | "phone";
export interface ForgotPasswordRequestPayload {
/** Email, username, or E.164 phone — whatever the user typed, normalised. */
identifier: string;
channel: ResetChannel;
}
export interface ForgotPasswordVerifyPayload extends ForgotPasswordRequestPayload {

View File

@@ -1,70 +1,20 @@
import { Alert, Button, PinInput, SegmentedControl, Stack, Text } from "@mantine/core";
import {
AlertCircle,
ArrowLeft,
Mail,
RotateCw,
ShieldCheck,
Smartphone,
} from "lucide-react";
import { Alert, Button, PinInput, Stack, Text } from "@mantine/core";
import { AlertCircle, ArrowLeft, RotateCw, ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react";
import { maskEmail, maskPhone } from "@/utils/identifier";
export type OtpChannel = "phone" | "email";
export const OTP_LENGTH = 6;
export interface OtpChannelSelectProps {
value: OtpChannel;
onChange: (channel: OtpChannel) => void;
disabled?: boolean;
label?: string;
}
/** Phone/email toggle deciding where the verification code is sent. */
export function OtpChannelSelect({
value,
onChange,
disabled,
label = "Send verification code via",
}: OtpChannelSelectProps) {
return (
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Text size="sm" fw={500} c="edr-text">
{label}
</Text>
<SegmentedControl
fullWidth
disabled={disabled}
value={value}
onChange={(v) => onChange(v as OtpChannel)}
data={[
{
value: "phone",
label: (
<span className="flex items-center justify-center gap-1.5">
<Smartphone size={14} /> Phone
</span>
),
},
{
value: "email",
label: (
<span className="flex items-center justify-center gap-1.5">
<Mail size={14} /> Email
</span>
),
},
]}
/>
</div>
);
}
export interface OtpChannelStepProps {
channel: OtpChannel;
/** Raw email or phone the code went to; masked before display. */
target: string;
/**
* Raw contacts the code was sent to; masked before display. The API sends one
* code to every contact on the account, so both are usually set — pass only
* what the client actually knows. Omit both when the client cannot know them
* (the forgot-password flow deliberately never reveals an account's contacts)
* and a generic line is shown instead.
*/
email?: string;
phone?: string;
value: string;
onChange: (otp: string) => void;
onVerify: () => void;
@@ -82,11 +32,13 @@ export interface OtpChannelStepProps {
/**
* The "enter the code we sent you" stage. Shared by signup and the
* forgot-password flow — both send through the same `/api/otp/*` service.
* forgot-password flow — both send through the same `/api/otp/*` service, which
* delivers a single code to the account's email AND phone; whichever message
* arrives first can be typed here.
*/
export default function OtpChannelStep({
channel,
target,
email,
phone,
value,
onChange,
onVerify,
@@ -100,7 +52,10 @@ export default function OtpChannelStep({
description,
submitLabel,
}: OtpChannelStepProps) {
const maskedTarget = channel === "email" ? maskEmail(target) : maskPhone(target);
const maskedTargets = [
email ? maskEmail(email) : null,
phone ? maskPhone(phone) : null,
].filter(Boolean) as string[];
const busy = sending || verifying;
return (
@@ -113,12 +68,23 @@ export default function OtpChannelStep({
<div className="space-y-1.5 text-center">
<h1 className="text-xl font-bold tracking-tight text-gray-900 sm:text-2xl">
{title ?? `Verify your ${channel === "email" ? "email" : "phone"}`}
{title ?? "Verify it's you"}
</h1>
<p className="text-sm leading-relaxed text-gray-500">
We sent a {OTP_LENGTH}-digit code to{" "}
<span className="font-medium text-gray-700">{maskedTarget}</span>.{" "}
{description ?? "Enter it to continue."}
{maskedTargets.length ? (
maskedTargets.map((target, index) => (
<span key={target}>
{index > 0 ? " and " : null}
<span className="font-medium text-gray-700">{target}</span>
</span>
))
) : (
<span className="font-medium text-gray-700">
the email and phone on your account
</span>
)}
. {description ?? "Enter it to continue."}
</p>
</div>

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { Button, Modal, Radio, Stack, Text } from "@mantine/core";
import { useMutation } from "@tanstack/react-query";
import { Alert, Button, Loader, Modal, Radio, Stack, Text } from "@mantine/core";
import { useMutation, useQuery } from "@tanstack/react-query";
import { KeyRound } from "lucide-react";
import { useState } from "react";
@@ -10,32 +10,48 @@ import { api } from "@/services/api";
import type { Company, ResetChannel } from "@/types/customer";
export interface ResetPasswordActionProps {
company: Pick<Company, "id" | "email" | "phone">;
company: Pick<Company, "id">;
}
/**
* Staff-triggered password reset. Sends a one-time code to the customer's
* primary contact; the customer picks their own new password. No credential is
* ever shown to or handled by staff.
* Staff-triggered password reset. Sends a single-use link to the customer's
* primary contact; the customer opens it and picks their own new password. No
* credential is ever shown to or handled by staff.
*/
export default function ResetPasswordAction({ company }: ResetPasswordActionProps) {
export default function ResetPasswordAction({
company,
}: ResetPasswordActionProps) {
const { user } = useAuth();
const { toast } = useToast();
const [opened, setOpened] = useState(false);
const [channel, setChannel] = useState<ResetChannel>("phone");
const allowed = hasPermission(user, FREIGHT_PERMS.customers.resetPassword);
// The destination is the primary contact's IAM account, not the company
// record — those are different fields and routinely hold different values, so
// showing `company.phone` here would tell staff the wrong number. Only fetched
// once the modal is open.
const targetQuery = useQuery(
api.customers.resetTarget.queryOptions({
input: { companyId: company.id },
enabled: allowed && opened,
}),
);
const target = targetQuery.data;
const { mutate, isPending } = useMutation(
api.customers.resetPassword.mutationOptions({
onSuccess: (result) => {
setOpened(false);
toast({
title: "Reset code sent",
description: `The customer can now reset their password using the code sent to ${result.maskedTarget}.`,
title: "Reset link sent",
description: `The customer can set a new password using the link sent to ${result.maskedTarget}. It expires in 24 hours.`,
});
},
onError: (error) => {
toast({
title: "Could not send reset code",
title: "Could not send reset link",
description: error.message,
variant: "destructive",
});
@@ -43,7 +59,10 @@ export default function ResetPasswordAction({ company }: ResetPasswordActionProp
}),
);
if (!hasPermission(user, FREIGHT_PERMS.customers.resetPassword)) return null;
if (!allowed) return null;
const channelMissing =
!!target && (channel === "email" ? !target.email : !target.phone);
return (
<>
@@ -58,46 +77,66 @@ export default function ResetPasswordAction({ company }: ResetPasswordActionProp
<Modal
opened={opened}
onClose={() => setOpened(false)}
title="Send a password-reset code"
title="Send a password-reset link"
centered
>
<Stack gap="md">
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">
We&apos;ll send a one-time code to this customer&apos;s primary contact.
They choose their own new password you will not see it.
We&apos;ll send a single-use link to this customer&apos;s primary
contact. They choose their own new password you will not see it.
The link expires in 24 hours.
</Text>
<Radio.Group
value={channel}
onChange={(v) => setChannel(v as ResetChannel)}
label="Send the code via"
>
<Stack gap="xs" mt="xs">
<Radio
value="phone"
label="SMS"
description={company.phone ?? "No phone on the company record"}
/>
<Radio
value="email"
label="Email"
description={company.email ?? "No email on the company record"}
/>
{targetQuery.isLoading ? (
<Stack align="center" py="md">
<Loader size="sm" />
</Stack>
</Radio.Group>
) : targetQuery.isError ? (
<Alert color="red" variant="light">
{targetQuery.error.message}
</Alert>
) : target ? (
<>
<Radio.Group
value={channel}
onChange={(v) => setChannel(v as ResetChannel)}
label={`Send the link to ${target.name || "the primary contact"} via`}
>
<Stack gap="xs" mt="xs">
<Radio
value="phone"
label="SMS"
disabled={!target.phone}
description={
target.phone ?? "No phone number on this account"
}
/>
<Radio
value="email"
label="Email"
disabled={!target.email}
description={
target.email ?? "No email address on this account"
}
/>
</Stack>
</Radio.Group>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">
The code goes to the primary contact&apos;s own email or phone, which
may differ from the company contact details shown above.
</Text>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">
These are the primary contact&apos;s own login details, which may
differ from the company contact details on the profile.
</Text>
<Button
color="edr-green"
loading={isPending}
onClick={() => mutate({ companyId: company.id, channel })}
>
Send reset code
</Button>
<Button
color="edr-green"
loading={isPending}
disabled={channelMissing}
onClick={() => mutate({ companyId: company.id, channel })}
>
Send reset link
</Button>
</>
) : null}
</Stack>
</Modal>
</>

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ export const QUERY_KEYS = {
documents: (id: string) =>
["customers", "detail", id, "documents"] as const,
payments: (id: string) => ["customers", "detail", id, "payments"] as const,
resetTarget: (id: string) =>
["customers", "detail", id, "reset-target"] as const,
changeRequests: (id: string) =>
["customers", "detail", id, "change-requests"] as const,
},

View File

@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ export const URL_CONSTANTS = {
`/payments/by-company/${id}/customer-view`,
RESET_PASSWORD: (companyId: string) =>
`/backoffice/customers/${companyId}/reset-password`,
RESET_TARGET: (companyId: string) =>
`/backoffice/customers/${companyId}/reset-target`,
},
BILLING: {

View File

@@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ import {
} from "@/auth/api";
import type { ResetTicket } from "@/auth/types";
import AuthShell from "@/components/auth/AuthShell";
import OtpChannelStep, {
OTP_LENGTH,
OtpChannelSelect,
type OtpChannel,
} from "@/components/auth/OtpChannelStep";
import OtpChannelStep, { OTP_LENGTH } from "@/components/auth/OtpChannelStep";
import PasswordChecklist from "@/components/auth/PasswordChecklist";
import { useResendCooldown } from "@/hooks/useResendCooldown";
import { normaliseIdentifier } from "@/utils/identifier";
@@ -28,7 +24,6 @@ const ForgotPasswordPage = () => {
const [stage, setStage] = useState<Stage>("identify");
const [identifier, setIdentifier] = useState("");
const [channel, setChannel] = useState<OtpChannel>("phone");
const [otpCode, setOtpCode] = useState("");
// The reset ticket lives in memory only — persisting it would leave a
// password-change credential sitting in localStorage.
@@ -45,7 +40,7 @@ const ForgotPasswordPage = () => {
const normalised = normaliseIdentifier(identifier);
const sendCode = async () => {
await requestPasswordResetRequest({ identifier: normalised, channel });
await requestPasswordResetRequest({ identifier: normalised });
setOtpCode("");
resendCooldown.start();
};
@@ -89,7 +84,6 @@ const ForgotPasswordPage = () => {
try {
const result = await verifyPasswordResetOtpRequest({
identifier: normalised,
channel,
otp: otpCode.trim(),
});
setTicket(result);
@@ -138,13 +132,10 @@ const ForgotPasswordPage = () => {
}
};
const identifierLabel =
channel === "email" ? "the email on your account" : "the phone on your account";
return (
<AuthShell
tagline="Recover your account"
taglineBody="Reset your EDR Freight backoffice password with a one-time code sent to your email or phone."
taglineBody="Reset your EDR Freight backoffice password with a one-time code sent to your email and phone."
>
<div className="flex w-full flex-col">
{stage === "identify" ? (
@@ -176,16 +167,9 @@ const ForgotPasswordPage = () => {
onChange={(event) => setIdentifier(event.target.value)}
/>
<OtpChannelSelect
value={channel}
onChange={setChannel}
disabled={sending}
label="Send the code to"
/>
<p className="text-xs text-gray-500">
The code goes to {identifierLabel}, which may differ from what you
typed above.
The code goes to the email and phone on your account, which may
differ from what you typed above.
</p>
{error ? (
@@ -217,8 +201,6 @@ const ForgotPasswordPage = () => {
{stage === "otp" ? (
<OtpChannelStep
channel={channel}
target={normalised}
value={otpCode}
onChange={setOtpCode}
onVerify={handleVerify}

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import type {
CustomerBooking,
CustomerDocument,
CustomerPayment,
CustomerResetTarget,
PaginatedCompanies,
ProfileStatus,
ResetChannel,
@@ -2581,6 +2582,13 @@ export const api = {
({ id }) => QUERY_KEYS.CUSTOMERS.payments(id),
),
resetTarget: endpoint<{ companyId: string }, CustomerResetTarget>(
"customers",
"resetTarget",
({ companyId }) => customersService.resetTarget(companyId),
({ companyId }) => QUERY_KEYS.CUSTOMERS.resetTarget(companyId),
),
resetPassword: endpoint<
{ companyId: string; channel: ResetChannel },
ResetPasswordResult

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import type {
CustomerBooking,
CustomerDocument,
CustomerPayment,
CustomerResetTarget,
PaginatedCompanies,
ProfileStatus,
ResetChannel,
@@ -89,8 +90,20 @@ export const customersService = {
},
/**
* Send a password-reset code to the company's primary contact. Staff never
* receive a credential the customer sets their own password from the code.
* The IAM account a reset link would go to. Read before offering the action
* so staff see the credentials the link actually reaches, not the company's
* business contact details.
*/
resetTarget(companyId: string): Promise<CustomerResetTarget> {
return apiClient
.get<CustomerResetTarget>(URL_CONSTANTS.COMPANIES.RESET_TARGET(companyId))
.then((r) => r.data);
},
/**
* Send a password-reset link to the company's primary contact. Staff never
* receive a credential — the customer opens the link and sets their own
* password.
*/
resetPassword(
companyId: string,

View File

@@ -110,13 +110,27 @@ export interface CompanyChangeRequest {
updatedAt: string;
}
/** The channel a customer's password-reset code is delivered over. */
/** The channel a customer's password-reset link is delivered over. */
export type ResetChannel = "email" | "phone";
export interface ResetPasswordResult {
channel: ResetChannel;
/** Where the code went, e.g. `+251•••4821` — safe to show to staff. */
/** Where the link went, e.g. `+251•••4821` — safe to show to staff. */
maskedTarget: string;
/** ISO timestamp after which the link stops working. */
expiresAt: string;
}
/**
* The IAM account a reset link would reach — the company's primary contact.
* Distinct from `Company.email` / `Company.phone`, which are business contact
* details and routinely differ from the credentials the customer logs in with.
*/
export interface CustomerResetTarget {
userId: string;
name: string;
email: string | null;
phone: string | null;
}
/** Mirrors backend `Company` (+ its `companyProfiles`). */

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import MyPortalPage from "./pages/MyPortalPage";
import MySignaturePage from "./pages/MySignaturePage";
import SettingsPage from "./pages/SettingsPage";
import ForgotPasswordPage from "./pages/accounts/ForgotPasswordPage";
import ResetPasswordLinkPage from "./pages/accounts/ResetPasswordLinkPage";
import LoginPage from "./pages/accounts/LoginPage";
import SetPasswordPage from "./pages/accounts/SetPasswordPage";
import SignupPage from "./pages/accounts/SignupPage";
@@ -265,6 +266,11 @@ const App = () => {
<Route path="/forgot-password" element={<ForgotPasswordPage />} />
</Route>
{/* Staff-issued reset links land here. Deliberately outside
RedirectIfAuthed: a customer with a stale session still needs the link
to work, and the token — not the session — is what authorises it. */}
<Route path="/reset-password" element={<ResetPasswordLinkPage />} />
{/* Signup-flow pages; reached while a session already exists */}
<Route path="/otp" element={<VerificationOtpPage />} />
<Route path="/set-password" element={<SetPasswordPage />} />

View File

@@ -1,70 +1,20 @@
import { Alert, Button, PinInput, SegmentedControl, Stack, Text } from "@mantine/core";
import {
AlertCircle,
ArrowLeft,
Mail,
RotateCw,
ShieldCheck,
Smartphone,
} from "lucide-react";
import { Alert, Button, PinInput, Stack, Text } from "@mantine/core";
import { AlertCircle, ArrowLeft, RotateCw, ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react";
import { maskEmail, maskPhone } from "@/utils/identifier";
export type OtpChannel = "phone" | "email";
export const OTP_LENGTH = 6;
export interface OtpChannelSelectProps {
value: OtpChannel;
onChange: (channel: OtpChannel) => void;
disabled?: boolean;
label?: string;
}
/** Phone/email toggle deciding where the verification code is sent. */
export function OtpChannelSelect({
value,
onChange,
disabled,
label = "Send verification code via",
}: OtpChannelSelectProps) {
return (
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Text size="sm" fw={500} c="edr-text">
{label}
</Text>
<SegmentedControl
fullWidth
disabled={disabled}
value={value}
onChange={(v) => onChange(v as OtpChannel)}
data={[
{
value: "phone",
label: (
<span className="flex items-center justify-center gap-1.5">
<Smartphone size={14} /> Phone
</span>
),
},
{
value: "email",
label: (
<span className="flex items-center justify-center gap-1.5">
<Mail size={14} /> Email
</span>
),
},
]}
/>
</div>
);
}
export interface OtpChannelStepProps {
channel: OtpChannel;
/** Raw email or phone the code went to; masked before display. */
target: string;
/**
* Raw contacts the code was sent to; masked before display. The API sends one
* code to every contact on the account, so both are usually set — pass only
* what the client actually knows. Omit both when the client cannot know them
* (the forgot-password flow deliberately never reveals an account's contacts)
* and a generic line is shown instead.
*/
email?: string;
phone?: string;
value: string;
onChange: (otp: string) => void;
onVerify: () => void;
@@ -82,11 +32,13 @@ export interface OtpChannelStepProps {
/**
* The "enter the code we sent you" stage. Shared by signup and the
* forgot-password flow — both send through the same `/api/otp/*` service.
* forgot-password flow — both send through the same `/api/otp/*` service, which
* delivers a single code to the account's email AND phone; whichever message
* arrives first can be typed here.
*/
export default function OtpChannelStep({
channel,
target,
email,
phone,
value,
onChange,
onVerify,
@@ -100,7 +52,10 @@ export default function OtpChannelStep({
description,
submitLabel,
}: OtpChannelStepProps) {
const maskedTarget = channel === "email" ? maskEmail(target) : maskPhone(target);
const maskedTargets = [
email ? maskEmail(email) : null,
phone ? maskPhone(phone) : null,
].filter(Boolean) as string[];
const busy = sending || verifying;
return (
@@ -113,12 +68,23 @@ export default function OtpChannelStep({
<div className="space-y-1.5 text-center">
<h1 className="text-xl font-bold tracking-tight text-gray-900 sm:text-2xl">
{title ?? `Verify your ${channel === "email" ? "email" : "phone"}`}
{title ?? "Verify it's you"}
</h1>
<p className="text-sm leading-relaxed text-gray-500">
We sent a {OTP_LENGTH}-digit code to{" "}
<span className="font-medium text-gray-700">{maskedTarget}</span>.{" "}
{description ?? "Enter it to continue."}
{maskedTargets.length ? (
maskedTargets.map((target, index) => (
<span key={target}>
{index > 0 ? " and " : null}
<span className="font-medium text-gray-700">{target}</span>
</span>
))
) : (
<span className="font-medium text-gray-700">
the email and phone on your account
</span>
)}
. {description ?? "Enter it to continue."}
</p>
</div>

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ const EXCLUDED_PATH_PATTERNS = [
/^\/forgot-password/,
/^\/otp/,
/^\/set-password/,
/^\/reset-password/,
/warehouse/i,
/first-mile/i,
/last-mile/i,

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ export const URL_CONSTANTS = {
CHANGE_PASSWORD: "/api/auth/change-password",
FORGOT_PASSWORD_REQUEST: "/api/auth/forgot-password/request",
FORGOT_PASSWORD_VERIFY: "/api/auth/forgot-password/verify",
FORGOT_PASSWORD_RESOLVE_LINK: "/api/auth/forgot-password/resolve-link",
},
USERS: {

View File

@@ -9,10 +9,11 @@ import {
Stack,
Text,
TextInput,
Tooltip,
} from "@mantine/core";
import { zodResolver } from "@hookform/resolvers/zod";
import { useQuery } from "@tanstack/react-query";
import { AlertCircle, ArrowLeft, ArrowRight } from "lucide-react";
import { AlertCircle, ArrowLeft, ArrowRight, Info } from "lucide-react";
import { useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { Controller, useForm } from "react-hook-form";
@@ -293,22 +294,28 @@ export default function CompanyProfileForm({
const [contactSameAsGm, setContactSameAsGm] = useState(false);
const [poaSameAsContact, setPoaSameAsContact] = useState(false);
// General Manager source: the eTrade-registered business owner when a TIN
// lookup found one, otherwise the registering user's own account details.
// General Manager source. The company step's email/phone are seeded from
// eTrade (and the account email) but stay editable, so the link reads the
// CURRENT form values rather than the frozen eTrade snapshot — an edit on the
// company step propagates here, the same way "Same as General Manager" tracks
// the general manager's live values. eTrade's owner name has no editable
// field of its own, so it falls back to the registering user's account name.
const companyEmail = watch("companyEmail");
const companyPhone = watch("companyPhone");
const gmSourceName = etradeOwner?.name ?? user.name?.en ?? "";
const gmSourcePhone = etradeOwner
? etradeOwner.phone
: toEthiopianE164(user.phoneNumber);
const gmSourceEmail = companyEmail || user.email || "";
const gmSourcePhone =
companyPhone || etradeOwner?.phone || toEthiopianE164(user.phoneNumber) || "";
useEffect(() => {
if (!gmSameAsOwner) return;
setValue("generalManagerName", gmSourceName, { shouldValidate: true });
setValue("generalManagerEmail", user.email ?? "", { shouldValidate: true });
setValue("generalManagerPhone", gmSourcePhone ?? "", {
setValue("generalManagerEmail", gmSourceEmail, { shouldValidate: true });
setValue("generalManagerPhone", gmSourcePhone, {
shouldValidate: true,
});
// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
}, [gmSameAsOwner, gmSourceName, gmSourcePhone, user.email]);
}, [gmSameAsOwner, gmSourceName, gmSourceEmail, gmSourcePhone]);
const toggleGmSameAsOwner = (checked: boolean) => {
setGmSameAsOwner(checked);
@@ -336,13 +343,28 @@ export default function CompanyProfileForm({
// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
}, [contactSameAsGm, gmName, gmEmail, gmPhone]);
// The contact-person step has no location/address of its own, so the linked
// PoA takes the company's — location as entered, address as composed from the
// company's address fields. Both stay mirrored while the link is checked.
const companyLocation = watch("companyLocation");
const companyAddress = watch("companyAddress");
useEffect(() => {
if (!poaSameAsContact) return;
setValue("poaName", contactName ?? "");
setValue("poaEmail", contactEmail ?? "");
setValue("poaPhone", contactPhone ?? "");
setValue("poaLocation", companyLocation ?? "");
setValue("poaAddress", companyAddress ?? "");
// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
}, [poaSameAsContact, contactName, contactEmail, contactPhone]);
}, [
poaSameAsContact,
contactName,
contactEmail,
contactPhone,
companyLocation,
companyAddress,
]);
const toggleContactSameAsGm = (checked: boolean) => {
setContactSameAsGm(checked);
@@ -360,6 +382,8 @@ export default function CompanyProfileForm({
setValue("poaName", "");
setValue("poaEmail", "");
setValue("poaPhone", "");
setValue("poaLocation", "");
setValue("poaAddress", "");
}
};
@@ -624,7 +648,24 @@ export default function CompanyProfileForm({
{...register("vatNumber")}
/>
<TextInput
label="FAN Number (16 digits)"
label={
<Group gap={6} align="center" wrap="nowrap">
<span>FAN Number (16 digits)</span>
<Tooltip
label="The FAN must belong to the person with power of attorney. If the company has no power of attorney, use the general manager's FAN."
multiline
w={260}
withArrow
position="top-start"
>
<Info
size={14}
color="var(--mantine-color-gray-6)"
className="cursor-help"
/>
</Tooltip>
</Group>
}
placeholder="1234567890123456"
maxLength={16}
error={errors.fanNumber?.message}
@@ -743,8 +784,8 @@ export default function CompanyProfileForm({
title="Same as business owner"
description={
etradeOwner
? "Reuse the eTrade-registered owner's name and phone (email from your account). Uncheck to enter different details."
: "Reuse your account's name, email and phone. Uncheck to enter different details."
? "Reuse the eTrade-registered owner's name, plus the company email and phone as you entered them. Uncheck to enter different details."
: "Reuse your account's name and the company email and phone as you entered them. Uncheck to enter different details."
}
/>
<TextInput
@@ -828,7 +869,7 @@ export default function CompanyProfileForm({
checked={poaSameAsContact}
onToggle={togglePoaSameAsContact}
title="Same as contact person"
description="Reuse the contact person's name, email and phone. Uncheck to enter different details."
description="Reuse the contact person's name, email and phone, plus the company's location and address. Uncheck to enter different details."
/>
)}
<TextInput

View File

@@ -5,11 +5,7 @@ import { Link, useNavigate } from "react-router-dom";
import { useResendCooldown } from "@/hooks/useResendCooldown";
import AuthShell from "@/components/auth/AuthShell";
import OtpChannelStep, {
OTP_LENGTH,
OtpChannelSelect,
type OtpChannel,
} from "@/components/auth/OtpChannelStep";
import OtpChannelStep, { OTP_LENGTH } from "@/components/auth/OtpChannelStep";
import PasswordChecklist from "@/components/auth/PasswordChecklist";
import { api } from "@/services/api";
import type { ResetTicket } from "@/types/auth";
@@ -24,7 +20,6 @@ export default function ForgotPasswordPage() {
const [stage, setStage] = useState<Stage>("identify");
const [identifier, setIdentifier] = useState("");
const [channel, setChannel] = useState<OtpChannel>("phone");
const [otpCode, setOtpCode] = useState("");
// The reset ticket lives in memory only — persisting it would leave a
// password-change credential sitting in localStorage.
@@ -41,7 +36,7 @@ export default function ForgotPasswordPage() {
const normalised = normaliseIdentifier(identifier);
const sendCode = async () => {
await api.auth.requestPasswordReset.call({ identifier: normalised, channel });
await api.auth.requestPasswordReset.call({ identifier: normalised });
setOtpCode("");
resendCooldown.start();
};
@@ -85,7 +80,6 @@ export default function ForgotPasswordPage() {
try {
const result = await api.auth.verifyPasswordResetOtp.call({
identifier: normalised,
channel,
otp: otpCode.trim(),
});
setTicket(result);
@@ -134,13 +128,10 @@ export default function ForgotPasswordPage() {
}
};
const identifierLabel =
channel === "email" ? "the email on your account" : "the phone on your account";
return (
<AuthShell
tagline="Recover your account"
taglineBody="Reset your EDR Freight password with a one-time code sent to your email or phone."
taglineBody="Reset your EDR Freight password with a one-time code sent to your email and phone."
>
<div className="flex w-full flex-col">
{stage === "identify" ? (
@@ -172,16 +163,9 @@ export default function ForgotPasswordPage() {
onChange={(event) => setIdentifier(event.target.value)}
/>
<OtpChannelSelect
value={channel}
onChange={setChannel}
disabled={sending}
label="Send the code to"
/>
<p className="text-xs text-gray-500">
The code goes to {identifierLabel}, which may differ from what you
typed above.
The code goes to the email and phone on your account, which may
differ from what you typed above.
</p>
{error ? (
@@ -213,8 +197,6 @@ export default function ForgotPasswordPage() {
{stage === "otp" ? (
<OtpChannelStep
channel={channel}
target={normalised}
value={otpCode}
onChange={setOtpCode}
onVerify={handleVerify}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
import { type FormEvent, useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { Alert, Button, Loader, PasswordInput, Stack } from "@mantine/core";
import { AlertCircle, KeyRound } from "lucide-react";
import { Link, useNavigate, useSearchParams } from "react-router-dom";
import AuthShell from "@/components/auth/AuthShell";
import PasswordChecklist from "@/components/auth/PasswordChecklist";
import { api } from "@/services/api";
import type { ResetLinkAccount } from "@/types/auth";
import { meetsAllRequirements } from "@/utils/passwordSchema";
import { extractApiError } from "@/utils/result";
/**
* Lands the password-reset link a staff member sends from the backoffice
* (`/reset-password?uid=…&token=…`).
*
* The link itself is the proof of possession — it was delivered to the address
* on the account — so there is no code to type. The token is validated before
* the form appears, which is what lets an expired link say so up front instead
* of after a password has been chosen.
*/
export default function ResetPasswordLinkPage() {
const navigate = useNavigate();
const [params] = useSearchParams();
const userId = params.get("uid") ?? "";
const token = params.get("token") ?? "";
const [account, setAccount] = useState<ResetLinkAccount | null>(null);
const [checking, setChecking] = useState(true);
const [linkError, setLinkError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [password, setPassword] = useState("");
const [confirmPassword, setConfirmPassword] = useState("");
const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
useEffect(() => {
if (!userId || !token) {
setLinkError(
"This password-reset link is incomplete. Open the full link from your email or SMS.",
);
setChecking(false);
return;
}
let cancelled = false;
api.auth.resolveResetLink
.call({ userId, token })
.then((resolved) => {
if (!cancelled) setAccount(resolved);
})
.catch((err) => {
if (!cancelled) setLinkError(extractApiError(err).message);
})
.finally(() => {
if (!cancelled) setChecking(false);
});
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [userId, token]);
const handleSubmit = async (event: FormEvent<HTMLFormElement>) => {
event.preventDefault();
setError(null);
if (!account) return;
if (password !== confirmPassword) {
setError("Passwords do not match.");
return;
}
setSubmitting(true);
try {
await api.auth.resetPassword.call({
userId: account.userId,
// Resolved server-side from the token — the account holder never types
// an identifier, so there is nothing here to get wrong.
email: account.identifier,
verificationCode: account.verificationCode,
newPassword: password,
confirmPassword,
});
navigate("/login", { replace: true, state: { passwordReset: true } });
} catch (err) {
setError(extractApiError(err).message);
} finally {
setSubmitting(false);
}
};
return (
<AuthShell
tagline="Set a new password"
taglineBody="Choose a new password for your EDR Freight account."
>
<div className="flex w-full flex-col">
<div className="mb-1 flex justify-center">
<span className="flex h-12 w-12 items-center justify-center rounded-full bg-primary/10 text-primary">
<KeyRound size={22} />
</span>
</div>
<div className="mb-4 mt-3 space-y-1.5 text-center sm:mb-5">
<h1 className="text-xl font-bold tracking-tight text-gray-900 sm:text-2xl">
Choose a new password
</h1>
<p className="text-sm leading-relaxed text-gray-500">
{checking
? "Checking your reset link…"
: account
? `Resetting the password for ${account.maskedIdentifier}.`
: "This link can no longer be used."}
</p>
</div>
{checking ? (
<div className="flex justify-center py-6">
<Loader size="sm" />
</div>
) : null}
{!checking && linkError ? (
<Stack gap="md">
<Alert color="red" variant="light" icon={<AlertCircle size={18} />}>
{linkError}
</Alert>
<Button
color="edr-green"
fullWidth
onClick={() => navigate("/forgot-password")}
>
Request a new link
</Button>
<p className="text-center text-sm text-gray-500">
Remembered it?{" "}
<Link
to="/login"
className="font-semibold text-primary hover:underline"
>
Back to sign in
</Link>
</p>
</Stack>
) : null}
{!checking && account ? (
<form onSubmit={handleSubmit} className="flex w-full flex-col">
<Stack gap="md">
<div>
<PasswordInput
label="New password"
placeholder="Create a strong password"
autoComplete="new-password"
required
disabled={submitting}
value={password}
onChange={(event) => setPassword(event.target.value)}
/>
<PasswordChecklist value={password} />
</div>
<PasswordInput
label="Confirm new password"
placeholder="Re-enter your password"
autoComplete="new-password"
required
disabled={submitting}
error={
confirmPassword && confirmPassword !== password
? "Passwords do not match"
: undefined
}
value={confirmPassword}
onChange={(event) => setConfirmPassword(event.target.value)}
/>
{error ? (
<Alert
color="red"
variant="light"
icon={<AlertCircle size={18} />}
>
{error}
</Alert>
) : null}
<Button
type="submit"
color="edr-green"
fullWidth
loading={submitting}
disabled={
submitting ||
!meetsAllRequirements(password) ||
password !== confirmPassword
}
>
Reset password
</Button>
</Stack>
</form>
) : null}
</div>
</AuthShell>
);
}

View File

@@ -18,11 +18,7 @@ import useAuth from "@/hooks/useAuth";
import { useResendCooldown } from "@/hooks/useResendCooldown";
import type { SignupPayload } from "@/types/auth";
import AuthShell from "@/components/auth/AuthShell";
import OtpChannelStep, {
OTP_LENGTH,
OtpChannelSelect,
type OtpChannel,
} from "@/components/auth/OtpChannelStep";
import OtpChannelStep, { OTP_LENGTH } from "@/components/auth/OtpChannelStep";
import PasswordChecklist from "@/components/auth/PasswordChecklist";
import { ControlledPhoneField, isValidPhone } from "@/components/PhoneField";
import { api } from "@/services/api";
@@ -64,15 +60,13 @@ export default function SignupPage() {
const { signup } = useAuth();
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
// Two-stage signup: fill the form, then a mandatory OTP challenge on the
// chosen channel before the account is actually created. The account is only
// created after the code is verified — the OTP is a hard requirement.
// Two-stage signup: fill the form, then a mandatory OTP challenge before the
// account is actually created. The code goes to BOTH the email and phone just
// entered — one code, either delivery verifies it — so there is nothing for
// the user to choose. The account is only created after the code is verified;
// the OTP is a hard requirement.
const [stage, setStage] = useState<"form" | "otp">("form");
const [pendingData, setPendingData] = useState<FormData | null>(null);
// Which contact method the code was sent to — chosen on the form, locked in
// once the challenge is sent.
const [channel, setChannel] = useState<OtpChannel>("phone");
const [otpChannel, setOtpChannel] = useState<OtpChannel>("phone");
const [sending, setSending] = useState(false);
const [verifying, setVerifying] = useState(false);
const [otpCode, setOtpCode] = useState("");
@@ -101,8 +95,8 @@ export default function SignupPage() {
const passwordValue = watch("password") ?? "";
// Step 1 — form is valid: make sure the email/phone aren't already
// registered, then send a fresh code to the chosen channel and move to
// the OTP challenge.
// registered, then send a fresh code to both of them and move to the OTP
// challenge.
const requestOtp = async (data: FormData) => {
setError(null);
setSending(true);
@@ -124,11 +118,8 @@ export default function SignupPage() {
return;
}
await api.auth.sendOTP.call(
channel === "email" ? { email: data.email } : { phone: data.phone },
);
await api.auth.sendOTP.call({ email: data.email, phone: data.phone });
setPendingData(data);
setOtpChannel(channel);
setOtpCode("");
setOtpError(null);
resendCooldown.start();
@@ -145,11 +136,10 @@ export default function SignupPage() {
setOtpError(null);
setSending(true);
try {
await api.auth.sendOTP.call(
otpChannel === "email"
? { email: pendingData.email }
: { phone: pendingData.phone },
);
await api.auth.sendOTP.call({
email: pendingData.email,
phone: pendingData.phone,
});
setOtpCode("");
resendCooldown.start();
} catch (err) {
@@ -170,9 +160,8 @@ export default function SignupPage() {
setVerifying(true);
try {
await api.auth.verifyOTP.call({
...(otpChannel === "email"
? { email: pendingData.email }
: { phone: pendingData.phone }),
email: pendingData.email,
phone: pendingData.phone,
otp: otpCode.trim(),
});
const payload: SignupPayload = {
@@ -259,12 +248,6 @@ export default function SignupPage() {
disabled={sending}
/>
<OtpChannelSelect
value={channel}
onChange={setChannel}
disabled={sending}
/>
<div>
<PasswordInput
label="Password"
@@ -320,12 +303,8 @@ export default function SignupPage() {
</form>
) : (
<OtpChannelStep
channel={otpChannel}
target={
otpChannel === "email"
? (pendingData?.email ?? "")
: (pendingData?.phone ?? "")
}
email={pendingData?.email}
phone={pendingData?.phone}
value={otpCode}
onChange={setOtpCode}
onVerify={confirmOtp}

View File

@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ export default function ContractViewPage() {
const [hasScrolledToBottom, setHasScrolledToBottom] = useState(false);
const [agreedToTerms, setAgreedToTerms] = useState(false);
// The signing OTP goes to the signed-in user's own registered phone, resolved
// server-side from their account (the same number the server verifies
// against). The client never picks the number, so send and verify can't
// The signing OTP goes to the signed-in user's own registered phone AND email,
// resolved server-side from their account (the same contacts the server
// verifies against). One code covers both, so a delayed SMS doesn't strand the
// signer. The client never picks the contacts, so send and verify can't
// disagree; we only get back a masked hint of where it landed.
const [otpSentTo, setOtpSentTo] = useState<string | null>(null);
@@ -168,8 +169,9 @@ export default function ContractViewPage() {
if (!signerName.trim()) return;
const image = usingSaved ? savedSignatureImage : signatureData;
if (!image) return;
// The server resolves and validates the company phone; if none is on file it
// returns a clear 400 that surfaces via the mutation's onError.
// The server resolves and validates the signer's own contacts; if the
// account has neither phone nor email it returns a clear 400 that surfaces
// via the mutation's onError.
setOtpCode("");
sendOtpMutation.mutate();
};
@@ -405,8 +407,8 @@ export default function ContractViewPage() {
/>
</Box>
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">
For security, enter the 6-digit code we sent by SMS to the
contract company&apos;s registered number
For security, enter the 6-digit code we sent to your registered
contacts
{otpSentTo ? (
<>
{" "}

View File

@@ -81,7 +81,9 @@ import type {
SignupResponse,
ForgotPasswordRequestPayload,
ForgotPasswordVerifyPayload,
ResetLinkAccount,
ResetTicket,
ResolveResetLinkPayload,
SendContactOtpPayload,
SendContactOtpResponse,
UpdateAccountNamePayload,
@@ -130,6 +132,11 @@ export const api = {
"verifyPasswordResetOtp",
authService.verifyPasswordResetOtp,
),
resolveResetLink: endpoint<ResolveResetLinkPayload, ResetLinkAccount>(
"auth",
"resolveResetLink",
authService.resolveResetLink,
),
resetPassword: endpoint<SetPasswordPayload, void>(
"auth",
"resetPassword",

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ import type {
LoginResponse,
OtpPayload,
OtpResponse,
ResetLinkAccount,
ResetTicket,
ResolveResetLinkPayload,
SendContactOtpPayload,
SendContactOtpResponse,
SetPasswordPayload,
@@ -79,6 +81,19 @@ export const authService = {
return { userId: res.data.userId, verificationCode: res.data.verificationCode };
},
/**
* Validate a staff-issued reset link before showing the password form, and
* pick up the ticket it carries. Rejected links (expired, already spent) fail
* here rather than after the customer has typed a new password.
*/
resolveResetLink: async (body: ResolveResetLinkPayload) => {
const res = await client.post<ResetLinkAccount>(
URL_CONSTANTS.AUTH.FORGOT_PASSWORD_RESOLVE_LINK,
body,
);
return res.data;
},
/**
* Spend the reset ticket. Distinct from `setPassword` above, which the
* authenticated post-signup flow drives through `useAuth` — this one carries

View File

@@ -33,7 +33,10 @@ export interface SignupResponse {
}
export interface OtpPayload {
/** Exactly one of phone/email — the channel the code is sent through. */
/**
* At least one of phone/email. Send both and the API delivers one code to
* both, verifiable by quoting either back.
*/
phone?: string;
email?: string;
/** Required on verify; omitted on send (the server generates the code). */
@@ -102,13 +105,9 @@ export interface SetPasswordPayload {
verificationCode: string;
}
/** The channel a password-reset code is delivered over. */
export type ResetChannel = "email" | "phone";
export interface ForgotPasswordRequestPayload {
/** Email, username, or E.164 phone — whatever the user typed, normalised. */
identifier: string;
channel: ResetChannel;
}
export interface ForgotPasswordVerifyPayload extends ForgotPasswordRequestPayload {
@@ -121,6 +120,21 @@ export interface ResetTicket {
verificationCode: string;
}
/** The `uid` / `token` pair carried by a staff-issued password-reset link. */
export interface ResolveResetLinkPayload {
userId: string;
token: string;
}
/**
* A validated reset link. Carries the identifier IAM matches the account on, so
* the customer never has to type one — plus a masked copy safe to display.
*/
export interface ResetLinkAccount extends ResetTicket {
identifier: string;
maskedIdentifier: string;
}
export interface GenerateVerificationCodePayload {
email: string;
phoneNumber: string;

View File

@@ -2,10 +2,6 @@ import { UseQueryOptions, QueryObserverOptions } from "@tanstack/react-query";
import axios, { AxiosError, InternalAxiosRequestConfig } from "axios";
import { URL_CONSTANTS } from "@/constants/URLS";
import { API_BASE_URL } from "@/constants/apiConfig";
import {
emitApiError,
extractApiErrorPayload,
} from "@/components/errors/ApiErrorModal";
import { captureApiError } from "@/lib/posthog";
const client = axios.create({
@@ -63,10 +59,9 @@ async function refreshSessionTokens(): Promise<string> {
}
type TokenPair = { token: string; refreshToken: string };
const { data } = await client.post<Partial<TokenPair> & { data?: TokenPair }>(
URL_CONSTANTS.AUTH.REFRESH_TOKEN,
{ refreshToken },
);
const { data } = await client.post<
Partial<TokenPair> & { data?: TokenPair }
>(URL_CONSTANTS.AUTH.REFRESH_TOKEN, { refreshToken });
// The API returns the pair flat ({ success, token, refreshToken }); accept
// a { data: { ... } }-wrapped shape too so a transform change can't
// silently break refresh again.
@@ -118,8 +113,8 @@ client.interceptors.response.use(
// Surface the server's actual error message in the global error modal
// (401s are handled by the session flow below/redirects, so skip them).
if (error.response && error.response.status !== 401) {
const payload = extractApiErrorPayload(error);
if (payload) emitApiError(payload);
// const payload = extractApiErrorPayload(error);
// if (payload) emitApiError(payload);
}
return Promise.reject(error);
}