edr-platform/apps/edr-freight-api/FREIGHT_QA_REPORT.md

EDR Freight — Full QA / Logic Audit Report

Date: 2026-07-15 Scope: @edr/freight-api + freight backoffice/portal web apps Excluded per request: warehouses, first-mile, last-mile, onboarding (Fayda/verifayda) Environment: live stack via pnpm run dev:freight, API on http://localhost:3030, DB edr_freight @ 10.18.7.207 Method: booted the real app, logged in as superadmin@tria.com, drove the API with curl, reproduced state bugs against live data, read every service/controller/entity in the in-scope modules, and cross-checked the backoffice screens against the API.

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1. How to read this report

Every finding has: Problem (what is wrong + concrete failure), Impact, Fix (code-level, with file:line), and — where I ran it live — a Repro block with the actual request/response.

Severity:

• CRITICAL — money moves wrongly, or anyone can act on anyone's data / settle invoices.
• HIGH — data corruption, cross-tenant read/write, physical-asset state diverges from reality.
• MEDIUM — wrong-but-recoverable state, missing guards, math/notification errors.
• LOW — hardening, stale displays, latent (unused endpoint) bugs.

Counts: 6 Critical · 18 High · 27 Medium · 20 Low (≈71 distinct issues).

The single most valuable structural fix is at the top of §4 — it eliminates a whole family of bugs.

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2. Live tests I actually ran (evidence)

#	Test	Result	Verdict
1	Login superadmin@tria.com	success:true + JWT	OK
2	Build train TR-00002 in KALITY, 2 locomotives	created	OK
3	Move coupled LOCO-004 to MOJO while train stays in KALITY	200, train KALITY / loco MOJO	BUG — your example, confirmed
4	Re-use same locomotive on a 2nd train	409 already coupled	Guard OK
5	PATCH /train-builder/:id/yard → MOJO	coupled locos + wagons follow	OK (builder path correct)
6	Decommission a coupled locomotive	200 OUT_OF_SERVICE	BUG — no coupling guard
7	Attach KALITY wagon to MOJO train	400 not in yard	Guard OK
8	PATCH /wagons/:id yard → different yard while ASSIGNED	200 accepted	BUG
9	DELETE /wagons/:id on a wagon coupled to a train	200 + row physically gone	BUG — hard delete, no guard
10	GET /payments/checkout no auth	200	BUG — public
11	POST /internal/payments/mark-paid no auth	400 (reached handler, not 401)	BUG — public
12	GET /payments/receipt/:id no auth	400 (reached handler)	BUG — public
13	GET /files/:id no auth	404 (reached handler)	BUG — public
14	Control: GET /locomotives, GET /incidents no auth	401	Auth global guard works

Tests 10–14 prove the "public" endpoints are genuinely reachable without a token (protected routes return 401; these return 400/404/200 because they hit the handler).

Boot-time noise (not app bugs): SMS + Email services fail on RabbitMQ ACCESS_REFUSED (broker creds), and Swagger warns about 3 duplicate DTO names (UpdateProfileDto, RequestChangesDto, SignContractDto) and a legacy /api/* route. See §9.

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3. CRITICAL — money & authorization

C1. Paying an invoice settles it instantly without any money moving

File: edr-platform/apps/edr-freight-api/src/modules/billing/billing.service.ts:973-986 A shipped "DEMO" shortcut fakes a payment.succeeded callback the moment a payment is initiated:

// DEMO: manually fire the gateway 'payment.succeeded' callback here …
if (!result.immediateSuccess) { await this.payment.handlePaymentEvent({ eventType: "payment.succeeded", … }) }

Real gateways return REQUIRES_ACTION (redirect), so immediateSuccess is false for essentially every payment → the invoice is marked PAID, the booking advances to PAID/batch allocation, and the clearance-fee gate opens. A customer clicks "Pay", closes the page, pays nothing, and the freight ships. If they do pay, the later real webhook is a no-op and money is collected against an already-settled invoice with no reconciliation. Fix: delete the if (!result.immediateSuccess) block. Settle only from settleByPaymentId on a verified provider signal, and check intent.amountMinor against the invoice balance at settle time.

C2. Unauthenticated endpoints can settle any invoice by ID (live-confirmed)

Files: billing/payment.controller.ts:55-104 (GET /payments/checkout, @Public()), payment/internal-payment.controller.ts:22-39 (POST /internal/payments/mark-paid, @Public() — its own comment: "anyone who can reach the API can mark payments as paid"), billing/payment.controller.ts:39-53 (POST /payments/initiate, no guard, no ownership check). Repro (live):

GET  /api/payments/checkout?invoiceId=…&method=TELEBIRR   → 200  (no token)
POST /api/internal/payments/mark-paid                     → 400  (no token, reached handler)
GET  /api/locomotives                                     → 401  (control)

Combined with C1, anyone with an invoice UUID marks it paid unauthenticated and ships the freight. Anyone can POST a forged payment.succeeded (only a booking id is needed) to mark-paid. Fix: shared-secret / x-service-token guard on mark-paid (the payment API already sends one — http-payment-event-publisher.ts:44-45); require auth + ownership on initiate; make checkout a signed, expiring URL.

C3. Currency-unit chaos — providers disagree by 100× on the same charge

Files: billing.service.ts:958 sends amountMinor: Math.round(Number(invoice.balanceAmount)) (invoice amounts are major units, numeric(14,2)). Providers then split: cbe-birr.provider.ts:57, ebirr.provider.ts:64, card.provider.ts:60, cac-bank.provider.ts:307 all do amountMinor / 100; but telebirr.provider.ts:201, dmoney.provider.ts:200, waafi.provider.ts:282 treat it as major (no /100). Impact: a 50,000 ETB invoice paid via CBE_BIRR/EBIRR/CARD/CAC charges 500.00 — while the freight side still marks it fully PAID (see C4). Math.round also drops cents. Fix: pick one convention (Math.round(balance*100) true-minor everywhere, fix the 3 major-unit providers), then enforce confirmedAmountMinor === intent.amountMinor at settlement.

C4. Settlement never verifies the amount charged

Files: billing.service.ts:527-552 (markInvoiceAsPaid sets paidAmount = totalAmount, balanceAmount = 0 purely from the invoice); edr-payment-api/.../intents/intents.service.ts:408-415 (an amount mismatch is only logger.error'd — the intent still finalizes SUCCEEDED, and no freight handler even populates confirmedAmountMinor). Impact: any wrong-amount success (C3's 1/100, a partial card capture, a reused stale intent) still marks the full invoice PAID. Fix: treat a confirmedAmountMinor mismatch as a failure/hold; in settleByPaymentId refuse (or record a partial) when the confirmed amount doesn't cover balanceAmount.

C5. Telebirr & D-Money webhook signatures are disabled

Files: edr-payment-api/.../webhooks/handlers/telebirr-webhook.service.ts:16-18 (const signatureValid = true; + // TODO: re-enable), dmoney-webhook.service.ts:16-17 (same). The pipeline only rejects when signatureValid is false, so these two are trusted unconditionally on the public /webhooks/* surface. Impact: an attacker who guesses a merch_order_id POSTs a fake success payload → intent SUCCEEDED → freight marks the invoice PAID and ships. Fix: implement verifyWebhookSignature for both; until keys exist, re-query the provider (queryStatus) before honoring SUCCEEDED.

C6. Customers can create/act-on bookings billed to any company

Files: bookings/bookings.service.ts:594-629 (create only resolves+verifies the caller's own company when dto.companyId is absent; a supplied companyId is used verbatim), plus a batch of booking mutations with no ownership check in bookings.controller.ts: PATCH /:id (205), DELETE /:id (585), POST /:id/generate-price (611), /submit (622), /confirm-submit (633), /reject (643), /clearance/documents (682), /clearance/proceed (699), GET /:id/clearance (672). Reads (GET /:id) do call assertCustomerCanAccessBooking; writes don't. Impact: Company A's user sets companyId to Company B and books/invoices under B; or calls DELETE /bookings/{B's id} / submits / uploads clearance docs on B's booking. UUIDs appear in list payloads, so they're discoverable within a session. Fix: require a staff permission to pass companyId; otherwise force it from the resolved user company. Add assertCustomerCanAccessBooking to every mutating booking route.

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4. HIGH — Train / Locomotive / Wagon consist integrity

★ Structural root cause (fix this first). The invariant "a consist (train + its locomotives + its wagons) moves and locks as one unit" is enforced only inside trains/train-builder.service.ts. Every legacy / master-data endpoint around it — PATCH /locomotives/:id, PATCH /wagons/:id, POST /wagons/:id/assign-train, wagons/bulk-status, wagons/bulk-transfer, DELETE /trains/:id, DELETE /wagons/:id — mutates the same rows with no coupling guard. Findings H1, H2, H5, H6, H7 are all the same missing check. The one fix that kills the family: make TrainLocomotive/wagon.trainId membership a guard that every locomotive/wagon mutation consults (reject or redirect to the builder endpoints).

H1. ★ Locomotive yard/status freely editable while coupled to a built train — your example, confirmed live

File: locomotives/locomotives.service.ts:87-119 (update). update() applies status and currentYardId with no check of the train_locomotives link table:

currentYardId: dto.currentYardId === undefined ? locomotive.currentYardId : (dto.currentYardId ?? null),

The builder keeps train + locomotives in the same yard (train-builder.service.ts:389-429 setYard, :656-660 validateAndLockLocomotives), but PATCH /locomotives/:id bypasses it. The frontend triggers it by accident: the locomotive edit form always includes the status and currentYardId selects (.../pages/fleet/config/resources.ts:168-169) and PATCHes the whole form object on every save (FleetResourcePage.tsx:301). So editing a coupled locomotive's name re-sends its yard → the train and its locomotive end up in different yards. Repro (live):

Build TR-00002 in KALITY with LOCO-004 (+LOCO-023)
PATCH /api/locomotives/LOCO-004 {"currentYardId": MOJO}   → 200
GET train  → yard: KALITY ; LOCO-004 → yard: MOJO   ← diverged, no error

Fix (exactly what you described — reject with a clear error, don't silently move):

const link = await this.ds.getRepository(TrainLocomotive)
  .findOne({ where: { locomotiveId: id }, relations: { train: true } });
if (link) {
  if (dto.currentYardId !== undefined && dto.currentYardId !== link.train?.currentYardId)
    throw new ConflictException(`Locomotive ${loco.code} is coupled to train ${link.train?.code}; move the train instead`);
  if (dto.status !== undefined && dto.status !== loco.status)
    throw new ConflictException(`Locomotive ${loco.code} is coupled to train ${link.train?.code}; detach it before changing status`);
}

Frontend: send only dirty fields, and disable the yard/status selects (show the modal error) when the locomotive is in a built train.

H2. Wagon PATCH is a free-for-all — yard, trainId, sequenceNumber, status all unguarded (live-confirmed)

File: wagons/wagons.service.ts:90-101 — Object.assign(wagon, dto) with zero invariant checks; UpdateWagonDto (PartialType of Create) exposes trainId, sequenceNumber, status, currentYardId. Repro (live): PATCH /api/wagons/:id {"currentYardId": MOJO} on a wagon ASSIGNED to a KALITY train returned 200 and moved it. Setting trainId directly attaches to any train bypassing every builder rule; flipping ASSIGNED→AVAILABLE while trainId is set makes the wagon grabbable by transfer requests and the legacy assign flow. Fix: reject trainId/sequenceNumber in update; when wagon.trainId != null, reject currentYardId/status changes (409 → point at train-builder endpoints).

H3. DELETE /wagons/:id hard-deletes with no guard — destroyed real data during this audit (live-confirmed)

File: wagons/wagons.service.ts:136-139 — this.wagonRepo.remove(wagon) is a hard delete (repo standard is soft-delete via BaseEntity.deletedAt). No check for trainId, live-schedule pinning, or containers. Repro (live): I called DELETE /api/wagons/{BW1-0009} while it was ASSIGNED to my test train → 200. Raw SQL then showed the row physically gone (SELECT … WHERE id=… → 0 rows). On delete, train_set_wagons.physical_wagon_id is SET NULL (a dispatched schedule silently loses its physical wagon) and wagon_movements is CASCADE (the audit ledger is destroyed).

I recreated BW1-0009 via the API (POST /api/wagons, new UUID d9b578ed-…, AVAILABLE @ KALITY) so the dev data count is whole again. The original UUID 905cad62-… is unrecoverable (hard delete). See §10. Fix: block deletion when trainId IS NOT NULL or the wagon is pinned to a DRAFT/SCHEDULED/DISPATCHED schedule (reuse train-builder's isWagonPinnedToLiveSchedule); switch to softRemove (add a partial unique index on wagon_number WHERE deleted_at IS NULL).

H4. DELETE /trains/:id hard-deletes a built train and permanently strands its wagons

File: trains/trains.service.ts:57-60 — trainRepo.remove(train), no active-schedule check (contrast train-builder.service.ts:536-563 disband, which blocks on live schedules and releases resources). Wagons' FK is SET NULL, so they keep status = ASSIGNED with trainId = null → unusable forever (attach requires status === Available). The fleet Trains CRUD page (resources.ts:204) points at this endpoint. Fix: delegate TrainsService.remove to TrainBuilderService.disband (block live schedules, reset wagons to Available, delete locomotive links), and use softRemove.

H5. Legacy wagon assign: maintenance wagons assignable, silent theft, duplicate sequences

File: wagons/wagons.service.ts:141-164 (POST /wagons/:id/assign-train). Only guard is status === Assigned. Holes vs the builder's attachWagons: a MAINTENANCE/DETAINED wagon is accepted and flipped to ASSIGNED (erasing the flag); a wagon with trainId set but status≠ASSIGNED has its trainId overwritten (steals it from another train's consist, never resequenced); no wagon-yard vs train-yard check; no train.status !== IN_SERVICE check; caller sequenceNumber isn't collision-checked (no unique index on (train_id, sequence_number)). Frontend echo: AssignWagonDialog.tsx:22-24 filters w.status === Available || !w.trainId — the || should be &&; today it offers maintenance/detained wagons. Fix: re-implement on builder rules (Available && trainId === null && sameYard && train not InService, sequence = max+1), or delete the endpoint and use POST /train-builder/:id/wagons.

H6. bulk-status / yard-workspace "Free up" corrupts wagons physically in a train

File: wagons/wagons.service.ts:241-269 (bulkSetStatus, no trainId guard); UI WagonYardWorkspaceModal.tsx:187,270-287,545-580 picks an arbitrary slice of ASSIGNED wagons and flips them AVAILABLE — including consist wagons (whose ASSIGNED means "coupled"). After the flip they still have trainId set but read AVAILABLE → transfer requests hand them out, bulk-transfer moves them, legacy assign re-homes them, while the builder consist still lists them. Fix: refuse to change status of wagons with trainId IS NOT NULL; exclude them from the modal's flip pools.

H7. bulk-transfer relocates train-coupled wagons; legacy unassign bypasses the schedule pin

File: wagons/wagons.service.ts:180-234 (bulkTransfer, existence-only check → moves consist wagons to another yard) and 166-172 (unassignFromTrain frees a wagon with no isWagonPinnedToLiveSchedule check and leaves a sequence gap). Fix: reject trainId IS NOT NULL in bulkTransfer; run the builder's pinned-schedule query in unassignFromTrain and resequence, or delete in favor of DELETE /train-builder/:id/wagons/:wagonId.

H8. Export capacity check-then-act race → train overbooking

File: bookings/booking-transition.service.ts:1093-1153 → train-scheduling/booking-batch.service.ts:722-793 — pickExportSchedule reads budget.fits(...) then reserve (idempotency only, never re-checks capacity). No transaction/row-lock spans the check and the write (the code comment even calls the pre-check "rough"). Impact: two staff accept two export bookings for the same near-full train concurrently → both pass fits(), both reserve → train exceeds locomotive pull weight / wagon slots. Fix: wrap check + reserve in a serializable transaction with SELECT … FOR UPDATE on the schedule (or a per-schedule advisory lock); re-verify fits() inside the lock.

H9. Consolidation pairing race → one partner paired with two bookings

File: bookings.service.ts:494-543 + bookings.repository.ts:213-261,287-309 — findComplementaryConsolidationPartner filters consolidationPartnerId IS NULL, pairConsolidation writes both sides, no lock between find and pair. Impact: two bookings both pick the same waiting partner → asymmetric pairing, shared-wagon capacity double-counted. Fix: FOR UPDATE on the candidate inside a transaction, re-assert consolidationPartnerId IS NULL on both before writing.

H10. import-operations controller has no authorization

File: import-operations/import-operations.controller.ts (whole file — only @ApiTags, no permission guard). Any authenticated portal user can POST /import-operations/customs/{anyBookingId}/release-permitted, assign customs risk, or mark duties/taxes paid on any booking. Fix: add @BookingStaff(FREIGHT_PERMS…) guards.

H11. interchange-documents controller has no authorization

File: interchange-documents/interchange-documents.controller.ts — POST /generate-from-schedule, PATCH /:id/acknowledge|dispute|cancel reachable by any authenticated user. These are outward-facing customs/port handover records. Fix: staff permission guards.

H12. Anyone can sign anyone's contract as CUSTOMER

File: contracts/contracts.controller.ts:502-523 (asserts permission only for non-CUSTOMER roles) + contract-transition.service.ts:795-816 (CUSTOMER branch checks only status + a caller-supplied dto.otpPhone/dto.otp). Any portal user signs another company's CONTRACT_READY contract with an OTP on their own phone → SIGNED_CUSTOMER, firing counter-sign/clearance-fee. renew (525) and clearance/documents (543) have the same gap. Fix: call assertCustomerCanAccessContract; verify OTP against the contract company's registered phone, not dto.otpPhone.

H13. Any file downloadable by anyone with the UUID (live-confirmed public)

File: files/files.controller.ts:20-55 — the single global file-stream route is @Public(), no auth, no ownership, no expiry. All uploads funnel through it: driver documents, contract PDFs, company license / Fayda national-ID files. Repro (live): GET /api/files/{uuid} → 404 with no token (reached handler; a valid id streams the file). Control routes return 401. Fix: require JwtGuard and authorize by the file's resource/resourceId, or serve via short-lived signed URLs (the code already has filesService.signUrl).

H14. Duplicate payment.succeeded regresses advanced/cancelled bookings back to PAID

File: bookings/booking-invoice.service.ts:133-166 — the idempotency guard // if (booking.paymentStatus === "PAID") return; is commented out, then it unconditionally rewrites status: "PAID" and re-runs allocation. The relay is documented at-least-once and freight never dedupes eventId (the PaymentWebhookEventEntity is registered but unused). Impact: a replayed success on a SCHEDULED/DISPATCHED — or CANCELLED — booking force-rewrites it to PAID and re-fires side effects. Fix: restore the guard as a state-machine check (only advance from awaiting-payment statuses); persist processed eventIds.

H15. Booking prices ignore the contract's frozen rate snapshots

File: bookings/booking-pricing.service.ts:123-229 prices exclusively from ratesService.findLiveRates(); nothing reads contract_rate_snapshots (only the clearance fee honors the freeze). contract-booking.service.ts:289-295 comments "compute from contract unit rates" but calls the live-rate path. Impact: customer signs a contract at 1,916 USD/40ft, rates team raises the live rate to 2,300, the drawdown booking bills 2,300 — contradicting the signed contract PDF. Fix: in computePriceForBooking, when booking.contractId is set, resolve unit prices from that contract's snapshots (fall back to live only for un-frozen codes).

H16. Cancelling a booking leaves its invoice open & payable; refund path is dead code

File: booking-transition.service.ts:519-543 (cancel() writes a note + status: CANCELLED, never cancels the open PREPAID invoice) and billing.service.ts:654-672 (markInvoiceAsRefunded has zero callers). Impact: the cancelled booking's invoice stays payable in the portal; paying it fires booking.invoice.paid → flips the CANCELLED booking back to PAID (see H14). Money already collected on a later-cancelled flow has no refund mechanism. Fix: cancel()/reject() must cancel/expire the open invoices in the same transaction; wire markInvoiceAsRefunded to a real staff refund endpoint; make advanceBookingOnPayment refuse terminal-status bookings.

H17. cancelTrainSchedule has no status guard — a DISPATCHED/ARRIVED train can be cancelled

File: train-scheduling/train-scheduling.service.ts:3226-3311 (unguarded at train-scheduling.controller.ts:817). Every sibling transition checks status; this one goes straight to the cancel transaction. Impact: cancelling a DISPATCHED train sets every pinned wagon's currentYardId = originStationId ("never left") while they're rolling; releases the locomotives out on this run to AVAILABLE; detaches IN_TRANSIT bookings while their cargo stays IN_TRANSIT. The frontend only shows Cancel for DRAFT/SCHEDULED (TrainScheduleV2ListPage.tsx:439-469) — the API enforces nothing. Fix: reject unless ['DRAFT','SCHEDULED'].includes(schedule.status).

H18. executeReschedule is not transactional — a mid-flight failure strands the schedule half-rescheduled

File: scheduling-reschedule/scheduling-reschedule.service.ts:131-210 — four separately-committed steps (persist new date → unassign each displaced booking → assignBookingsToSchedule → audit event). Step 3 routinely throws (re-validates against the new date persisted in step 1). Result: date already moved, displaced bookings already gone, no audit event, 400 to staff. Fix: run the whole execute in one dataSource.transaction, threading the manager through unassign/assign.

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5. MEDIUM — scheduling, bookings, cargo, containers

M1. Cargo delivery never releases the container (counts itself)

File: cargoes/cargoes.service.ts:159-175 — sets cargo.status = 'DELIVERED' in memory, then counts LOADED cargo on the container before saving, so the cargo being delivered counts itself → remaining >= 1 always → the container is never flipped back to AVAILABLE. Fix: save the cargo first, or exclude the current id: count({ where: { containerId, status: 'LOADED', id: Not(cargo.id) } }).

M2. Cargo unload leaves the container marked LOADED

File: cargoes.service.ts:139-147 — unloadCargo sets cargo UNLOADED but never touches container.status (which loadCargo set to LOADED). Emptied containers read as in-use forever. Fix: on unload, if no remaining LOADED cargo references the container, reset it to AVAILABLE.

M3. Container↔wagon assignment: no capacity/duplicate guard; status wrongly AVAILABLE

File: container-management/containers.service.ts:113-136 — MAX(position)+1 check-then-act with no (wagon_id, position) unique constraint; no check that the container is already on another wagon (silently overwrites wagonId); sets status = 'AVAILABLE' for a container physically on a wagon (so it reads free for another assignment). (There's also a dead containers.service copy.ts duplicate.) Fix: reject when the container already has a wagonId; enforce wagon capacity; unique (wagon_id, position) + allocate in a transaction; use a distinct on-wagon status.

M4. Interchange document state machine holes

File: interchange-documents/interchange-documents.service.ts:182-206 — dispute has no status guard (a CANCELLED or ACKNOWLEDGED doc can be flipped to DISPUTED); acknowledge guards only CANCELLED, so an already-DISPUTED doc can be quietly ACKNOWLEDGED (losing the dispute). Fix: restrict dispute to GENERATED/ACKNOWLEDGED; restrict acknowledge to GENERATED.

M5. Interchange item weight mixes tons and kg in one column

File: interchange-documents.service.ts:238-361 — the weight column is COALESCEd from tons sources (total_vgm_tons, cargo_total_weight_vgm) and kg sources (containers.max_gross_weight, cargoes.weight // kg). Different line items in the same customs handover carry weights ~1000× apart. Fix: normalize every source to one unit before writing.

M6. Cargo load/create allow weight over container capacity

File: cargoes.service.ts:114-137 — loadCargo sets cargo.weight = dto.weight (@Min(0) only), never compared to the container's maxGrossWeight, no aggregate across cargoes. Fix: verify tare + sum(loaded) ≤ maxGrossWeight (mind M5's units) and reject overflow.

M7. Reschedule changes the departure date without any of updateScheduleDate's validation

File: scheduling-reschedule.service.ts:151-157 vs train-scheduling.service.ts:781-865 — the reschedule/maintenance path writes scheduledDepartureDate directly: no PRE_WINDOW check, no lead-window rejection, no re-derivation of windowOpensAt/ClosesAt/Phase, no route+day group re-anchor, and past dates are accepted (never compared to now; only the dialog checks client-side). Windows keep the timing computed for the OLD date. Fix: delegate to updateScheduleDate (or replicate its checks) and validate newDepartureDate > now.

M8. compareSchedulingPriority sorts null-date bookings FIRST (comment says last)

File: scheduling/compare-scheduling-priority.util.ts:4-6,20-22 — null scheduledDate → getTime() falls back to 0 (epoch), ascending sort puts it first. In previewReschedule this decides who is retained when capacity is tight → a general-contract booking with no date outranks customers who booked a concrete slot. Fix: fall back to Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER, not 0.

M9. Assigning bookings never checks the booking's day matches the schedule's departure day

File: train-scheduling.service.ts:1226-1259 + 3321-3618 — the parity guard's comment claims day-fit is enforced "downstream", but validateBookingsForScheduling never reads dto.scheduleDate or compares booking.scheduledDate. A booking a customer picked for Jul 25 can be assigned to a train departing Jul 17, silently. Fix: add a violation (or forceAssign warning) when eatDay(booking.scheduledDate) !== eatDay(schedule departure).

M10. Partial unassignBooking frees the booking but not its wagon slots/totals

File: train-scheduling.service.ts:1492-1541 — TrainSetWagon slots and TrainSet aggregates are only reset when the train becomes fully empty. Remove 1 of 3 bookings → tonnage/length/wagonCount stay stale, empty slots stay RESERVED with wagons pinned, free-capacity under-reports (can hide the day from customers), dispatch sends the empty pinned wagons. Fix: after a partial unassign, release the emptied slots and recompute totals from surviving allocations.

M11. Displaced-booking fallback leaves the booking still linked to the schedule

File: scheduling-reschedule.service.ts:159-168 — on unassign failure the catch only flips scheduling fields; it doesn't delete the TrainScheduleBooking link, clear trainScheduleId, or free allocations. The booking becomes ELIGIBLE for batch fills and still linked → double-booking; its stale trainScheduleId also blocks manual assignment elsewhere. Fix: in the fallback, delete the link + allocations and set trainScheduleId: null (or re-throw and abort).

M12. Reschedule notifies "rescheduled to a new date" even when the date didn't change

File: scheduling-reschedule.service.ts:204-235 — effectiveDeparture falls back to the (never-null) existing date, so the if (newDeparture) branch always runs → a GOVERNMENT_PREEMPT rebalance with no date change SMS/email-blasts every retained customer "rescheduled to <same date>". Fix: const effectiveDeparture = dto.newDepartureDate ? new Date(dto.newDepartureDate) : null;

M13. Maintenance reschedule endpoint bypasses DTO validation & drops caller bookings

File: scheduling-reschedule.controller.ts:56-65 (body typed as an intersection PreviewRescheduleDto & { … } → Nest emits Object metadata → ValidationPipe is skipped, so newDepartureDate: "garbage" and missing arrays reach the service) + scheduling-reschedule.service.ts:257-283 (preview uses currentIds.length ? currentIds : dto.incomingBookingIds, so caller-supplied incoming ids are dropped on a non-empty train, then execute re-runs with dto.incomingBookingIds → the displaced-set equality check can 400). Fix: real MaintenanceRescheduleDto extends PreviewRescheduleDto with @IsDateString() newDepartureDate; merge currentIds ∪ dto.incomingBookingIds for both preview and execute.

M14. Routes editable (milestones deleted, endpoints swapped) while live schedules reference them

File: routes/routes.service.ts:108-140 — update() deletes+rewrites milestones and origin/destination with no check for DRAFT/SCHEDULED/DISPATCHED schedules on the route. Schedules read the corridor live afterward (sub-leg validation, checkpoints, customer day pool), so a reroute silently invalidates boarding bookings and renumbers stations mid-run. Fix: reject milestone/endpoint changes when any non-terminal schedule references the route (allow status-only edits).

M15. Workspace capacity meter sums locomotive limits; API caps at the weakest locomotive

File: .../components/trainScheduling/ScheduleWorkspacePanel.tsx:98-109 (reduce(sum + maxPullWeightTons)) vs train-capacity.util.ts:242-260 + service 1349-1389 (minLocomotiveLimits — the weakest locomotive caps the train; gate is cargo + consist tare). Two 3500T locos → the meter shows 7000T and "43% full" while the API already rejects adds at ~3500T gross; the overfill warning fires on the wrong threshold. Fix: capacity = min(maxPullWeightTons) + min(overageToleranceTons), and include consist tare in used.

M16. Vehicles under maintenance stay assignable; maintenance never changes availability

File: maintenance/* never writes vehicle.status/availability; maintenance.service.ts:36-46 COMPLETED doesn't restore anything; assignment paths check only availability, never VehicleStatus.MAINTENANCE. Impact: a vehicle in the shop can be dispatched; marking a vehicle MAINTENANCE doesn't block assignment. Fix: on maintenance start set the vehicle unavailable, on completion restore, and reject MAINTENANCE/OUT_OF_SERVICE/RETIRED at assignment.

M17. Fuel purchases accept negative/zero quantities, no duplicate guard

File: fuel/dto/create-fuel-purchase.dto.ts:11-15 (liters, costPerLiter are @IsNumber() only) → fuel.service.ts:18 totalCost = liters * costPerLiter. Negative liters → negative monthly totals & averages, poisoning Financial Reports/Fleet Dashboard; no (vehicleId, receiptNumber) uniqueness → double-counting. Fix: @IsPositive() on both; reject duplicate (vehicleId, receiptNumber).

M18. Public OTP verify: no expiry, no rate limit, no attempt cap, replayable

File: otp/otp.service.ts:94-120 (verifyOtp, exposed @Public() at otp.controller.ts:22-63) — a 6-digit code (1e6 space) with unlimited attempts, no age check, and only flagged verified=true on success (the same code keeps working). The hardened verifyOtpForAction (TTL + 5-attempt cap + delete-on-success) exists but this route doesn't use it. Fix: give verifyOtp the same TTL/attempt-cap/consume semantics; rate-limit the public OTP routes.

M19. OTP generated with Math.random() (not a CSPRNG)

File: otp/otp.service.ts:27-29 — this gates password reset (forgot-password.service.ts:134) and contract-signature sudo. Predictable codes weaken account-takeover resistance. Fix: crypto.randomInt(100000, 1000000).

M20. OTP send is public & unthrottled — SMS/email bombing + counter reset

File: otp/otp.controller.ts:33-42 (@Public() POST /otp/send) + otp.service.ts:35-88 (each send does actionAttempts.delete(...), resetting the in-memory brute-force counter — attacker-controllable, and per-process anyway). Fix: rate-limit per target + per IP; move the attempt counter to persistent storage.

M21. Email notifications silently discarded while reporting success

File: notifications/strategies/notification.email.strategy.ts:8-11 — send() logs and return false; (stub). notifications.service.ts:25-32 directSend awaits it, logs is sent - false, and neither throws nor surfaces the failure. Every email notification (booking lifecycle, contracts, companies, booking-window) silently never sends. Fix: implement the strategy (or route through the working EmailClientService); make directSend treat false/throw as an observable failure.

M22. Rate "CEO approval" is self-approvable (no segregation of duties)

File: rule-engine/services/rates.service.ts:186-208 + rates.controller.ts:61-76 — submit and approve share the identical @RuleEngineManage('rates') permission, and approve never checks approverUserId !== proposedByStaffId. One staffer can draft→submit→approve LIVE. (Same in priority-rule-change-requests.service.ts:78-112.) Fix: distinct approver permission + reject self-approval.

M23. Uploads accept arbitrary type & unbounded size

File: drivers/drivers.controller.ts:74-82 (AnyFilesInterceptor(), no limits/fileFilter) + files/files.service.ts:36-55 (stores whatever mime/size). file.buffer held in memory → DoS; executables/active-HTML then served inline via the public files route (H13). The file-upload-settings config exists but isn't enforced. Fix: Multer limits.fileSize + mime allowlist (driven by file-upload-settings), validated in FilesService.upload.

M24. Incidents controller: full CRUD + IDOR for any authenticated user

File: incidents/incidents.controller.ts:17-69 — no permission guard on any route (sibling fleet modules all use @BookingStaff). A portal customer can read any driver's incident history by driverId and create/alter/delete incident records. Fix: class-level @BookingStaff(FREIGHT_PERMS.incidents.view) + per-write permissions.

M25. Tracking timeline IDOR

File: tracking/tracking.controller.ts:11-17 — GET /:consignmentId has no guard/ownership check; any logged-in user reads any consignment's full movement history by iterating UUIDs. Fix: permission guard + scope to the caller's company.

M26. Clearance-fee gate silently waived when the fee snapshot is missing

File: contracts/clearance-fee.service.ts:80-87 — gateApplies returns false (skipping the prepay gate, warn-log only) whenever no CUSTOMS_CLEARANCE snapshot line exists, and contract-pricing.service.ts:262-284 falls back to a stale stored breakdown. A customs contract whose price predates the fee feature ships clearance for free. Fix: for customsClearingEnabled contracts, hard-fail counter-sign/shipment-request when no fee line resolves.

M27. Manual settlement / updateStatus gaps in the invoice state machine

File: billing.service.ts:577-609 (recordPayment guards Cancelled/Refunded/Paid but not Draft/Expired → an expired invoice can be settled at the counter, resurrecting a released flow) and 889-907 (updateStatus accepts any target including Paid without touching paidAmount/balanceAmount → a PAID invoice with a full outstanding balance). Fix: add Draft/Expired to the reject list; restrict updateStatus to the Draft→Issued transition it's actually used for.

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6. LOW — hardening & latent bugs

• L1. Decommission ignores coupling — locomotives.service.ts:121-133 sets OUT_OF_SERVICE with no TrainLocomotive check (live-confirmed: decommissioned a coupled loco, 200). Train keeps hauling with a dead loco on paper; capacityTons not recomputed. → link-table guard.
• L2. Builder accepts ASSIGNED/UNAVAILABLE locomotives — train-builder.service.ts:653 blocks only OUT_OF_SERVICE/MAINTENANCE; a loco out on a dispatched run (ASSIGNED) can be coupled to a new train. → allowlist AVAILABLE/IMPORT_READY/EXPORT_READY.
• L3. Legacy PATCH /trains/:id — trains.service.ts:50-55 Object.assign lets status/capacityTons/code/trainNumber be rewritten (unfreeze a dispatched train, break the weakest-loco capacity, code/number clashes → 500 or silent collision). → strip those fields; run the builder's clash query.
• L4. PATCH /train-builder/:id/details skips even/odd run-number rule — update-train-details.dto.ts:17-29 lacks the @Matches(/…[13579]$/ | …[02468]$/) the build DTO enforces → can set IMPORT number odd. → copy the decorators.
• L5. Legacy reorder ignores trainId — wagons.service.ts:271-287 (_trainId unused) renumbers any wagon list to 1..n with no set-equality check → duplicate sequences on other trains. → validate set equality vs find({ where: { trainId } }).
• L6. Wagon type soft-deletable while in use — wagon-types.service.ts:114-117 no reference check; soft-deleted type → wagon.wagonType loads null → builder length/tare math silently zeroes. → block when wagons reference it.
• L7. Facilities create/update are dead — facilities/dto/*.dto.ts are plain interfaces (no decorators) under a forbidNonWhitelisted pipe → every non-empty body 400s, empty body 500s. → decorate the DTOs + code-uniqueness check.
• L8. Yard soft-delete has no reference guard — rule-engine/services/yards.service.ts:62-66 strands trains/locos/wagons parked there (their current_yard_id scalar survives but joins miss). → count references, 409.
• L9. Wagon create incoherent state — wagons.service.ts:27-37 accepts trainId while status defaults AVAILABLE (violates attached⇒ASSIGNED); duplicate wagonNumber → 500 not 409. → drop trainId/sequenceNumber from create DTO, uniqueness pre-check.
• L10. Locomotive code generation is a read-scan race — locomotives.service.ts:40-48 scans all rows for max LOCO-NNN; concurrent creates collide → 500. → MAX(SUBSTRING…) + probe loop or a sequence.
• L11. Train.capacityTons stale after a coupled loco's pull limit is edited — locomotives.service.ts:87-119 has no recompute hook; list vs detail disagree. → recompute for trains found via TrainLocomotive.
• L12. GET /facilities/:id returns 200 null, DELETE succeeds for unknown ids — facilities.service.ts:20-30 (every sibling 404s). → throw NotFound.
• L13. Import customs flow has no ordering/terminal guards — import-operations.service.ts:102-210: duties-paid before notify, risk changed after completion, no terminal lock. → state + completedAt guards.
• L14. Consignment create doesn't validate the referenced booking — consignments.service.ts:14-17 persists the DTO directly (bookingId only @IsUUID). → existence check.
• L15. Incident & maintenance status transitions unvalidated — incidents.service.ts:64-71, maintenance.service.ts:36-46 accept any status (REPORTED→CLOSED, SCHEDULED→COMPLETED). → allowed-transition checks.
• L16. Maintenance cost fields accept negatives — maintenance/dto/create-maintenance.dto.ts estimatedCost/actualCost/costAmount no @Min(0). → add it.
• L17. Procurement depreciation accepts inverted money — procurement/dto/procurement.dto.ts:89-99 (no @Min(0)) + procurement.service.ts:120-131: salvageValue > cost → negative monthly depreciation → bookValue grows unbounded. → @Min(0) + salvage <= cost.
• L18. notification-inbox fan-out is sequential N+1 — notification-inbox.service.ts:62-64 per-recipient create+countUnread+findOne. → batch/parallelize (it's fire-and-forget, so slow not broken).
• L19. GPS history limit unguarded vs NaN/negative — gps-tracking.controller.ts:38 passes parseInt through; ?limit=abc→NaN, ?limit=-5→negative take. → clamp to a positive int.
• L20. Hardcoded default JWT secret — @edr/api-common shared-auth.module.js falls back to a public constant if JWT_SECRET is unset (mitigated by the session-row check). → ensure JWT_SECRET always set in the environment.

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7. Backoffice / portal frontend mismatches (already folded into findings above)

• Locomotive/Wagon fleet edit forms PATCH the whole form object (FleetResourcePage.tsx:301, resources.ts:168-169,273-279) → the accidental trigger for H1/H2.
• AssignWagonDialog.tsx:22-24 — status === Available || !w.trainId should be && (H5).
• WagonYardWorkspaceModal.tsx — "Assigned→Available" flip picks an arbitrary slice including coupled wagons (H6).
• ScheduleWorkspacePanel.tsx:98-109 — capacity meter sums loco limits instead of the weakest (M15).
• InvoiceDetailPage.tsx:129-131 / PayClearanceFeeButton.tsx:121-125 — pay button shows totalAmount, backend charges balanceAmount; the correct amountDue line is commented out → a 60%-paid invoice tells the customer they'll pay the full total. Also a leftover console.log(paymentMethod) at line 71.
• Reflected XSS on the public checkout page — billing/payment.controller.ts:100-103,156-176 interpolates provider error message/status/intentId unescaped into @Public() HTML. → HTML-escape or return a generic message.
• Portal tracking/consignments pages are still mock-backed (portal/src/pages/tracking/shipments.mock.ts, consignments.mock.ts) — they show mock data, not live consignments.

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8. What is working correctly (verified, not bugs)

So the report is balanced — these were checked and are sound:

• Train-builder same-yard enforcement at build and attach (rejected my cross-yard attempts with clear 400s).
• Double-coupling a locomotive → 409 already coupled to train … (guard works).
• train-builder yard change correctly relocates the whole consist (locos + wagons follow).
• Dispatch / arrive / finalize status guards, dispatch train-number pooling with pessimistic locks, route direction derivation and segment ordering, EAT-timezone math in batch-window.util.ts (no string date comparisons).
• Booking cancellation can't leak reserved capacity (only pre-reservation statuses cancellable); approval-step sequencing; allocateContainers and interchange generation are properly transactional.
• GT06 GPS codec coordinate/CRC/UTC decoding correct.
• notification-inbox WebSocket auth, signatures, backoffice role management (blocks reserved roles), forgot-password/customer-reset (use the hardened OTP + single-use IAM tickets) — all scope correctly.
• Clearance-fee migration 2260 itself is sound (nullable/defaulted, IF NOT EXISTS); the gate enforcement on document upload is correct on both contract and booking sides (the bugs are around it — M26, and C1–C3 letting the fee be "paid" for free).

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9. Boot-log noise (environment, not code bugs)

• SMS + Email over RabbitMQ fail: Handshake terminated by server: 403 (ACCESS-REFUSED) … Login was refused using authentication mechanism PLAIN — broker credentials for the dev environment. (Compounds M21: email is doubly dead — stub strategy and no broker.)
• Swagger duplicate-DTO warnings: UpdateProfileDto, RequestChangesDto, SignContractDto each defined twice with different schemas ("will throw in the next major version"). Rename the duplicates.
• LegacyRouteConverter warning on /api/* — path-to-regexp v6 wants /api/*path.

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10. Test-data side effects from this audit (please review)

I drove real writes against edr_freight. Net state:

1. Created train TR-00002 (exportTrainNumber 9901, importTrainNumber 9902, name "QA-TEST-TRAIN") — then deleted it (cleaned up).
2. Destroyed wagon BW1-0009 (original UUID 905cad62-1b12-46a0-9268-bacbf115e787) via the hard-delete bug (H3). I recreated it via the API — new UUID d9b578ed-e65a-48f6-9ae2-fb8239451460, AVAILABLE, in KALITY, same wagon type. The wagon count is whole again; only the UUID changed (its old wagon_movements ledger was cascade-deleted and cannot be recovered).
3. Locomotives briefly moved during the yard-divergence repro (LOCO-004, LOCO-023, LOCO-025) — all restored to KALITY / their original yards. LOCO-004 was briefly set OUT_OF_SERVICE by the decommission test and restored to AVAILABLE.

No other records were mutated. (A raw-SQL restore of the original wagon UUID was intentionally not performed — the DB-write guard blocked it, and re-inserting via the API is the correct, app-logic-respecting cleanup.)

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11. Prioritized fix roadmap

Do first (security / money — a customer or attacker can exploit these today):

1. C1 — remove the DEMO auto-settle in billing.service.ts:973.
2. C2 / H13 — auth-guard mark-paid, payments/initiate, payments/checkout, payments/receipt, and files/:id.
3. C3 + C4 — unify currency units and enforce amount verification at settlement.
4. C5 — enable Telebirr/D-Money webhook signature checks.
5. C6 / H10 / H11 / H12 / M24 / M25 — add ownership/permission guards to booking writes, import-operations, interchange-documents, contract-sign, incidents, tracking.

Do next (data integrity — the consist family, one structural fix): 6. H1–H7 + L1–L2: the TrainLocomotive/wagon.trainId coupling guard on every locomotive/wagon mutation (this is your reported bug and its whole family). Switch DELETE to soft-delete. 7. H8/H9 capacity & consolidation locks; H17 cancel-status guard; H18 transactional reschedule.

Then (correctness): M1–M27 (container release, weight units, scheduling day/priority/notification bugs, OTP hardening, self-approval).

Finally (hardening): the L-series + the frontend dirty-field / display fixes in §7.

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Report generated from a live run of pnpm run dev:freight plus a full read of the in-scope modules. Every "live-confirmed" item has a reproduced request/response above; every code finding cites file:line.

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ADDENDUM — Fixes Applied (2026-07-16)

All 18 High + 27 Medium findings were fixed. Critical (C1–C6) and Low (L-series) were left untouched per the request (except L1, which shares the H1 guard). Applied across ~35 backend files + 3 frontend files via 6 partitioned edit passes.

Verification status

• turbo run type-check --filter=@edr/freight-api → clean (0 errors).
• Web apps: freight-portal clean; freight-backoffice fails only on the pre-existing user-management/web-Management/** errors (documented, none in edited files).
• scheduling-reschedule.service.spec → 5/5 pass (updated for the H18 transaction + a future-dated fixture for the new M7 past-date guard).
• App boots clean on 3030; migration 2280000000000-WagonNumberPartialUnique applied and recorded (partial unique index UQ_wagons_wagon_number_active verified live).

Live-verified fixes (real requests against the running app)

• H1 — PATCH /locomotives/:id on a coupled loco → 409 "coupled to train TR-00002; move the train instead" (yard) and 409 "detach it before changing its status" (status). This is your reported bug — now behaves exactly as requested.
• L1 — decommission coupled loco → 409.
• H2 — PATCH /wagons/:id yard on coupled wagon → 409; sending trainId → 400 "property trainId should not exist".
• H3 — DELETE /wagons/:id on coupled wagon → 409, wagon survives (data-loss bug closed); delete now uses softRemove.
• H4 — DELETE /trains/:id on a built train → frees wagon (AVAILABLE, unlinked) + both locos, soft-deletes the train (tombstone row, not stranded).

What each pass changed (high level)

• Fleet (H1–H7, L1): coupling guard (train_locomotives / wagon.trainId) on every legacy loco/wagon mutation; assignToTrain tightened to builder rules; bulk-status/bulk-transfer/unassign refuse coupled/pinned wagons; hard-delete → soft-delete (+ migration); frontend AssignWagonDialog ||→&&, workspace modal excludes coupled wagons.
• Scheduling (H17, M8–M10, M14, M15): cancel status-guard; null-date sort fixed; booking-day match check; partial-unassign now releases slots + recomputes TrainSet totals; route edit blocked while live schedules reference it; capacity meter uses weakest loco.
• Reschedule (H18, M7, M11–M13): date+event wrapped in one transaction; newDepartureDate > now guard; real MaintenanceRescheduleDto (validation no longer skipped); merged incoming-booking set; retained-customer notice only when the date actually moves; displaced-fallback clears trainScheduleId.
• Bookings/Billing/Contracts (H8, H9, H12, H14–H16, M26, M27): export-capacity + consolidation now lock the row (FOR UPDATE) and re-check before reserving; payment idempotency guard restored (won't resurrect CANCELLED/advanced); cancel/reject expire open invoices; contract-sign requires ownership + verifies OTP against the company's registered phone; pricing honors frozen contract-rate snapshots; clearance-fee gate hard-fails instead of waiving; invoice state-machine gaps closed.
• Cargo/Containers/Customs (M1–M6, H10, H11): container release counts fixed (exclude-self); unload frees container; load rejects over-capacity; container→wagon assign rejects double-assign + wraps position in a txn; interchange state-machine guarded; interchange item weights normalized to tons; import-operations + interchange-documents controllers now permission-guarded.
• Ops/Auth/Files (H13, M16–M25): file download requires auth; incidents + tracking guarded; maintenance flips vehicle status/availability; fuel rejects non-positive + duplicate receipts; OTP uses CSPRNG + TTL/attempt-cap/consume-on-success, send no longer resets the brute-force counter; email strategy implemented + failures surfaced; rate/priority self-approval blocked; driver uploads size/type-limited.

Residual / partial (flagged in code with TODOs — intentional, safe)

• H18 cross-service (un)assign calls still run their own transactions (can't thread the manager without editing the scheduling core); date+event are atomic.
• M7 kept the raw date write + >now guard; booking-window fields are not re-derived (delegating to updateScheduleDate would wrongly require PRE_WINDOW).
• M11 best-effort detach (clears trainScheduleId); the link-row/allocation delete lives in the scheduling core.
• M13 format is enforced; newDepartureDate is validated-when-present but not strictly required (parent DTO marks it optional).
• M15 meter capped at weakest loco; consist tare isn't available client-side.
• M16 maintenance sets vehicle status; the assignment-side reject lives in the excluded first/last-mile modules (out of scope).
• M20 counter-reset removed; per-IP/per-target throttling is a TODO (no Throttler in the codebase yet).
• M22 self-approval blocked for normal staff; super admins are exempt (full backoffice authority — verified live: propose→submit→self-approve → LIVE). Both rates and priority-rule change requests. A distinct CEO/approver permission is still recommended (TODO).
• M24 reused real drivers.* permission keys (no incidents:* key exists yet — TODO to add one).
• M25 view-guarded; company-scoping the query is a TODO.
• H13 download now authenticated; ownership-by-resource + signed-URL previews are the next step (inline previews that relied on anonymous access will 401 until the frontend uses signUrl).
• H15 frozen rates cover base rail + surcharges + first/last-mile; a rare container-fallback line keeps the live rate.
• M3 position race narrowed by a txn; a (wagon_id, position) unique index is the full fix (TODO).

Not committed. All changes are in the working tree only.